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Abstract
Framed in positive terms, this report examines how technical AI
research might be steered in a manner that is more attentive to hu-
manity’s long-term prospects for survival as a species. In negative
terms, we ask what existential risks humanity might face from AI
development in the next century, and by what principles contempo-
rary technical research might be directed to address those risks.
A key property of hypothetical AI technologies is introduced,
called prepotence, which is useful for delineating a variety of poten-
tial existential risks from artificial intelligence, even as AI paradigms
might shift. A set of twenty-nine contemporary research directions
are then examined for their potential benefit to existential safety.
Each research direction is explained with a scenario-driven motiva-
tion, and examples of existing work from which to build. The research
directions present their own risks and benefits to society that could
occur at various scales of impact, and in particular are not guaran-
teed to benefit existential safety if major developments in them are
deployed without adequate forethought and oversight. As such, each
direction is accompanied by a consideration of potentially negative
side effects.
Taken more broadly, the twenty-nine explanations of the research
directions also illustrate a highly rudimentary methodology for dis-
cussing and assessing potential risks and benefits of research direc-
tions, in terms of their impact on global catastrophic risks. This
impact assessment methodology is very far from maturity, but seems
valuable to highlight and improve upon as AI capabilities expand.
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Preface
At the time of writing, the prospect of artificial intelligence (AI) posing an
existential risk to humanity is not a topic explicitly discussed at length in
any technical research agenda known to the present authors. Given that
existential risk from artificial intelligence seems physically possible, and
potentially very important, there are number of historical factors that might
have led to the current paucity of technical-level writing about it:
1) Existential safety involves many present and future stakeholders
(Bostrom, 2013), and is therefore a difficult objective for any single
researcher to pursue.
2) The field of computer science, with AI and machine learning as sub-
fields, has not had a culture of evaluating, in written publications, the
potential negative impacts of new technologies (Hecht et al., 2018).
3) Most work potentially relevant to existential safety is also relevant to
smaller-scale safety and ethics problems (Amodei et al., 2016; Cave
and ÓhÉigeartaigh, 2019), and is therefore more likely to be explained
with reference to those applications for the sake of concreteness.
4) The idea of existential risk from artificial intelligence was first popu-
larized as a science-fiction trope rather than a topic of serious inquiry
(Rees, 2013; Bohannon, 2015), and recent media reports have leaned
heavily on these sensationalist fictional depictions, a deterrent for
some academics.
We hope to address (1) not by successfully unilaterally forecasting the fu-
ture of technology as it pertains to existential safety, but by inviting others
to join in the discussion. Counter to (2), we are upfront in our examina-
tion of risks. Point (3) is a feature, not a bug: many principles relevant to
existential safety have concrete, present-day analogues in safety and ethics
with potential to yield fruitful collaborations. Finally, (4) is best treated by
simply moving past such shallow examinations of the future, toward more
deliberate and analytical methods.
Our primary intended audience is that of AI researchers (of all levels)
with some preexisting level of intellectual or practical interest in existential
safety, who wish to begin thinking about some of the technical challenges it
might raise. For researchers already intimately familiar with the large vol-
ume of contemporary thinking on existential risk from artificial intelligence
(much of it still informally written, non-technical, or not explicitly framed
in terms of existential risk), we hope that some use may be found in our
categorization of problem areas and the research directions themselves.
Our primary goal is not to make the case for existential risk from artifi-
cial intelligence as a likely eventuality, or existential safety as an overriding
ethical priority, nor do we argue for any particular prioritization among
the research directions presented here. Rather, our goal is to illustrate how
researchers already concerned about existential safety might begin thinking
about the topic from a number of different technical perspectives. In doing
this, we also neglect many non-existential safety and social issues surround-
ing AI systems. The absence of such discussions in this document is in no
way intended as an appraisal of their importance, but simply a result of
our effort to keep this report relatively focused in its objective, yet varied
in its technical perspective.
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The arches of the Acueducto de Segovia, thought to have been
constructed circa the first century AD (De Feo et al., 2013).
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1 Introduction
AI technology has the potential to alleviate poverty, automate medical re-
search, accelerate clean energy development, and enhance human cognitive
abilities. Such developments would have been difficult to imagine in concrete
terms 100 years ago, but are not inconceivable now. If the worldwide AI
research and development community is vigilant in distributing the benefits
of these technologies fairly and equitably to all of humanity, global human
welfare could be drastically and permanently improved.
Unfortunately, any human extinction event would mean humanity ceases
or fails to ever enjoy these marvelous benefits. The purpose of this report is
to consider research directions in terms of their potential to steer away from
human extinction risks, toward globally safer outcomes for humanity. While
it is very difficult to forecast whether any particular research direction will
lead to an increase in risk to society, it may still be possible for researchers
to steer research in safer and more beneficial directions, if we are collectively
attentive and mindful of the potential for both risks and benefits as new
capabilities are developed. Since it is common for researchers to discuss the
potential benefits of their work, this report is focussed almost entirely on
risk.
Why focus on human extinction risk, and not global catastrophic risks
more broadly? For two reasons: relative concreteness, and agreeability.
Many principles for mitigating existential risks also apply to mitigating
global catastrophic risks in general. However, thinking about the potential
for future global catastrophic risks from artificial intelligence, while morally
compelling, involves a great deal of speculation.
Discussions in computer science can be more focused if there is a con-
crete and agreeably important outcome in mind, and the survival of the hu-
man species is one such an outcome that is relatively concrete and broadly
agreeably important in the landscape of global catastrophic risks.
1.1 Motivation
Taking a positive view of artificial intelligence, the aim of this report is
to examine how technical AI research might be steered in manner that is
more sensitive to humanity’s long-term prospects for survival in co-existence
with AI technology. In negative terms, the aim is to consider how human
extinction could occur if artificial intelligence plays a significant role in that
event, and what principles might help us to avoid such an event.
If human extinction were to occur within the next century, it seems
exceedingly likely that human activities would have precipitated the ex-
tinction event. The reason is simple: nature has not changed much in the
past 10,000 years, and given that nature on its own has not yielded a hu-
man extinction event for the past 100 centuries, it is not a priori likely for
a natural human extinction event to occur in the next century. (Indeed, a
naive application of Laplace’s law of succession would yield a probability
estimate of at most around 1%.) By contrast, within this century, human
extinction could occur through a variety of anthropogenic pathways, includ-
ing bio-terrorism, climate change, nuclear winter, or catastrophic artificial
intelligence developments (Matheny, 2007; Bostrom, 2013). This report is
focused on the latter.
Unfortunately, there are numerous pitfalls of human reasoning and co-
ordination that mean human extinction in particular is not a problem we
should expect to avoid by default:
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“We may be poorly equipped to recognize or plan for extinction
risks (Yudkowsky, 2008b). We may not be good at grasping the
significance of very large numbers (catastrophic outcomes) or
very small numbers (probabilities) over large time frames. We
struggle with estimating the probabilities of rare or unprece-
dented events (Kunreuther et al., 2001). Policymakers may not
plan far beyond current political administrations and rarely do
risk assessments value the existence of future generations [For
an exception, see Kent (2004).] We may unjustifiably discount
the value of future lives. Finally, extinction risks are market fail-
ures where an individual enjoys no perceptible benefit from his
or her investment in risk reduction. Human survival may thus
be a good requiring deliberate policies to protect.” –Matheny
(2007), Reducing the risk of human extinction.
In an effort to avoid some of these shortfalls of reasoning and coordina-
tion, this document examines how the development of artificial intelligence
(AI) specifically could lead to human extinction, and outlines how various
directions of technical research could conceivably be steered to reduce that
risk.
Aside from wishing to avert existential risks in general, there are several
reasons to take seriously the objective of reducing existential risk from
artificial intelligence specifically:
1. A variety of advanced AI capabilities could be sufficient to pose ex-
istential risks. A central theme of this report, argued further in
Section 2, will be that artificial intelligence does not need to meet
the conditions of “human-level AI” (Nilsson, 2005), “artificial general
intelligence” (Goertzel and Pennachin, 2007), or “superintelligence”
(Bostrom, 1998) to become a source of existential risk to humanity.
It is conceivable that increasingly capable AI systems could lead to
human extinction without ever achieving human-level intelligence or
fully general reasoning capabilities.
2. The AI development timeline is unknown. AI development has en-
tered a period of high activity and abundant funding. In the past, AI
research has cycled through periods of excitement and stagnation. “AI
winter” is a term used for a period of reduced funding and interest
in AI. It was previously believed that the current period of activity
might terminate with an AI winter sometime in the 2010s (Hendler,
2008), but this does not seem to have occurred. Others believe that
another AI winter could be yet to come. Grace et al. (2018) conducted
a 2016 survey of the 1634 researchers who published in NIPS 2015,
and found great variation among the respondents, but a majority
of respondents believing “High-level machine intelligence” would be
achieved within a century:
Our survey used the following definition:
‘High-level machine intelligence’ (HLMI) is achieved
when unaided machines can accomplish every task
better and more cheaply than human workers.
Each individual respondent estimated the probability of
HLMI arriving in future years. Taking the mean over each
individual, the aggregate forecast gave a 50% chance of
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HLMI occurring within 45 years and a 10% chance of it
occurring within 9 years. [...] There is large inter-subject
variation: [...] Asian respondents expect HLMI in 30 years,
whereas North Americans expect it in 74 years. [...] Respon-
dents were asked whether HLMI would have a positive or
negative impact on humanity over the long run. They as-
signed probabilities to outcomes on a five-point scale. The
median probability was 25% for a “good” outcome and 20%
for an “extremely good” outcome. By contrast, the probabil-
ity was 10% for a bad outcome and 5% for an outcome de-
scribed as “Extremely Bad (e.g., human extinction).” Forty-
eight percent of respondents think that research on mini-
mizing the risks of AI should be prioritized by society more
than the status quo (with only 12% wishing for less).
Given this variation in opinion, combined with the consensus that
HLMI will most likely be developed in this century, it seems pru-
dent to direct some immediate research attention at managing the
concomitant risks.
3. Safe and powerful AI systems could reduce existential risk. If safe and
robust AI technologies continue to be developed, AI technology could
in principle be used to automate a wide range of preventive measures
for averting other catastrophes, thus serving to reduce existential risk
(Yudkowsky, 2008a).
1.2 Safety versus existential safety
This report is about existential safety. What is the relationship between
existential safety and safety for present-day AI systems? The answer can
be summarized as follows:
1) Deployments of present-day AI technologies do not present existential
risks. Today’s AI systems are too limited in both their capabilities
and their scope of application for their deployment to present risks at
an existential scale.
2) Present-day AI deployments present safety issues which, if solved,
could be relevant to existential safety. For instance, the deployment
of present-day autonomous vehicles present risks to individual human
lives. Solutions to such safety problems that generalize well to more
powerful AI capabilities could be used to improve existential safety
for future AI technologies. On the other hand, safety techniques that
work for present-day AI technologies but fail to generalize for more
powerful AI systems could yield a false sense of security and lead
to existential safety problems later. Questioning which safety tech-
niques and methodologies will generalize well is an important source
of research problems.
3) Present-day AI deployments present non-safety issues which could
later become relevant to existential safety. For instance, consider
present-day AI ethics problems such as fairness, accountability, and
transparency for AI systems.
Many such problems do not present immediate and direct risks to
the physical safety of humans or even their physical property, and are
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thus not often considered AI safety problems. However, if AI capa-
bilities improve to become much more impactful on a global scale,
ethical issues in the governance of those capabilities could eventually
become matters of existential safety, just as present-day human in-
stitutions can present risks to public safety if not governed ethically
and judiciously.
Points (1)-(3) above can be summarized in the diagram of Figure 1:
Figure 1: Relationship between AI safety, ethics, and existential safety.
A brief review of and comparison of related AI safety research agendas
is provided in Section 10.1, including:
• Aligning Superintelligence with Human Interests (Soares and Fallen-
stein, 2014),
• Research Priorities for Robust and Beneficial Artificial Intelligence
(Russell et al., 2015),
• Concrete Problems in AI Safety (Amodei et al., 2016),
• Alignment for Advanced Machine Learning Systems (Taylor et al.,
2016), and
• Scalable Agent Alignment via Reward Modeling: a research direction
(Leike et al., 2018).
1.3 Inclusion criteria for research directions
Each research direction in this report has been chosen for its potential to
be used in some way to improve human existential safety. The directions
have been somewhat intentionally sampled from conceptually diverse areas
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of AI research, so as to avoid neglecting important considerations for how
the technology could develop.
Research directions have not been filtered for only being relevant to AI
safety or ethics. In particular, many of the selected research directions seem
likely be pursued for reasons entirely unrelated to existential safety, at least
in some form.
In addition, the research directions have have not been filtered for having
no potentially negative side effects; otherwise, the result would have been a
very empty document. Instead, reasoning is provided for how each research
direction could potentially be pursued in service of existential safety, to
enable further deliberation and discussion of that potential.
Importantly, the reasoning included with each research direction is not
intended to argue or predict that the catastrophic scenarios discussed in
this report will occur, nor to claim that humanity will or will not take
adequate precautions to prevent catastrophes arising from AI development.
Rather, this report simply aims to form a small part of those precautions.
In particular, this document is by no means a reasonable representation of
the immense number and variety of potential beneficial applications of AI
research.
1.4 Consideration of side effects
None of the research directions in this report are guaranteed to be helpful to
existential safety, especially if they are deployed carelessly or prematurely.
As such, each direction is exposited with a mini-section entitled “Consider-
ation of Side Effects”, intended to encourage researchers to remain mindful
of the potential misapplications of their work.
Unfortunately, it is not yet the norm in computer science research to
write about the potentially negative impact of one’s work in the course of
producing the work. This story has already been well told by the ACM
Future of Computing Academy:
“The current status quo in the computing community is to frame
our research by extolling its anticipated benefits to society. In other
words, rose-colored glasses are the normal lenses through which we
tend to view our work. [...] However, one glance at the news these
days reveals that focusing exclusively on the positive impacts of a
new computing technology involves considering only one side of a
very important story. [...]
We believe that this gap represents a serious and embarrassing in-
tellectual lapse. The scale of this lapse is truly tremendous: it is
analogous to the medical community only writing about the benefits
of a given treatment and completely ignoring the side effects, no mat-
ter how serious they are. [...] What’s more, the public has definitely
caught on to our community-wide blind spot and is understandably
suspicious of it. [...] After several months of discussion, an idea for
acting on this imperative began to emerge: we can leverage the gate-
keeping functionality of the peer review process. [...] At a high level,
our recommended change to the peer review process in computing
is straightforward: Peer reviewers should require that papers and
proposals rigorously consider all reasonable broader impacts, both
positive and negative.”
– Hecht, B., Wilcox, L., Bigham, J.P., Schöning, J., Hoque, E.,
Ernst, J., Bisk, Y., De Russis, L., Yarosh, L., Anjum, B., Con-
tractor, D. and Wu, C. “It’s Time to Do Something: Mitigating
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the Negative Impacts of Computing Through a Change to the
Peer Review Process.” (2018) ACM Future of Computing Blog.
https://acm-fca.org/2018/03/29/negativeimpacts/.
In light of this phenomenon, perhaps this report can participate in an
academia-wide shift toward the active consideration of potentially negative
side effects of research outputs, including outputs of the research directions
exposited here.
As readers examine these potential side effects, it is important to re-
member that these are not intended to communicate a forecast of what
will happen, only what might happen and ought to be avoided.
1.5 Overview
The logical thrust of this report can be summarized as follows. This sum-
mary is not meant to stand on its own, and thus contains links to the
relevant sections expanding on each point. Please refer to those sections for
supporting arguments.
Existential risks arising from advancements in artificial intelligence are
physically possible, very important if they occur, and plausible within this
century (Section 1.1). Since existential safety applications of AI research are
somewhat different from smaller-scale safety applications (Section 1.2), it
makes sense to begin some manner of explicit discussions of how AI research
could be steered in directions that will avoid existential risks. This report
aims to embody such a discussion (Preface, Section 1.3, and Section 1.4).
For present-day thinking about existential safety to be robustly valuable
for the many potential pathways along which AI technology could develop,
concepts and arguments are needed that will be relevant in a broad variety
of potential futures. Section 2 will attempt to organize together a few such
key ideas. For instance, the potential for humanity to lose control of the
Earth to powerful AI systems is a key consideration, so Section 2.2 will
define prepotent AI as, roughly speaking, AI technology that would (hy-
pothetically) bring about unstoppable globally significant changes to the
Earth. If prepotent AI technology is ever developed, there are many po-
tential pathways through which the effects of that technology could render
the Earth unsurvivable to humans (Section 2.5). Hence, the potential de-
velopment of prepotent AI technology presents a source of existential risk.
Importantly, a hypothetical existential catastrophe arising from AI technol-
ogy need not be attributable to a single, indecomposable AI system (Sec-
tion 2.8); catastrophes could also arise from the aggregate behavior of many
AI systems interacting with each other and/or humans (Section 2.8.1).
How might a catastrophe come about? In general, supposing AI tech-
nology were to someday precipitate an existential catastrophe, there are
a variety of societal errors that might have led up to that event. Such
errors could include coordination failures between AI development teams
(Section 3.1.1), failure to recognize the prepotence of an AI technology be-
fore its deployment (Section 3.1.2), unrecognized misalignment of an AI
system’s specifications with the long-term preservation of human existence
(Section 3.1.3), or the involuntary or voluntary deployment of a technology
known to be dangerous (Sections 3.1.4 and 3.1.5).
What do these errors have in common? Abstractly, an existential catas-
trophe arising from AI technology could be viewed as an instance of AI
systems failing to “do what humans want.” After all, humans usually do
not wish for humanity to become extinct. Thus, research aiming at exis-
tential safety for future AI systems might begin by studying and improving
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the interactions between a single AI system and a single human (Section 5)
to ensure that the AI system behaves in a manner desirable to the human.
This could involve methods to help the human comprehend the AI system
(Section 5.1), deliver instructions to the system (Section 5.2), and control
the system if it begins to malfunction (Section 5.3).
However, as soon as any new capability is developed that enables a
single human to delegate to a single AI system for some sort of task, that
capability is likely to be replicated many times over, leading to a multiplicity
of AI systems with similar functionalities (Section 2.8). Thus, any research
anticipating the potentially global impacts of AI technology should take into
account the numerous potential side effects of many AI systems interacting
(Section 6).
Moreover, diverse stakeholders can be expected to seek involvement in
the governance of any AI technology that could be sufficiently impactful
as to present an existential risk (Section 2.8). Therefore, existential safety
solutions involving only single-stakeholder oversight are not likely to be
satisfying on their own (Section 2.8.1). For this and many other reasons,
it makes more sense for AI technology to be developed in a manner that
is well-prepared for oversight by ideologically, politically, and ethnically
diverse people and institutions (Section 7).
In particular, facilitating collaboration in the oversight of AI systems by
diverse stakeholders (Section 7.1) could reduce incentives for research teams
to enter unsafe development races (Section 7.2), mitigate idiosyncratic risk-
taking among the stakeholders (Section 7.3), and increase the likelihood
that systems will someday be developed with existential safety as their
primary purpose (Section 7.4). Sections 8 and 9 therefore adopt a focus on
research directions relevant to one or more AI systems to serve multiple
stakeholders at once. Taken together, the research directions in Sections 5,
6, 8, and 9 constitute an incomplete but conceptually diverse portfolio of
technical topics with potential relevance to existential safety.
2 Key concepts and arguments
There are many potential pathways along which AI technology could de-
velop. This section introduces a few concepts and arguments for addressing
a broad range of hypothetical futures in which existential risks from artifi-
cial intelligence could arise.
2.1 AI systems: tools, agents, and more
By “AI system”, we refer to any collection of one or more automated
decision-making units. The units are not assumed to be cooperating or
competing, and are not assumed to have been created by cooperating or
competing stakeholders. Hence, the term “system” is intentionally gen-
eral and agent-agnostic, and is meant to encompass simple and complex
artifacts of engineering that could variously be called “decision-making
tools”, “agents”, “multi-agent systems”, “societies of machines”, or none of
the above.
2.2 Prepotence and prepotent AI
We say that an AI system or technology is prepotent /"prE-p@-t@nt/ (relative
to humanity) if its deployment would transform the state of humanity’s
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habitat—currently the Earth—in a manner that is at least as impactful as
humanity and unstoppable to humanity, as follows:
• at least as impactful as humanity : By this we mean that if the AI
system or technology is deployed, then its resulting transformative
effects on the world would be at least as significant as humanity’s
transformation of the Earth thus far, including past events like the
agricultural and industrial revolutions.
• unstoppable to humanity : By this we mean that if the AI system or
technology is deployed, then no concurrently existing collective of
humans would have the ability to reverse or stop the transformative
impact of the technology (even if every human in the collective were
suddenly in unanimous agreement that the transformation should be
reversed or stopped). Merely altering the nature of the transformative
impact does not count as stopping it.
In English, the term “prepotent” means “Very powerful; superior in force,
influence, or authority; predominant”. On analogy with the terms ‘intelli-
gent/intelligence’ and ‘omnipotent/omnipotence’, we favor the term prepo-
tence /"prE-p@-t@n(t)s/ over the more standard usage “prepotency” /"pre¯-­po¯-
t@n(t)-se¯/. In a number of Latin-descended languages, direct translations of
“prepotent”, such as “prepotente” and “prépotent”, mean “arrogant”, “over-
bearing”, “high-handed”, “despotic” or “possessing excessive or abusive au-
thority”. These connotations are not typically carried in English, and while
they do not contradict our usage, they are more specific than we intend.
Before considering what level and types of risks prepotent AI technolo-
gies could pose to humanity, let us first consider briefly whether a prepotent
AI system is physically possible to build in principle. In short, the answer is
probably yes. Why should human beings—a product of random evolution
and natural selection—be physically unsurpassable in our ability to con-
trol our physical environment? Indeed, there are at least several classes of
capabilities that might enable an AI technology to be prepotent, including:
• Technological autonomy. Consider an AI system capable of out-
performing the collective efforts of the world’s top human scientists,
engineers and industry professionals in endeavors of novel and inde-
pendent scientific research and engineering. Let us call such a system
technologically autonomous. Technologically autonomous AI might be
able to build other AI systems that are prepotent, if so directed by
whatever decision process determines its priorities.
As well, technologically autonomous AI itself could constitute prepo-
tent AI if it expands its scientific activities in the physical world in a
manner that humans cannot contend with. For comparison, consider
how non-human animals are unable to contend with the industrial
expansion of humans.
• Replication speed. The capability of AI systems to self-replicate
and consume the Earth’s physical resources too quickly for human
civilization to intervene would constitute prepotence. To illustrate the
in-principle possibility of such a scenario, consider the destruction of a
large organism by a potent biological virus as a side effect of the virus
rapidly disassembling the organism’s cells to obtain resources for the
virus producing copies of itself. The virus need not be “generally more
intelligent” than the host organism in any natural sense in order to
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end up destroying the host as a side effect of the virus’s replication
process. The virus needs only to overwhelm or circumvent the host’s
immune system, a domain-specific problem.
• Social acumen. The capability to socially manipulate human na-
tions to suddenly or gradually cede control of their resources could
enable prepotence. To see the possibility of such a scenario in princi-
ple, consider that the holocaust of World War II was an event precip-
itated in large part by the highly influential natural language outputs
of a particular human agent during a time of geopolitical unrest.
Because of the potential for such capabilities to cause humanity to lose
control of the future, to develop any of them would mean facing a consid-
erable and highly objectionable risk.
Historical note. The possibility that advanced AI systems could be dif-
ficult to control was considered by thinkers as early as visionary computer
scientist Alan Turing:
“Let us now assume, for the sake of argument, that these ma-
chines are a genuine possibility, and look at the consequences of
constructing them. [. . . ] [I]t seems probable that once the ma-
chine thinking method had started, it would not take long to
outstrip our feeble powers. There would be no question of the
machines dying, and they would be able to converse with each
other to sharpen their wits. At some stage therefore we should
have to expect the machines to take control [. . .] – Alan Turing
[1951], “Intelligent Machinery, A Heretical Theory”.
Mathematician and philosopher Norbert Wiener, widely regarded as
the originator of the cybernetics, also remarked at the potential dangers of
powerful “mechanical agencies" with which we “cannot interfere’:
[...] if a bottle factory is programmed on the basis of maximum
productivity, the owner may be made bankrupt by the enormous
inventory of unsalable bottles manufactured before he learns he
should have stopped production six months earlier. [...]
Disastrous results are to be expected not merely in the world
of fairy tales but in the real world wherever two agencies es-
sentially foreign to each other are coupled in the attempt to
achieve a common purpose. If the communication between these
two agencies as to the nature of this purpose is incomplete, it
must only be expected that the results of this cooperation will
be unsatisfactory.
If we use, to achieve our purposes, a mechanical agency with
whose operation we cannot efficiently interfere once we have
started it, because the action is so fast and irrevocable that we
have not the data to intervene before the action is complete,
then we had better be quite sure that the purpose put into the
machine is the purpose which we really desire and not merely a
colorful imitation of it.” (Wiener, 1960)
Prepotent AI vs “transformative AI”. The concept of prepotent AI
may be viewed as defining a subset of what the Open Philanthropy Project
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has called transformative AI (Karnovsky, 2016), which roughly corresponds
to clause 1 of the definition of prepotent AI. Specifically, prepotent AI sys-
tems/technologies are transformative AI systems/technologies that are also
unstoppable to humanity after their deployment (clause 2 of the prepotence
definition).
Prepotence vs “superintelligence”. This report explicitly avoids de-
pendence on the notion of “superintelligence” (Bostrom, 2014) as a con-
ceptual starting point. Bostrom has defined the term superintelligence to
refer to “an intellect that is much smarter than the best human brains
in practically every field, including scientific creativity, general wisdom and
social skills” (Bostrom, 1998). This notion of superintelligence helps to sim-
plify certain arguments about the in-principle possibility of existential risk
from artificial intelligence, because superintelligence seems both physically
possible to build in principle, and plausibly sufficient for threatening our
existential safety. However, not all of the competencies stipulated in the
definition of superintelligence are necessary for an AI technology to pose
a significant existential risk. Although Bostrom (2014) argues that super-
intelligence would likely be unstoppable to humanity (i.e., prepotent), his
arguments for this claim (e.g., the “instrumental convergence thesis”) seem
predicated on AI systems approximating some form of rational agency, and
this report aims to deemphasize such unnecessary assumptions. It seems
more prudent not to use the notion of superintelligence as a starting point
for concern, and to instead focus on more specific sets of capabilities that
present “minimum viable existential risks”, such as technological autonomy,
high replication speed, or social acumen.
2.3 Misalignment and MPAI
In considering any prepotent or even near-prepotent AI technology, one
immediately wonders whether its transformative impact on the world would
be good or bad for humanity. AI alignment refers to the problem of ensuring
that an AI system will behave well in accordance with the values of another
entity, such as a human, an institution, or humanity as a whole (Soares and
Fallenstein, 2014; Taylor et al., 2016; Leike et al., 2018).
What should qualify as a misaligned prepotent AI (MPAI)? Setting
aside the difficulty of defining alignment with a multi-stakeholder system
such as humanity, where might one draw the threshold between “not very
well aligned” and “misaligned” for a prepotent AI system? For the purpose
of this report, we draw the line at humanity’s ability to survive:
MPAI. We say that a prepotent AI system is a misaligned if it is
unsurvivable (to humanity), i.e., its deployment would bring about
conditions under which the human species is unable to survive.1
Since any unsurvivable AI system is automatically prepotent, mis-
aligned prepotent AI (MPAI) technology and unsurvivable AI tech-
nology are equivalent categories as defined here.
1It is interesting to ask what it means for a particular AI system to “bring about”
unsurvivable conditions, if such conditions occur. This is a question involving account-
ability for AI systems (Barocas and Hardt, 2014), which may become more difficult to
define for more capable systems. If System A builds System B, and System B brings
about unsurvivable conditions, did System A bring about unsurvivable conditions? Any
scientific claim that a system will not “bring about” unsurvivable conditions will have
to settle on a definition in order to be meaningful. For the purposes of this report, the
precise technical definition of “bring about” is left as an open question.
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Figure 2: Venn diagram relating “transformative AI”, “prepotent AI”, and “unsurvivable AI”
(“MPAI” in this report). In other contexts less focussed on human survival, it might make
sense to use a different threshold to define misalignment for prepotent AI, in which case the
term unsurvivable AI could be reserved for what is called MPAI in this report.
Extinctive versus unsurvivable. It may worth noting that humanity
can become extinct in a manner where our habitat is at no point unsurviv-
able, if the extinction is somehow willful. This means there is a category
of extinctive AI that lies strictly between prepotent AI and MPAI, which
includes AI systems that would somehow lead humanity to extinction along
a pathway where humanity has the ability to prevent its extinction at every
point along the way, but somehow fails to exercise this ability, right to the
very end. This may be a very important consideration for humanity, how-
ever, it will not be a key focus of the present document. In fact, Section 2.5
will raise some considerations suggesting that prepotent AI systems may
be unsurvivable by default in a certain sense, in which case intermediate
categories between prepotent AI and MPAI may not be particularly useful
distinctions. In any case, attentive readers wishing to draw this distinction
may often need to treat “human extinction” as a shorthand for “involuntary
human extinction” at some places in this report.
2.4 Deployment events
What counts as the deployment of a prepotent AI system? If an AI system
becomes prepotent after it is already in deployment, shall we consider that
moment “the deployment of a prepotent AI system“? In this report, the
short answer is yes, because the resulting loss of control for humanity from
that point forward may be similar to the result of deploying an AI system
that is already prepotent.
To be more precise, throughout this report,
• a transformative AI deployment event refers to either a transforma-
tive AI technology becoming deployed, or a deployed AI technology
becoming transformative.
• a prepotent AI deployment event refers to either a prepotent AI tech-
nology becoming deployed, or a deployed AI technology becoming
prepotent;
• an MPAI deployment event refers to either an MPAI technology be-
coming deployed, or a deployed AI technology becoming MPAI.
As defined above, these deployment events have the following implications
for what is possible for humanity:
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→ At the deployment of a transformative AI technology, it follows that
a highly significant global transformation of humanity’s habitat will
occur, but that transformation might be reversible or stoppable by
humanity after it occurs.
→ At the deployment of a prepotent AI technology, it follows that hu-
manity has no further ability to reverse or stop the transformative
impact of the system, but might still have some ability to channel or
direct the impact in some way.
→ At the deployment of an MPAI technology, it follows that humanity
has no further ability prevent human extinction from occurring.
Since these deployment events correspond to successively smaller cate-
gories of AI systems having been in active deployment, if they occur they
must occur in a sequence, as in Figure 3.
Figure 3: timeline of hypothetical deployment events
Note in particular that Ttrans can be less than Tprep in a scenario where
a transformative AI system becomes prepotent only after the system is in
active deployment, and Tprep can be less than TMPAI in a scenario where a
prepotent AI system becomes misaligned only after the system is in active
deployment.
2.5 Human fragility
There are numerous pathways through which the deployment of a prepotent
AI system could be unsurvivable to humanity. In short, the reason is that
many possible transformations of the Earth would render it unsurvivable
to humans, and prepotent AI technology by definition would globally and
unstoppably transform the Earth.
To see this, first observe that the physical conditions necessary for hu-
mans to survive are highly specific, relative to the breadth of environments
in which machines can operate. For instance, consider the availability of oxy-
gen in the atmosphere, availability of liquid water, absence of many other
compounds that would be noxious to breathe or drink, radiation levels,
air pressure, temperature, and the availability of highly complex digestible
food sources. Each of these is a physical feature of humanity’s surroundings
which, if transformed significantly, would be unsurvivable. By contrast, ma-
chines can already be designed to operate under the ocean, in space, and
on Mars. Humans can also visit these places, but only with the help of
machines to maintain safe conditions for the human body.
Next, recall that the deployment of a prepotent AI technology by def-
inition brings about changes to the Earth at a global scale, in a manner
that humans cannot reverse or stop. At first such changes might not result
in inevitable human extinction. However, many vectors of change would, if
compounded over time, end up violating one of the many physical, chemi-
cal, and biological prerequisites needed for human survival. Over the past
century it has become clear that human-driven changes to the Earth have
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the potential to destroy the human species as a side effect. The variety of
possible AI-driven changes expands and accelerates this potential. While
any particular pathway to unsurvivability is unlikely, the likelihood that
some such pathway could obtain is much higher, because of the many con-
ditions which, if violated, would end human existence. This conclusion has
been argued by numerous others, including Yudkowsky (2008a), Shulman
(2010), Shanahan (2015), and Bostrom (2018).
Of course, it is not logically impossible for humans to survive the de-
ployment of a prepotent AI technology. Preserving conditions necessary for
human survival means operating within certain limits, and if the creators of
the technology were collectively mindful of human extinction as a potential
side effect, perhaps great care and coordination may have been undertaken
to ensure those limits would be permanently enforced. One might even think
the conditions for human survival are relatively easy to maintain, because
they have been maintained for at least as long as humanity has existed.
However, it is reasonable to expect that the deployment of an arbitrarily
generated prepotent AI system would most likely be unsurvivable to hu-
mans if deployed, just as the conditions of an arbitrarily generated planet
would be unsurvivable to humans.
This raises a key question regarding the danger of prepotence: how dif-
ficult is it to ensure that the deployment of prepotent AI technology would
be survivable to humans? Certainly we humans could all agree to never cre-
ate or allow the development of prepotent AI technology in the first place,
but this is not an answer to the question at hand: conditional on the de-
ployment of a prepotent AI technology, what is the chance that humanity
would be unable to survive? In statistical terms, this is a question about
the distribution from which the prepotent AI technology would be drawn,
and that distribution itself is a function of the effort humanity collectively
puts into constraining AI development through coordinated safety efforts.
For instance, if the AI research community as a whole became deeply en-
gaged in the technical challenge of preserving human existence, perhaps
that would be enough to eventually relinquish control of the Earth to pre-
potent AI technology while maintaining survivable conditions for humans.
Would a lesser degree of care suffice?
An answer to this question is beyond the scope of this report. It would
be a claim relating the fragility of human existence with the coordinated
aptitude of the worldwide AI research and development community.
On one hand, Perrow’s theory of Normal Accidents (Perrow, 1984)
would imply that if AI technology turns the world as a whole into a “tightly
coupled complex system”, then catastrophic failures should be expected by
default. On the other hand, the literature on highly reliable organizations
(LaPorte, 1996; Roberts and Bea, 2001a) is suggestive that well-managed
hazardous systems can operate for periods of decades without incident.
Could humans ever succeed in developing prepotent AI technology that
would operate as safely as a highly reliable human organization, over the
indefinite future?
Attempting this would seem an unnecessary risk from many perspec-
tives; why not build highly beneficial non-prepotent AI instead?
In any case, perhaps reflecting on the fragility of human beings could
do some good toward motivating the right kinds of work. To that end, we
encapsulate the above discussion in the following thesis:
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The Human Fragility Argument. Most potential future states
of the Earth are unsurvivable to humanity. Therefore, deploying a
prepotent AI system absent any effort to render it safe to humanity
is likely to realize a future state which is unsurvivable. Increasing
the amount and quality of coordinated effort to render such a system
safe would decrease the risk of unsurvivability. However, absent a
rigorous theory of global human safety, it is difficult to ascertain the
level of risk presented by any particular system, or how much risk
could be eliminated with additional safety efforts.
With this argument in mind, we next consider the added complexity intro-
duced by a multiplicity of human stakeholders delegating to a multiplicity
of AI systems.
2.6 Delegation
Throughout this report, the relationship between humans and AI systems is
viewed as one of delegation: when some humans want something done, those
humans can delegate responsibility for the task to one or more AI systems.
From the perspective of the AI systems, the relationship would be one of
assistance directed toward the humans. However, to avoid dependence of
our arguments upon viewing AI systems as having a “perspective”, we treat
humans as the primary seat of agency, and view the humans as engaged in
delegation.
Human/AI delegation becomes more complex as the number of humans
or AI systems increases. We therefore adopt the following terminology for
indicating the number of human stakeholders and AI systems in a hu-
man/AI delegation scenario. The number of humans is always indicated
first; as a mnemonic, remember that humans come before AI: in history,
and in importance!
• Single(–human)/single(–AI system) delegation means delega-
tion from a single human stakeholder to a single AI system (to pursue
one or more objectives).
• Single/multi delegation means delegation from a single human
stakeholder to multiple AI systems.
• Multi/single delegation means delegation from multiple human
stakeholders to a single AI system.
• Multi/multi delegation means delegation from multiple human
stakeholders to multiple AI systems.
In this taxonomy, the notion of a single human stakeholder refers to
either a single natural human person, or a single human institution that is
sufficiently internally aligned and organized that, from the perspective of
an AI system, the institution can be modeled as a single human. It remains
an open research question to determine when and how a human institution
should be treated as a single human stakeholder.
What should be viewed as a collection of distinct interacting AI systems,
versus a single composite AI system? In some situations, both views may
be useful. This consideration is deferred to the beginning of Section 6.
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2.7 Comprehension, instruction, and control
Throughout this report, three human capabilities are viewed as integral to
successful human/AI delegation: comprehension, instruction, and control, as
defined below. This focus on maintaining human capabilities serves to avoid
real and apparent dependencies of arguments upon viewing AI systems as
“agents”, and also draws attention to humans as responsible and accountable
for the systems to which they delegate tasks and responsibilities.
Comprehension: Human/AI comprehension refers to the human
ability to understand how an AI system works and what it will do.
Debuggers, static analysis, and neural net visualization tools are among
present-day methods for improving human/AI comprehension. Comprehen-
sion helps us reason about how an AI system will respond to an instruction
before deploying it with that instruction, a key capability for reducing risks.
Instruction: Human/AI instruction refers to the human ability to
convey instructions to an AI system regarding what it should do.
For a human to derive useful work from an AI system, there must be
some conveyance of information or knowledge from the human about what
the human would find useful, in a manner that steers the behavior of the AI
system toward that work. This conveyance, or “instruction”, could take any
number of forms, e.g., code written by the system’s creators, recorded data
about human history, real-time interactions with humans during training
or deployment, keyboard input from a human user, or a direct neurological
link with the user. Some of these channels of human/AI instruction may be
used to control and modulate the others. Effective instruction involves not
only ensuring a flow of information from the human to the AI system, but
also knowing what information to put into which channels, and ensuring
the information affects the AI system’s behavior as needed.
Just as some programming languages are more difficult to write than
others, there will always be some available forms of human/AI instruction
that are more effective than others. For example, methods that are highly
tolerant of errors in human judgement or transcription will be easier to
use than methods highly sensitive to human error. In any case, human/AI
instructions are bound to fail from time to time.
Control: Human/AI control refers to the human ability to retain
or regain control of a situation involving an AI system, especially in
cases where the human is unable to successfully comprehend or in-
struct the AI system via the normal means intended by the system’s
designers.
Shutting down, repairing, or dismantling an AI system are ways in which
humans can retain control of an AI system’s operation even when the com-
munication abstractions of comprehension and instruction are not working
well.
Of course, few present-day machines could not be safely shut down or
destroyed by their owners if so desired. However, some machines have no
owner, such as the internet, and are not so easy to shut down by legiti-
mate means. If real-world AI capabilities ever approach the potential for
prepotence, it may become very important for humans to retain safe and
legitimate means to carry out such interventions on AI systems.
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Instruction versus control. Where should one draw the distinction
between “instruction” and “control”? For instance, one could argue that an
action like «unplug the power» is an “instruction” for turning a machine off,
and that the laws of physics are the “interpreter” ensuring the instruction is
followed. However, in this framing, the “communication channel” comprised
by the «unplug» mechanism is certainly of a different design and purpose
than the usual mouse, keyboard, and voice instruction channels. In par-
ticular, the «unplug» channel has the power to override any instructions
from the other channels. So, even if one wishes to view control as a kind of
instruction, it should be treated as a fairly special case, with the purpose
and capacity to override other instructions.
2.8 Multiplicity of stakeholders and systems
When first beginning to analyze existential risk from AI development, it
may be tempting—and perhaps conceptually simpler—to focus on sin-
gle/single delegation. Indeed, if AI technology brings about a human ex-
tinction event, one might easily argue that the system “did not do what
humans would have wanted”, and the task of making an AI system do what
even a single human wants is still a difficult challenge in many domains.
Perhaps for this reason, much of the technical research to date that is for-
mally or informally cited as relevant to catastrophic risks from AI—under
such labels as “AI safety”, “AGI safety” or “long-term AI safety”—has been
focussed primarily on single/single delegation. (Section 10.1 will give a more
detailed overview of the literature.)
Focusing entirely on single/single delegation can be misleading, how-
ever. There are powerful social and economic forces that can transform
a single/single delegation scenario into a multi/multi delegation scenario.
First, note that there are numerous pathways through which a single/single
delegation scenario with any powerful AI system (such as a prepotent or
near-prepotent AI system) can become a multi/single scenario:
a) Outside stakeholders will have a strong motivation to seek to own
and/or share control of the system, because of its potential for impact.
b) The creators of the system might encounter any number of disagree-
ments regarding how best to use the system. These disagreements
might not have been considered in advance, especially if the creators
were not confident they would succeed in developing the system, or
did not have a clear understanding of how the system would end up
working when they began their partnership. Facing the heightened
stakes of this increased potential for impact could lead to a splin-
tering of opinions about what to do next. So where previously the
creators might have acted as single unified stakeholder, this might
not remain the case.
These pathways lead from single/single to multi/single delegation scenarios.
Next, consider how a multiplicity of AI systems can result:
c) The creators of any powerful AI system have economic incentives to
duplicate and sell instances of the system to outside buyers.
d) Contemporary research groups, upon observing the capabilities of a
powerful AI system, may also have strong intellectual and economic
incentives to replicate its capabilities.
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These pathways lead from single/single and multi/single to multi/multi
delegation scenarios. In summary:
The multiplicity thesis. Soon after the development of methods
enabling a single human stakeholder to effectively delegate to a sin-
gle powerful AI system, incentives will likely exist for additional
stakeholders to acquire and share control of the system (yielding
a multiplicity of engaging human stakeholders) and/or for the sys-
tem’s creators or other institutions to replicate the system’s capa-
bilities (yielding a multiplicity of AI systems).
2.8.1 Questioning the adequacy of single/single delegation
The multiplicity thesis presents a source of added complexity in maintaining
existential safety, which might not be well addressed by safety research
focussed on single/single delegation.
How important is it to prepare for this complexity before it arises?
That is to say, how important is it to begin work today on single/multi,
multi/single, and multi/multi delegation solutions, from an existential
safety perspective?
An optimistic view. One view is that, given the development of near-
prepotent AI systems for single/single delegation, future humans and hu-
man institutions would be able to use non-technical means to coordinate
their use of those systems to ensure that either prepotent AI systems are
never developed, or that the systems will maintain existential safety if they
are developed.
In this view, there is no pressing existential need to develop multi/multi
delegation solutions prior to the development of near-prepotent AI systems.
As evidence for this view, one can point to any number of past suc-
cesses of human coordination in the use and governance of technology. For
instance, there is the Montreal Protocol banning the production of CFCs,
which was fully signed in 1987, only 14 years after the scientific discovery
in 1973 that CFSs are damaging to the ozone layer (Murdoch and Sandler,
1997; Andersen and Sarma, 2012). For an example of international coordina-
tion in computer science specifically, consider the creation and governance
of internet protocols such as TCP/IP by the Internet Engineering Task
Force—a community with no formal organizational hierarchy—by “rough
consensus and running code” (Russell, 2006; Resnick, 2014).
A pessimistic view. Alternatively, it might be that future humans
would struggle to coordinate on the globally safe use of powerful sin-
gle/single AI systems, absent additional efforts in advance to prepare
technical multi/multi delegation solutions.
For a historical analogy supporting this view, consider the stock market
“flash crash” of 6 May 2010, viewed as one of the most dramatic events
in the history of financial markets (Madhavan, 2012). The flash crash was
a consequence of the use algorithmic stock trading systems by competing
stakeholders (Easley et al., 2011; Kirilenko et al., 2017). If AI technology
significantly broadens the scope of action and interaction between algo-
rithms, the impact of unexpected interaction effects could be much greater,
and might be difficult to anticipate in detail. World War I is a particularly
horrific example where technology seemed to outpace the strategic think-
ing of human beings (specifically, military and state leaders) regarding how
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to use it (Gray, 2013, Chapter 5: The nineteenth century, II: technology,
warfare and international order). Military tactics lagged behind military
technology, such as the machine gun and mustard gas, that had been de-
veloped over the preceding century, leading to an unprecedented number of
casualties at war.
As a motivating thought experiment involving rapid and broadly scoped
multi-agent interaction, imagine that 10 years from today, 50% of all hu-
mans will be able to think one thousand times faster than they can today.
Such a sudden change in human capabilities might be incredibly pos-
itive, dramatically accelerating progress in science, technology, diplomacy,
and perhaps even multi/multi delegation research. But the result could also
be disastrous. First, if the areas of the international economy most accel-
erated by intelligence enhancement turned out to involve the production
of pollution or similar side effects, a rapid physical destruction of the en-
vironment could result. Second, perhaps the rapidly changing social and
geopolitical landscape could lead to a proliferation of attempts to seize po-
litical or economic power via socially or physically destructive tactics or
warfare.
The proliferation of powerful single/single AI delegation solutions could
conceivably have a similar destabilizing effect upon society and the environ-
ment. Indeed, some have argued that artificial intelligence and computing
technology more broadly has already outpaced our collective ability to make
good decisions about how it is used (Hecht et al., 2018).
A precautionary view. Of course, only one future will obtain in real-
ity. Which of the above views—optimism or pessimism—will be closer to
the truth? This question obscures the role of pessimism in preparedness:
we all can exercise some agency in determining the future, and the most
useful form of pessimism is one that renders its own predictions invalid by
preventing them.
In any case, it is well beyond the scope of this report to determine
for certain whether future humans and human institutions will succeed
or fail in the judicious use of powerful single/single delegation solutions.
And, maintaining a diversity of views will enable planning for a diversity of
contingencies. Thus, in place of a prediction, we instead posit the following
value judgement:
Multi/multi preparedness. From the perspective of existential
safety in particular and societal stability in general, it is wise to
think in technical detail about the challenges that multi/multi AI
delegation might eventually present for human society, and what
solutions might exist for those challenges, before the world would
enter a socially or geopolitically unstable state in need of those
solutions.
We will return to this discussion in Section 7.
2.9 Omitted debates
To maintain a sufficiently clear conceptual focus throughout, a number of
debates have been intentionally avoided in this document:
• What about global catastrophes that would not result in human ex-
tinction? For concreteness, and to avoid digressions on what would
or would not constitute a global catastrophe, this report is focussed on
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the simpler-to-agree-upon concept of human survival. Nonetheless, it
does seems likely that many present-day approaches relevant to avert-
ing extinction risk should also be applicable to averting other events
that would broadly be considered global catastrophes. The reader is
therefore invited to use their own judgement to determine where ar-
guments or methods in this report can be generalized from human
extinction prevention to global catastrophic risk prevention.
• What constitutes a human? Even the concept of human survival is
subject to some debate regarding its meaning, because of potential
future ambiguity in what constitutes a human being. For instance,
Moravec (1988, “Transmigration”, Chapter 4) describes a future in
which humans can replace themselves by digital emulations their own
minds, and Hanson (2016) envisions a future economy where most
work is carried out by human-like emulations that have been modi-
fied and selected for performing valuable work. If no biological humans
remain, but human emulations continue to operate, should humanity
be considered extinct? This report does not delve into that question,
because the authors suspect that most present-day approaches to ex-
istential safety will are not greatly affected by the answer, although
it could still become important in the future.
• What about other negative side effects of AI development? Many ideas
and arguments considered in this report could be applied to averting
safety and ethical failures that would by no means be considered
global catastrophes. The reader is invited to use their own judgement
to consider what other negative side effects of AI development can
be avoided and are worth the cost of avoidance. As discussed in the
Preface, omissions of other safety and ethical issues from this report
is not intended by the authors as an appraisal of their importance or
relevance to society.
• What constitutes “beneficial” AI? A closely related topic to reducing
existential risk from artificial intelligence—and which does not en-
tirely fit within the scope of this report—is that of developing prov-
ably beneficial AI systems, i.e., AI systems which provably benefit the
whole of human society. At a technical level, provable beneficence and
existential safety are tightly intertwined:
1. For any broadly agreeable definition of “benefit”, an AI system
that provably benefits all of humanity should, by most defini-
tions, preserve humanity’s ability to avoid extinction.
2. Conversely, preventing existential risk requires attending to
global-scale problems and solutions, which might yield math-
ematical and algorithmic techniques for ensuring other global
benefits as well as reducing other global risks.
Despite these relationships, provable beneficence is a more general
problem than existential safety. To address provable beneficence, one
would need to address or dissolve what it really means to benefit hu-
manity, given that individual human preferences are ill-defined, plas-
tic, and not in universal agreement. By contrast, it might be easier
to reach agreement on what scenarios constitute human extinction
events, or at least to agree upon the general goal of avoiding all such
scenarios. So, this this report explicitly avoids delving into any debate
regarding the meaning of “provable beneficence”.
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3 Risk-inducing scenarios
How could human society make the mistake of deploying AI technology
that is unsurvivable to humanity? There are many hypothetical scenario
types to consider, each of which might call for different forms of preventive
measures. In this report, scenarios are organized into risk types that will be
outlined in this section. The risk types are related via the causal diagram
in Figure 4.
• “Tier 1” refers to risks that are 1 degree of causal separation from
unsurvivability in the diagram, whereas
• “Tier 2” refers to risks that would generate Tier 1 risks, and are hence
2 degrees of causal separation from unsurvivability.
Figure 4: Relationship between risk types considered in this report; each risk type is described
as its own subsection.
3.1 Tier 1: MPAI deployment events
This section outlines specific scenarios wherein an MPAI deployment event
could occur.2 Because this report is targeted at AI developers, the MPAI
deployment events considered here have been classified according to the fol-
lowing exhaustive decision tree centered on the hypothetical AI developers
involved in building the MPAI:
a. Type 1a risk (uncoordinated MPAI development). Was there
no single AI development team who was primarily responsible for
developing the MPAI technology? If so, classify the MPAI deployment
event as arising from uncoordinated MPAI development.
Otherwise, in the remaining risk types one can assume the developers
of the MPAI constitute a single team, and further subdivide scenarios
based on the relationship of that team to the MPAI deployment event:
b. Type 1b risk (unrecognized prepotence). Prior to the technol-
ogy being deployed and prepotent, did the development team fail to
recognize that the technology would be or become prepotent? If so,
classify as an unrecognized prepotence event; otherwise consider:
2Such scenarios have been considered extensively by philosopher Nick Bostrom
(Bostrom, 2014) under more specific assumptions defining “superintelligent” AI systems.
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c. Type 1c risk (unrecognized misalignment). Prior to the technol-
ogy being deployed and misaligned, did the development team fail to
recognize that the technology would be or become misaligned? If so,
classify as an unrecognized misalignment event; otherwise consider:
d. Type 1d risk (involuntary MPAI deployment). Did the MPAI
deployment event occur without the voluntary permission of the de-
velopment team responsible for creating it? If so, classify as an invol-
untary MPAI deployment event; otherwise classify as:
e. Type 1e risk (voluntary MPAI deployment). The MPAI de-
ployment was voluntarily permitted by its developers.
The remainder of Section 3.1 examines these risk types in more detail.
3.1.1 Type 1a: Uncoordinated MPAI development
This risk type comprises MPAI deployment events that arise from uncoor-
dinated MPAI development in the sense that no one research team is solely
responsible for having developed the MPAI.
As an example of uncoordinated MPAI development, suppose Group
A deploys a powerful AI system for managing an online machine learning
development system, which is not prepotent because it lacks some key cog-
nitive ability. Then, suppose that around the same time, Group B releases
an open source algorithm that Group A’s system learns about and uses to
acquire the key cognitive ability, thereby becoming prepotent.
In this situation, because no coordinated effort has been made to align
the resulting prepotent AI system with human survival, it is relatively likely
to be misaligned, by the Human Fragility Argument (Section 2.5). And,
one could argue that neither Group A nor Group B was solely responsible
for having developed the MPAI; rather, they failed to coordinate on the
combined impact of their development and deployment decisions. Even if
some members of each group were aware that the result of their actions
might result in MPAI development, perhaps the local incentives of each
group were to continue working on their products nonetheless. A similar
dynamic can be seen in the way separate countries tend to follow local
economic incentives to continue producing carbon emissions, despite the
potentially dangerous combined impact of those emissions.
Avoiding this risk type calls for well-deliberated and respected assess-
ments of the capabilities of publicly available algorithms and hardware, ac-
counting for whether those capabilities have the potential to be combined
to yield MPAI technology. Otherwise, the world could essentially accrue “AI
pollution” that might eventually precipitate or constitute MPAI.
The remaining four Tier 1 risk types will focus on the knowledge and
intentions of “the developers” of a hypothetical MPAI technology, such as
whether the prepotence or misalignment of the technology was known or
intended in advance. By contrast, for an MPAI deployment scenario where
the developers of the technology are too poorly coordinated to have a clear
consensus on whether it will be prepotent or misaligned, the present risk
type—uncoordinated MPAI deployment—may be a better descriptor.
3.1.2 Type 1b: Unrecognized prepotence
This risk type comprises MPAI deployment scenarios where the prepotence
of the relevant AI technology was unrecognized prior to it being deployed
and prepotent.
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Examples of this risk type can be divided into two natural sub-cases:
• deployment, then prepotence: The AI technology in question is
not prepotent at the time of its initial deployment, but later becomes
prepotent in a manner that surprises its developers. For instance,
this could happen if the developers are insufficiently informed of the
system’s relationship with the world after its initial deployment, if
they are informed but insufficiently attentive to the information, or if
they are informed and attentive but unable to deduce that the system
will become prepotent.
• prepotence, then deployment: The AI technology in question is
prepotent prior to its deployment, but the developers fail to recognize
this at deployment time. For instance, this could happen if the devel-
opers did not attempt to assess the prepotence of the technology, or
somehow failed to complete an accurate assessment.
These sub-cases share an important feature in common: an AI technology
with unrecognized prepotence is relatively likely to turn out to be MPAI.
For, suppose an AI development team deploys an AI technology that turns
out to be or become prepotent in some way that they did not expect.
Because of their faulty understanding of the system’s capacity for impact,
their safety efforts would have been undertaken under invalid assumptions.
From there, by Section 2.5 there are numerous pathways through which the
system’s unstoppable transformative impact might be unsurvivable. Hence,
unrecognized prepotence comes with an increased likelihood of unrecognized
misalignment.
Avoiding this risk type calls for a rigorous scientific theory to understand
and recognize when an AI system might be or become prepotent. An impor-
tant way in which the prepotence of an AI technology could go unrecognized
is if the system exhibits behavior likely to obfuscate the full breadth of its
capabilities, thereby prompting developers to mistakenly deploy it as a non-
prepotent system. Such behavior could result from a selection process that
favors AI systems that somehow obfuscate capabilities that humans would
consider dangerous. Capability obfuscation could also arise from a system
with social reasoning and planning capabilities that learns, in pursuit of
real-world attainment of its assigned objective, to “work around" human
measures to prevent the deployment of prepotent systems. The latter case
could be viewed as an instance of “intentional deception” by the system,
although attribution of intention is not necessary to describe this general
class of phenomena. In any case, an adequate theory for understanding and
recognizing prepotence must account for the possibility of such systems
systematically obfuscating their prepotence.
3.1.3 Type 1c: Unrecognized misalignment
This risk type comprises MPAI deployment scenarios where the misalign-
ment of the relevant AI technology is unrecognized by its developers prior
to it being deployed and misaligned. Like unrecognized prepotence, unrec-
ognized misalignment can occur whether the misalignment occurs before or
after the technology is initially deployed.
For example, suppose some team of AI developers build a prepotent
AI system that they realize or suspect is prepotent, with the intention of
using it for some positive and permanently transformative impact on the
world. There is some risk that the developers might mistakenly overestimate
the system’s alignment, and hence fail to recognize that it is or will become
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MPAI. And, just as with prepotence, an important way misalignment could
go unrecognized is if the system itself deceives humans into thinking it is
aligned.
Avoiding this risk type calls for a rigorous scientific discipline for aligning
powerful AI systems with human interests and existence, and for recognizing
potential misalignment in deployed systems, including systems that may be
able to systematically deceive humans regarding their misalignment.
3.1.4 Type 1d: Involuntary MPAI deployment
This risk type comprises MPAI deployment events that are involuntary on
the part of the technology’s developers, i.e., occurring against the direct
intentions of the team who developed the relevant AI technology.
For example scenarios, let us focus on cases where the developers rec-
ognize that the MPAI deployment event is forthcoming before it happens
(since Types 1b and 1c risk already cover MPAI deployment events involv-
ing unrecognized prepotence and unrecognized misalignment). These sce-
narios can be further organized according to whether an MPAI technology
becomes deployed (“release” events) or an already-deployed AI technology
becomes MPAI (“conversion” events):
1. MPAI release events (involuntary): An existing MPAI technol-
ogy somehow becomes deployed without the voluntary consent of its
developers. For instance, consider a well-meaning team of developers
who have created an AI technology that they suspect is both pre-
potent and misaligned, and are now conducting experiments on the
technology to learn more about the risks it could present. In such a
scenario, at least some security measures would likely be in place to
prevent the technology from being deployed against the intentions of
the developers, but those measures could fail in some manner. The
failure could involve:
(a) Accidental release: An existing MPAI technology is released
accidentally by its development team, enabling others to de-
ploy it without the developers’ consent. No one on the devel-
opment team intentionally causes the release of the technology;
it is merely a haphazard mistake on the part of the developers.
This sort of event could be analogized to a nuclear power-plant
meltdown: someone is responsible for the accident, but no one
did it on purpose.
(b) Unauthorized release: An existing MPAI technology is ob-
tained by someone other than its developers, against the devel-
opers wishes. For instance:
i. Hackers obtain access to the technology’s code base and de-
ploy it, perhaps without knowledge of its misalignment or
prepotence.
ii. Physical force is used to obtain access to the technology’s
code base, such as by a military or terrorist group, who then
go on to deploy the technology, perhaps without knowledge
of its misalignment or prepotence.
iii. A running instance of the AI technology acquires its own
deployment as a goal, and finds a way to achieve deployment
without its developers’ permission.
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2. MPAI conversion events (involuntary): An AI technology is de-
ployed and is later converted into MPAI by certain post-deployment
events that were not intended by the technology’s developers.
The conversion could be caused by interactions with the relevant AI
system(s), or by failures entirely external to the system(s):
(a) Conversion by uncontrolled interactions: The developers
did not establish adequate controls for post-deployment inter-
actions with the technology, and those interactions convert the
technology into MPAI.
(b) Conversion by external failures: Humanity’s collective ca-
pacity to control or otherwise survive the impact of the technol-
ogy somehow decreases after its deployment (say, due to a con-
flict between humans that destroys resources or coordination),
and systems using the technology do not adjust their behavior
accordingly, becoming MPAI by virtue of humanity’s increased
vulnerability rather than by changes internal to the technology
itself.
Avoiding this risk type calls for measures enabling well-meaning AI de-
velopers to recognize and prevent the use of their inventions in ways that
might harm society.
3.1.5 Type 1e: Voluntary MPAI deployment
This risk type comprises scenarios where an MPAI deployment event is
triggered voluntarily by the developers of the MPAI technology. Even if the
majority of the AI research and development community develops methods
that make it easy to align powerful AI systems with human interests and
existence, and existing powerful AI systems are protected from falling into
the wrong hands, it may be possible for some misguided persons to develop
and deploy MPAI technology on their own for some reason. For example,
1. Indifference: Persons unconcerned with the preservation of the hu-
man species develop and deploy a powerful AI system in pursuit of
values that will yield human extinction as an inevitable side effect.
2. Malice: A military or terrorist organization develops MPAI technol-
ogy with the misguided hope of controlling it to threaten particular
adversaries.
3. Confusion: One or more AI developers that would not normally
ignore or threaten human welfare becomes convinced to deploy an
MPAI technology by morally confusing arguments. Perhaps the ar-
guments are produced by other indifferent or malicious persons, or
perhaps by an AI system.
Avoiding this risk type calls for measures to prevent powerful AI tech-
nologies from being developed and deployed by misguided persons. Some of
these preventive measures could also guard against instances of Type 1d risk
(involuntary MPAI deployment) that would arise specifically from unautho-
rized access to near-prepotent systems or code bases.
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3.2 Tier 2: Hazardous social conditions
This section examines types of social conditions that exacerbate the like-
lihood of Tier 1 risks. Unlike the typology of Tier 1 risks, the following
typology is non-exhaustive.
3.2.1 Type 2a: Unsafe development races
This risk type comprises scenarios wherein two teams are in competition to
develop powerful AI systems with the hope that the more successful of the
teams might achieve wealth or power from the deployment of their system,
and where each team is motivated by their competitive incentives to take
risks that would be considered irresponsible from a societal perspective.
Even if each competing team knows about the challenges of aligning their
systems with human existence, they might be tempted to divert resources
away from safety measures in order to best the competition with superior
capabilities.
This sort of development race exacerbates the probability of Tier 1 risks
(MPAI deployment events), specifically Type 1a, 1b, and 1c risks (uncoor-
dinated MPAI development, unrecognized prepotence, and unrecognized
misalignment). This conclusion has also been argued by Bostrom (2014)
and Armstrong et al. (2016). Moreover, Type 1d risk (involuntary MPAI
deployment) is increased because security measures against unauthorized
or accidental deployments are more difficult to implement in a hurry, to re-
duce the chances of hazardous post-deployment interactions with the sys-
tem. Finally, if one of the development groups is a military or terrorist
organization, they might decide to deploy their technology in a desperate
attempt to overthrow their competitors by force. This would constitute a
Type 1e risk (voluntary MPAI deployment).
Avoiding this risk type calls for measures to reduce incentives for com-
peting AI development teams to take socially unacceptable safety risks in
the course of developing and deploying their technology.
3.2.2 Type 2b: Economic displacement of humans
This risk type comprises scenarios wherein most human persons have no
power to bid for the continued preservation of the human species, because
humans have mostly been economically displaced by AI systems.
The possibility of an unemployment crisis arising from automation has
been discussed by numerous authors, e.g., Joy (2011), Ford (2013), Bryn-
jolfsson and McAfee (2014), Brynjolfsson et al. (2014),
Russell et al. (2015), Chace (2016), and Frey and Osborne (2017). A
gradual replacement of human workers by AI systems could lead to an
economy wherein most trade and consumption is carried out by non-human
entities. This is a bleak future from the point of view of many, but not yet
a global threat to human survival.
To see how this trend would constitute an existential risk if taken far
enough, consider a scenario where human institutions have all been out-
competed and replaced by autonomous corporations. Such autonomous cor-
porations could be deployed by idealistic individuals looking to increase
transparency or efficiency in certain industries, such as finance, supply
chain management, or manufacturing. Perhaps autonomous corporations
could eventually also engage in primary resource industries such as mining,
oil drilling, or forestry, which could supply raw materials to corporations
in other industries. If some combination of corporations turned out to be
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capable of sustaining and expanding an economy entirely without humans,
humanity would lose its trade leverage for influencing their activities. This
could constitute prepotence for the collective machine economy, as was ar-
gued by Turing (1951) in “Intelligent Machinery, A Heretical Theory”.
Given the machine economy’s prepotence, misalignment is relatively
likely to follow. By the Human fragility argument of Section 2, the side ef-
fects of a prepotent machine economy—in terms of resource consumption,
waste emissions, or both—would be hazardous to humans by default, un-
less the leading autonomous corporations coordinated in such a way as to
provide or at least allow the equivalent of social assistance and environmen-
tal protection to humans, for reasons not driven by the humans’ economic
output.
The potential for economic take-off of a self-sustaining fully mechanized
economy thus constitutes a Type 1a risk (uncoordinated MPAI develop-
ment): the combined activities of the machine economy could be prepotent
while no single human decision-making entity would be responsible for the
development and deployment of that economy. With no one in particular
being responsible for the deployment, coordinated safety measures might be
sorely lacking, yielding a serious risk to humanity by the Human Fragility
Argument (Section 2.5).
Avoiding this risk type calls for the development of coordination mech-
anisms to ensure the continued economic relevance of both humans and
human-aligned AI systems.
3.2.3 Type 2c: Human enfeeblement
This risk type comprises scenarios where humans become physically or men-
tally weaker as a result of assistance or interference from AI systems.
For example, if AI-driven machines replace most or all forms of hu-
man labor, it is possible that humans will become generally physically and
mentally weaker as a result. Human enfeeblement is a serious risk to the
value of human society as it currently exists. In particular, if the impair-
ment of decision-making capacities of human individuals and institutions
leads to a mismanagement of hazardous technologies inherited from previ-
ous generations, the chances of Type 1a, 1b, 1c, and 1d risks (uncoordinated
MPAI development, unrecognized prepotence, unrecognized misalignment,
and involuntary MPAI deployment) might be increased, as well as other
existential risks from non-AI technologies.
Avoiding this risk type calls for the observance of collectively agreeable
metrics for human cognitive abilities such as attention span, numeracy, lit-
eracy, working memory, and interpersonal skills, as well as the continued
observance of physical health metrics, so that any onset of widespread cog-
nitive or physical declines would be noticed. Some effort in this direction
can already be seen in research broadly construed as examining the impact
of internet and media technology on mental and physical health (Cain and
Gradisar, 2010; Strasburger et al., 2010; Kuss and Griffiths, 2012; Hale and
Guan, 2015; Lemola et al., 2015; Demirci et al., 2015). However, much of the
work in this area has been observational rather than experimental, making
it currently difficult to identify clear and valuable public policy recommen-
dations. Meanwhile, as AI becomes an increasingly prevalent determinant
of how and when people use technology, the urgency and importance of un-
derstanding its causal impact on human health and vigor will only increase
in significance.
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3.2.4 Type 2d: ESAI discourse impairment
This risk type comprises scenarios where human persons and institutions
fail to collectively assess and address existential risks from artificial intel-
ligence, as a result of difficulties encountered in communicating about ex-
istential safety. There are numerous ways in which discourse on existential
safety for artificial intelligence (“ESAI”) could be become impoverished:
• (alarmism) If too many debates are raised in the name of existen-
tial safety that on reflection turn out to have been unreasonable con-
cerns, then discussions of ESAI could come to be seen as inflammatory
and counterproductive to discuss, by the proverbial “cry wolf” effect
(Breznitz, 2013).
• (politicization) The topic of ESAI could someday become politicized,
in the sense that arguments for or against existential safety issues
can become tightly linked with one or more political ideologies. For
example, beliefs around the issue of climate change—an existential
safety issue—are currently strongly correlated with political party
affiliations (McCright and Dunlap, 2011; Hart and Nisbet, 2012). If
ESAI becomes similarly politicized, the quality of available discourse
on the topic could be reduced. This possibility has also been argued by
Baum (2018). Brysse et al. (2013) argues that climate scientists may
systematically underreport their risk estimates so as to avoid seeming
alarmist, and Taylor and Buttel (1992) argues that such reputational
and political forces can even affect what problems scientists choose to
pursue.
• (information security concerns) If transmitting information about
ESAI between AI researchers comes to be viewed as risking the
dissemination of information hazards (Bostrom et al., 2011)—i.e.,
information that is too dangerous to be widely shared—then col-
laborative research efforts to improve existential safety could be
impoverished.
• (association with science fiction) If planning for the safer develop-
ment of powerful AI systems comes to be seen as evoking exciting
or entertaining fictional narratives of the future, ESAI might come
to be taken less seriously than would be appropriate given its poten-
tial importance. Rees (2013) has argued that “In a media landscape
saturated with sensational science stories and ‘end of the world’ Hol-
lywood productions, it may be hard to persuade the wide public that
real catastrophes could arise. . . ”.
Such discourse impairments not only impoverish group-scale decision pro-
cesses, but also diminish opportunities for individuals to improve their own
judgment through discussions with others.
Prevention of this risk type calls for measures attending to whether
AI researchers feel comfortable honestly expressing, to each other and the
public, their views on the potential impacts of artificial intelligence, and
measures attending to whether public consensus and expert consensus on
risks from artificial intelligence are in agreement. The present authors have
not yet put forward any technical AI research directions that would benefit
such measures, but social science research in this area might be valuable for
helping society to continue making reasonable and legitimate risk/reward
trade-offs in the governance of AI technology.
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3.3 Omitted risks
Several other extremely costly potentialities for human society are conspic-
uously absent from the remainder of this document:
Hazardous deliverables. Supposing humanity develops highly ad-
vanced AI systems, those systems could aid humans in developing other
technologies which would themselves pose significant global risks to human-
ity. Nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and bioweapons are examples of
such hazardous technologies that have been developed in the past, without
the aid of AI technology.
Risks arising from the development of more such hazardous technologies
in the future—with or without the assistance of AI in the development
process—are not explicitly addressed by the technical directions of this
report. However, such risks could be addressed by related principles of safe
and ethical oversight.
Suboptimal futures. More generally, it has been argued that futures
where humans exist, but are not flourishing to the degree one would hope,
should be considered existential risks or at least be treated with the same de-
gree of severity as human extinction risks. For example, Bostrom (2013) con-
siders “permanent stagnation” and “flawed realization” scenarios, wherein
human civilization respectively either “fails to reach technological maturity”
or “reaches technological maturity in a way that is dismally and irremedia-
bly flawed”. These scenarios are excluded from this report for two reasons.
The first reason is to avoid debate in this report the issue of what con-
stitutes a suboptimal future, as discussed somewhat in Section 2.9. The
second reason is that these other risks do not naively belong under the
heading “existential”, so most readers are not likely to be confused by their
omission.
4 Flow-through effects and agenda structure
Sections 5, 6, 8, and 8 of this report may be viewed as a very coarse descrip-
tion of a very long-term research agenda aiming to understand and improve
interactions between humans and AI systems, which could be viewed as
ongoing throughout the full historical development of artificial intelligence,
multi-agent systems theory, and human-computer interaction.
How can one begin to account for the many ways in which progress in
different areas of AI research all flow into one another, and how these flow-
through effects relate to existential risk? The task is daunting. To organize
and reduce the number of possible flow-through effects one would need to
consider, the research directions in this report have been organized under
the subsections of Sections 5, 6, 8, and 9, which themselves are related by
a lattice structure depicted in Figure 7.
4.1 From single/single to multi/multi delegation
Research on single/single delegation can be expected to naturally flow
through to a better understanding of single/multi and multi/single dele-
gation, and which will in turn flow through to a better understanding of
multi/multi delegation.
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Figure 5: “discovery flow-though” effects between sections.
4.2 From comprehension to instruction to control
Sections 5, 6, and 8 are each divided into subsections regarding the human
ability to either comprehend AI systems, instruct AI systems, or control
AI systems, as defined in Section 2.7. Within each section, comprehension
research can be expected to benefit but not subsume instruction research,
and comprehension and instruction research can be expected to benefit but
not subsume control research.
Figure 6: subsection lattice, depicting “discovery flow-through” effects between subsections
within each section.
4.3 Overall flow-through structure
Put together, the flow-through effects discussed above combine to yield the
lattice depicted in Figure 7 below. This lattice defines the overall organiza-
tional structure for Sections 5, 6, 8, and 9, and summarizes the bulk of the
“discovery flow-through” effects that should be expected between research
directions in this report. Whenever a research direction would contribute to
multiple corners of this subsection lattice, it is discussed under the earliest
relevant subsection, leaving its usefulness to subsections further down in
the lattice to be implied from the document structure.
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Figure 7: subsection lattice, depicting “discovery flow-through” effects between research direc-
tions in this report.
4.4 Research benefits vs deployment benefits
Suppose that a major breakthrough is made in single/single delegation,
but that multi/multi delegation remains poorly understood. If the break-
through leads to the release of several AI systems each intended to serve
a different human stakeholder, then a multi/multi interaction scenario im-
mediately results. In such an event, the R&D process that designed the
AI systems will not have accurately accounted for the interaction effects
between the multiple humans and systems. Hence, many errors are likely
to result, including safety issues if the AI systems are sufficiently impactful
as a collective.
In the preceding scenario, single/single research flows through to a harm,
rather than a benefit, in a multi/multi deployment setting. Such scenarios
can make it very confusing to keep track of whether earlier developments
will help or hinder later developments. How can one organize one’s thinking
about such flow-through effects? One way to reduce confusion is to carefully
distinguish research benefits from deployment benefits. While research on
earlier nodes can be reasonably expected to benefit research on later nodes,
the opposite effect can hold for deployment scenarios on later nodes. This
happens when research on an earlier node results in a premature deployment
event in a setting where research on a later node was needed to ensure
proper functioning. For instance, Figure 8 summarizes a causal pathway
whereby research on single/single delegation could robustly lead to real-
world errors in multi/multi delegation.
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Figure 8: Research progress on single/single delegation can easily have negative flow-through
effects on real-world multi/multi deployment scenarios if multi/multi delegation research does
not keep pace.
Of course, it is common sense that the premature distribution of a
powerful new technology can be hazardous. However, combined with the
observation that single/single systems can easily be replicated to yield a
multi/multi interaction scenario, the potential for premature deployment
implies that an understanding of multi/multi delegation for powerful sys-
tems may be needed in short order after the development of any powerful
single/single delegation solutions. For any AI technology with the potential
for global impact, this observation should not be taken lightly. Society may
typically learn to correct premature deployment errors through experience,
but an error that yields a human extinction event is not one that we humans
can learn from and correct later.
4.5 Analogy, motivation, actionability, and side effects
In the next few sections, the reader may soon notice a series of repeated sub-
headings, intended to suggest a methodology for thinking about long-term
risks. The intended meaning behind these subheadings will be as follows:
• “Social analogue”. These subsections are post-hoc analogies for in-
troducing each research direction by comparing desired AI system
properties with typical human properties. The analogies can only be
fitting to the extent that AI systems might be designed to operate
according to similar principles as humans. Hence, the motivation and
actionability subsections (below) aim to give more precise illustrations
that are intended to expand, clarify, and supersede these analogies.
• “Scenario-driven motivation”. These subsections explain the final
causal pathway through which a given research direction could be
used to reduce existential risk. In aggregate, this content is intended
to illustrate just some of the many technical and social mechanisms
through which AI research and existential safety are intertwined. Mo-
tivations for some sections may be directly at odds with other sections.
At best this suggests a hedged portfolio of approaches to existential
safety; at worst, some approaches may need to be cut short if they
present serious negative externalities.
• “Instrumental motivation”. These subsections explain how a given
research direction could be steered and applied to benefit other re-
search directions in this report.
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• “Actionability”. These subsections aim to provide illustrative exam-
ples of existing work relevant to a given research direction. This report
falls woefully short of providing fair and comprehensive overviews of
the large corpora of work relevant to each direction, and for this the
authors apologize in advance.
• “Consideration of side effects”. These subsections examine ways
in which particular research ideas could be taken in directions that
would be problematic from an existential safety perspective. The fact
that many research directions are “dual purpose” in this way seems
unavoidable: when examining capabilities relevant to existential risk,
there is always the possibility that poor judgments about how to
intervene on those capabilities could make matters worse.
5 Single/single delegation research
This section begins our examination of research directions relevant to ex-
istential safety in the delegation of tasks or responsibilities from a single
human to a single AI system.
Consider the question: how can one build a single intelligent AI system
to robustly serve the many goals and interests of a single human? Numer-
ous other authors have considered this problem before, under the name
“alignment”. For a diversity of approaches to AI alignment, see Soares and
Fallenstein (2014); Taylor et al. (2016); Leike et al. (2018).
The AI alignment problem may be viewed as the first and simplest
prerequisite for safely integrating highly intelligent AI systems into human
society. If we cannot solve this problem, then more complex interactions
between multiple humans and/or AI systems are highly unlikely to pan
out well. On the other hand, if we do solve this problem, then solutions to
manage the interaction effects between multiple humans and AI systems
may be needed in short order.
(Despite the current use of the term “alignment” for this existing
research area, this report is instead organized around the concept of
delegation, because its meaning generalizes more naturally to the multi-
stakeholder scenarios to be considered later on. That is, while it might be
at least somewhat clear what it means for a single, operationally distinct AI
system to be “aligned” with a single human stakeholder, it is considerably
less clear what it should mean to be aligned with multiple stakeholders. It
is also somewhat unclear whether the “alignment” of a set of multiple AI
systems should mean that each system is aligned with its stakeholder(s) or
that the aggregate/composite system is aligned.)
Social analogue. As a scenario for comparison and contrast throughout
our discussion of single/single delegation, consider a relationship between a
CEO named Alice who is delegating responsibilities to an employee named
Bob:
• (comprehension) In order to delegate effectively to Bob, Alice needs
some basic understanding of how Bob works and what he can do—
Alice needs to comprehend Bob to some degree.
• (instruction) Alice also needs to figure out how to explain her wishes
to Bob in a way that he will understand—to instruct Bob.
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• (control) If Bob genuinely wants to enact Alice’s wishes as she intends
them, that is a good start, but he can still falter, perhaps catastroph-
ically. Perhaps he might ignore or severely misinterpret Alice’s in-
structions. So, Alice also needs some systems in place to control Bob’s
involvement in the company if he begins to behave erratically. For in-
stance, she should be able to revoke his computer system or building
access if needed. As Bob’s employer, Alice also maintains the legal
authority to fire him, at which point other company employees will
typically stop accommodating his plans.
Consideration of side effects. There are a number of potentially neg-
ative side effects of developing single/single delegation solutions in general,
which are included here to avoid repetition:
1. (racing) If near-prepotent AI systems are eventually under devel-
opment by competing institutions, single/single delegation solutions
might increase the willingness of the systems’ creators to move for-
ward with deployment, thereby exacerbating Type 2a risk (unsafe
development races).
2. (enfeeblement) Widespread consumer dependence on single/single AI
systems could lead to Type 2c risk (human enfeeblement) if the sys-
tems take on so many mental and physical tasks that human capabil-
ities begin to atrophy.
3. (misleading safety precedents) Single/single delegation solutions that
only work for non-prepotent AI systems could create a false sense of
security that those solutions would scale to near-prepotent and pre-
potent systems, increasing Type 1c risk (unrecognized misalignment).
For instance, “just turn it off when it’s malfunctioning” is a fine strat-
egy for many simple machines, but it won’t work if the AI system
is too pervasively embedded in key societal functions for shutting it
down to be politically viable (e.g., food distribution), or if the system
will develop and execute strategies to prevent humans from shutting
it down even when they want to.
4. (premature proliferation) If single/single delegation solutions are de-
ployed broadly without sufficient attention to the multi/multi del-
egation dynamics that will result, the resulting interaction between
multiple humans and/or multiple AI systems could be destabilizing
to society, leading to as-yet unknown impacts. This general concern
was discussed in Section 2.8.1.
5.1 Single/single comprehension
Comprehending a human employee is quite different from comprehending
an AI system. Humans have many cognitive features in common, due to
some combination of common evolutionary and societal influences. There-
fore, a human may use an introspective self-model as a stand-in for modeling
another person—to “put oneself in someone else’s shoes”. By contrast, arti-
ficial intelligence implementations are by default quite varied and operate
very differently from human cognition.
A recent and salient illustration of the difference between machine and
human intelligence is the vulnerability of present-day image classifiers to
the perturbations that are imperceptible to humans Szegedy et al. (2013),
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due the many degrees of freedom in their high dimensional inputs Goodfel-
low et al. (2014). For instance, Su et al. (2017) trained an All Convolutional
Network to achieve 86% accuracy on classifying images in the CIFAR-10
database of 32× 32 images, and found that 68.36% of the images could be
transformed into a misclassified image by modifying just one pixel (0.1% of
the image), with an average confidence of 73.22% assigned to the misclassi-
fication. As well, Athalye et al. (2017) developed a method for constructing
physical objects that are deceptive to machine vision but not to human
vision. The method was used to construct a toy replica of a turtle that
was misclassified as a rifle from almost all viewing angles, by TensorFlow’s
standard pre-trained InceptionV3 classifier (Szegedy et al., 2016), an image
classifier with a 78.0% success rate of classifying ImageNet images using
the “top-1” scoring rule.
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ABSTRACT
Neural network-based classifiers parallel or exceed human-level accuracy on
many common tasks and are used in practical systems. Yet, neural networks
are susceptible to adversarial examples, carefully perturbed inputs that cause net-
works to misbehave in arbitrarily chosen ways. When generated with standard
methods, these examples do not consistently fool a classifier in the physical world
due to viewpoint shifts, camera noise, and other natural transformations. Adver-
sarial examples generated using standard techniques require complete control over
direct input to the classifier, which is impossible in many real-world systems.
We introduce the first method for constructing real-world 3D objects that consis-
tently fool a neural network across a wide distribution of angles and viewpoints.
We present a general-purpose algorithm for generating adversarial examples that
are robust across any chosen distribution of transformations. We demonstrate its
application in two dimensions, producing adversarial images that are robust to
noise, distortion, and affine transformation. Finally, we apply the algorithm to
produce arbitrary physical 3D-printed adversarial objects, demonstrating that our
approach works end-to-end in the real world. Our results show that adversarial
examples are a practical concern for real-world systems.
1 INTRODUCTION
The existence of adversarial examples for neural networks has until now been largely a theoretical
concern. While minute, carefully-crafted perturbations can cause targeted misclassification in a
neural network, adversarial examples produced using standard techniques lose adversariality when
directly translated to the physical world as they are captured over varying viewpoints and affected
by natural phenomena such as lighting and camera noise. This phenomenon suggests that practical
systems may not be at risk because adversarial examples generated using standard techniques are
not robust in the physical world.
classified as turtle classified as rifle classified as other
Figure 1: Randomly sampled poses of a single 3D-printed turtle adversarially perturbed to classify
as a rifle at every viewpoint by an ImageNet classifier. An unperturbed model is classified correctly
as a turtle 100% of the time. See https://youtu.be/YXy6oX1iNoA for a video where every
frame is fed through the classifier: the turtle is consistently classified as a rifle.
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Figure 9: From Synthesizing robust adversarial examples, Athalye et al. (2017). Video avail-
able at https://youtu.be/YXy6oX1iNoA.
The fact that the image classifier networks in these experiments tend
to fail outside their training sets means that the networks themselves have
difficulty generalizing. This alone is not a problem with human/AI com-
prehension. However, the fact that the networks fail in ways that humans
find surprising means that our own understanding of their capabilities is
also prone to generalizing poorly. In particular, humans are unlikely to be
able to comprehend AI systems by generalizing from simple analogies to
other humans. As such, research specifically enabling human/AI compre-
hension will likely be needed to achieve and maintain a reasonable level of
understanding on the part of human users and even AI developers.
5.1.1 Direction 1: Transparency and explainability
One approach to improving human/AI comprehension is to develop meth-
ods for inspecting the inner-workings of the AI system (transparency), or
for explaining the counterfactual dependencies of its decisions (explainabil-
ity). These techniques can then be used guide R&D by helping engineers
to better understand the tools they are building. Perhaps good metrics for
transparency and/or explainability could be used as objectives to guide
or constrain the training of complex systems. Together, transparency and
explainability are sometimes called “interpretability”.
Social analogue. Businesses are required to keep certain records of de-
cisions made and actions taken in order to remain amenable to public over-
sight, via government agencies such as the IRS. This makes the expenditure
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of business resources on illegal activities at least somewhat difficult. If one
views an AI system as somewhat analogous to a corporation—a non-human
entity which nonetheless pursues an objective—one might hope to impose
analogous internal record-keeping requirements that could be used by hu-
mans to detect undesirable cognitive patterns before they would manifest
in harmful actions. Doing so would require a degree of transparency to the
humans imposing the requirements.
Scenario-driven motivation. The decision to deploy a powerful AI sys-
tem should come with a high degree of confidence that the system will be
safe, prior to system being deployed. In particular, the researchers and de-
velopers responsible for the system should have enough insight into the its
inner workings to determine that it is not misaligned and prepotent.
Just as business tends to move faster than governance, powerful AI sys-
tems will likely eventually operate and make decisions on a time scale that
is too fast for humans to oversee at all times. The more we are able to
understand how such systems work, the less likely they will be to surprise
us. Thus, AI transparency improves our ability to foresee and avert catas-
trophes, whether it be with a powerful AI system or a rudimentary one.
Explainability, or after-the-fact transparency, also serves to improve human
predictions about AI systems: aside from explanations informing humans’
future predictions about what the system will do, if we impose explainabil-
ity as a constraint on the system’s behavior, we might avert at least some
behaviors that would be surprising—to the point of being inexplicable—to
the human. Hence, this direction could apply to reducing Type 1b and 1c
risks (unrecognized prepotence and unrecognized misalignment), by help-
ing us to understand and predict the prepotence and/or misalignment of a
system before its deployment. Transparency and explainability techniques
could also be used to reduce Type 1d risks (involuntary MPAI deployment),
such as by enabling the inspection any AI-dependent computer security in-
frastructure in use by AI development teams.
Actionability. There is already active research working to make the de-
cisions of modern machine learning systems easier to explain, for instance,
Yosinski et al. (2015) and Olah et al. (2017) have created visualization tools
for depicting the inner workings of a neural network. While the decisions
made by a neural network routinely combine thousands of variables under
intricate rules, it is in principle possible to locally approximate arbitrarily
complex decisions by identifying a small number of critical input features
that would most strongly affect the output under relatively small changes.
This can be used to provide tractable “local” explanations of AI decisions
that might otherwise be difficult or impossible for humans to comprehend
(Ribeiro et al., 2016).
Modifying the objective function or architecture of a machine learning
system to require a degree of explainability to human inspectors could result
in systems that are more legible to human overseers (Zhang et al., 2018).
One might hope to achieve better generalizability than most earlier work on
explainability for AI systems, such as Van Lent et al. (2004). Perhaps quan-
titative models of pragmatic communication (Goodman and Stuhlmüller,
2013), wherein speakers and listeners account for one another’s goals to
communicate and thereby cooperate, could be useful for representing ob-
jective functions for explainability. Or, perhaps sparse human feedback on
the understandability of a self-explaining ML system could be augmented
with frequent feedback from an automated dialogue state-tracking system,
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e.g., as studied by Henderson et al. (2014). This would mean repurposing
the dialogue state-tracking system to give quantitative feedback on the un-
derstandability of the outputs of the self-explaining system, based on the
state-tracker’s experience with understanding human dialogue.
Explanations in natural language are an active area of exploration, e.g.,
by Hendricks et al. (2016). The use of natural language is promising because
it is in principle infinitely expressive, and thus opens up a wide space of
possible explanations. However, their technique currently produces after-
the-fact “rationalizations” that do not always correspond to the decision
procedure actually employed by the AI system in each classification in-
stance. Further work on producing natural language explanations should
focus on ensuring faithfulness to the underlying reasoning of the system
in each decision instance. As Hendricks et al. remark, future models could
“look ‘deeper’ into networks to produce explanations and perhaps begin to
explain the internal mechanism of deep models”. This objective is critical:
the goal of explainability should be to inform human users, never to ap-
pease or convince them. By contrast, if explanations are optimized merely
to convince the human of a foregone conclusion, the system is essentially
being trained to deceive humans in situations where it has made a mistake.
Starting down the path of developing such deceptive AI systems might ex-
acerbate Type 1b, 1c, and 1d risks (unrecognized prepotence, unrecognized
misalignment, and involuntary MPAI deployment).
Robotic motion planning is another area of application for transparency.
Using a simple model that treats humans as Bayesian reasoners, robots can
adjust their motion using that model to more legibly convey their goal
to a human collaborator (Dragan et al., 2013), and plan action sequences
that will be easier for humans to anticipate (Fisac et al., 2016). Studies
of mutual adaptation in human-robot collaboration seek to account for
humans’ ability to infer and conform to the robot’s plan while also expecting
it to reciprocate (Nikolaidis et al., 2016).
To guide progress in any application area, it would be useful to un-
derstand the features of transparency and explanation that (1) humans
instinctively prefer, and (2) aid in improving human judgment. For exam-
ple, humans tend to prefer certain features in the explanations they re-
ceive, including simplicity (Lombrozo, 2007) and “exportable dependence”,
i.e., usability of the explanation for future predictions and interventions
(Lombrozo and Carey, 2006; Lombrozo, 2010). These principles could be
quantified in objective functions for training prototypical “explainable AI”
systems.
Consideration of side effects. One possible source of negative side
effects could occur if transparency and explaiability (T&E) tools are de-
veloped which enable engineers to build much more complex systems than
they would otherwise be able to construct, and if AI systems nearing pre-
potence turn out to be beyond the reach of the T&E methods. So, if T&E
methods are developed which hasten tech development but for whatever
reason cannot be applied to ensure the safety of near-prepotent systems,
the result would be a precarious situation for humanity.
5.1.2 Direction 2: Calibrated confidence reports
This research direction is concerned with developing AI systems which ex-
press probabilistic confidence levels that roughly match their success rates
in answering questions or choosing good actions. For instance, among state-
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ments that a knowledge database system assigns a 89%-91% probability of
truth, roughly 90% of those statements should turn out to be true. Ex-
pressing calibrated confidence to accompany decisions can be seen as a
subproblem of transparency or explainability, but has other applications as
well.
Social analogue. Suppose Bob sells Alice an investment promising her
a 99% chance of doubling her money by the end of the year. However, Alice
also learns that among many other investments that Bob has sold claiming
“over a 95% chance of doubling”, only 65% actually doubled. Therefore, even
though Bob’s “99%” recommendation claims a very good expected value,
Alice does not end up believing Bob’s explicit claims about the likelihood
of success.
Suppose Alice also receives an investment tip from Charlie, who claims
a 99% chance of doubling in value. When Alice investigates Charlie’s past
performance, he has no prior record of either success or failure rates on
which to base her judgment. Alice also investigates Charlie’s reasons for
claiming the investment will double, and finds that Charlie has done al-
most no market research, and knows very little about the investment. Even
without a track record, Alice is able to reason that Charlie is probably not
very well calibrated, and does not end up believing his claim.
Scenario-driven motivation. Ultimately, the decision to deploy a pow-
erful AI system should come with a well-calibrated prediction that the sys-
tem is non-prepotent and/or aligned, prior to its deployment. A working
methodology for producing calibrated confidence reports could be used for
this, in conjunction with well-codified notions of prepotence and/or mis-
alignment. That is to say, one could ask a confidence reporting system for
the probability that a given AI system is aligned and/or non-prepotent.
Hence, this direction could help to address Type 1b and 1c risks (unrecog-
nized prepotence and unrecognized misalignment).
In addition, reliable confidence reports could be used to temper an AI
system’s online behavior. For instance, a powerful AI system could be re-
quired to shut down or act conservatively when its confidence in the human-
alignment of in its decision-making is low, thereby reducing the probability
of catastrophes in general.
Instrumental motivation.
• Direction 10 (corrigibility). Well-calibrated uncertainty could help an
AI system to recognize situations where shutdown or repair is needed.
• Direction 11 (deference to humans). Calibrated confidence reports
could be used to trigger increased human oversight when an AI sys-
tem’s confidence in its own good performance is low (Hadfield-Menell
et al., 2016b).
• Direction 17 (hierarchical human-in-the-loop learning (HHL)). Cor-
rectly identifying its uncertainty also allows an AI system to make
better use of a limited supply of human feedback. For instance, an
RL agent can specifically request feedback about human preferences
or rewards when it is less certain (Christiano et al., 2017) or when the
information is expected to help it improve its policy (Krueger et al.,
2016).
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Thus, to make marginal improvements to scalable oversight, improve-
ments to calibration need only lead to better-than-random decisions
about what kind of feedback is useful.
Actionability. Efforts to represent model uncertainty in deep learning
(Gal and Ghahramani, 2016; Kendall and Gal, 2017) are directly applicable
to developing well-calibrated confidence reports from AI systems. There are
many recent papers focussed on improving calibration for machine learning
models used to make uncertain predictions or classifications (Guo et al.,
2017; Lakshminarayanan et al., 2017; Lee et al., 2017; Liang et al., 2017;
DeVries and Taylor, 2018; Hafner et al., 2018; Kuleshov et al., 2018). Be-
cause of the inevitability of some model misspecification in any system one
might build, perfectly accurate calibration may be impossible to achieve in
reality. Thus, it is important to determine when and how one can reliably
achieve precise calibration, and when and how awareness of imperfect cali-
bration (in a sense, “meta calibration”) can be leveraged to improve active
learning and corrigibility. For instance, Liu et al. (2015) propose an active
learning approach that accounts for a model’s inductive bias and thereby
outperforms random selection of queries. Meanwhile, understanding the
implications of miscalibration can motivate future work by suggesting ap-
plications of calibration solutions. As a case study, Carey (2017) provides
examples of how misspecification of an RL agent’s priors in an “off-switch”
game (Hadfield-Menell et al., 2016b) can lead to incorrigibility of the RL
agent, via miscalibration about when to defer to the human.
Consideration of side effects. The potential negative side effects of this
work are similar to those of Direction 1 (transparency and explainability),
i.e., the risk that these methods might accelerate tech development without
scaling to apply to near-prepotent systems. One way this could occur is if
calibrated safety reports are fundamentally more difficult to produce for
a system with the capacity for developing a plan to deceive the safety
assessment protocol. Perhaps this issue, if it arose, could be mitigated with
other transparency techniques for detecting if the system is planning to
deceive the safety assessment.
5.1.3 Direction 3: Formal verification for machine learning sys-
tems
For any safety criterion that one could hope for a powerful AI system
to meet, a combination of empirical (experiment-driven) and formal
(proof/argument-driven) verification methods might be relevant and useful.
This direction is about bolstering formal methods.
Social analogue. When a venture capital (VC) firm chooses to invest
in a start-up, they look for formal legal commitments from the company
regarding how and when the VC firm will be entitled to redeem or sell its
shares in the company. Suppose instead the start-up offered only a word-
of-mouth agreement, appealing to fact that the VC firm has never been
swindled before and are hence unlikely to be swindled now. The VC firm
would likely be unwilling to move forward with the actual transfer of funds
until a formal, legally enforceable agreement was written and signed by
the start-up. With the written agreement, the firm can develop a greatly
increased confidence that they will eventually be entitled to liquidate their
investment.
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Scenario-driven motivation. At the point of deploying any powerful
AI system or system component that could result in prepotence and/or
misalignment, reliance entirely on empirical tests for alignment and/or con-
trollability is likely to be unsatisfying and perhaps even reckless. Indeed,
the test “will this system overthrow human society after it is deployed?” is
not an experiment one would like to actually run.
But how can one know the outcome of an experiment before running
it? In other high-stakes engineering endeavors, such as building a bridge or
launching a rocket, one is never satisfied with merely testing the components
of the bridge or rocket, but also use formal arguments from well-established
principles of physics to establish bounds on the safety of the system. Such
principled analyses serve as a guide for what can and cannot be concluded
from empirical findings, e.g., “if force X amounts to less than 100 Newtons
and force Y amounts to less than 200 Newtons, then in combination they
will amount to less than 300 Newtons”. Laying out such arguments in an
explicit form allows for the identification of key assumptions which, if vi-
olated, could result in a system failure (e.g., a bridge collapse, or a rocket
crash).
As AI systems become more powerful, persons and institutions con-
cerned with risks will expect to see similarly rigorous formal arguments to
assess the potential impacts of the system before deployment. Some would
argue that such assessments should already have been carried out prior to
the deployment of widespread social media technology, given its pervasive
impact on society and potential to affect the outcome of national elections.
Techniques and tools for automatically generating formal assessments of
software and its interaction with the real world will thus be in increasing
demand as more powerful AI systems are developed.
Actionability. Since many present-day AI systems involve deep learning
components, advances in scalable formal verification techniques for deep
neural networks could be potentially very valuable. For instance, Dvijotham
et al. (2018) have developed an anytime algorithm for bounding various
quantities definable from network weights, such as robustness to input per-
turbations. Katz et al. (2017) have adapted the linear programming simplex
method for verifying or refuting quantifiable statements about ReLU net-
works. Akintunde et al. (2018) and Lomuscio and Maganti (2017) have
begun developing methods for reachability analysis of feed-forward ReLU
neural networks. Selsam et al. (2017) have developed an automated proof as-
sistant for generating machine-checkable proofs about system performance
as a step in the engineering process. Their training system, Certigrad, per-
formed comparably to Tensorflow.
For even more rigorous verification, one must also consider assumptions
about the so-called trusted computing base (TCB), the core software ap-
paratus used to interpret and/or compile code into binaries and to write
and verify proofs about the code. Kumar et al. (2018) argue that verifi-
cation with a very small TCB is possible with appropriate adjustments to
the programmer’s workflow, and that such workflows are already possible
in systems such as CakeML (Kumar et al., 2014) and Œuf (Mullen et al.,
2018).
In order to formally specify societal-scale safety criteria that formal ver-
ification tools would go on to verify for powerful AI systems, input may be
needed from many other research directions, such as Directions 8, 7, and 13
(human cognitive models, human belief inference, and rigorous coordination
models).
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Consideration of side effects. There is an interesting duality between
design and verification in the creation of AI systems by human developers,
that can be seen as analogous to the duality between training and testing in
the creation of image classifiers by supervised learning algorithms. Specifi-
cally, when some fraction of formal verification specs for an AI system are
withheld from the human developers who design and build the system, the
withheld specs can serve as an independent test of the system’s performance
(and hence also the quality of the developers’ design process). This is sim-
ilar to how, after a classifier has been “built” from a training dataset by a
supervised learning algorithm, a separate testing dataset typically serves as
an independent test of the classifier’s accuracy (and hence also the quality
of the learning algorithm). Such independent tests are important, because
they reveal “overfitting” tendencies in the learning algorithm that make past
performance on the training data an overly optimistic predictor of future
performance on real data. Conversely, using the entirety of a supervised
learning dataset for training and none of the data for testing can result in
a failure to detect overfitting.
The analogue for human developers designing AI systems is that includ-
ing too many automated verifications for the developers to use throughout
the design processes enables the developers to fix just the automatically
verifiable issues and not other issues that may have been overlooked. Thus,
if one publishes all of one’s available formal verification methods for testing
an AI system’s performance, one impoverishes one’s ability to perform in-
dependent tests of whether the developers themselves have been sufficiently
careful and insightful during the design process to avoid “over-fitting” to the
specs in ways that would generalize poorly to real-world applications.
This potential side effect of making too many formal verification specs
publicly available can be viewed as an instance of Goodhart’s Law (Man-
heim and Garrabrant, 2018): “When a measure becomes a target, it ceases
to be a good measure.” Simply put, if all known proxy measures for safety
are made publically available in the form of automated tests, it could be-
come too easy for reseachers to accidentally or intentionally learn to “cheat”
on the test. What this means for formal verification methods is that once a
useful formal safety verification standard is developed, a non-trivial decision
needs to be made about whether to publish reproducible code for running
the safety test (making it a “target”), or to keep the details of the test some-
what private and difficult to reproduce so that the test is more likely to
remain a good measure of safety. For very high stakes applications, certain
verification criteria should always be withheld from the design process and
used to make final decisions about deployment.
5.1.4 Direction 4: AI-assisted deliberation
Another approach to improving human/AI comprehension is to improve the
human’s ability to analyze the AI system’s decisions or recommendations.
In this report, AI-assisted deliberation (AIAD), refers to the capability
of an intelligent computer system to assist humans in the process of reflect-
ing on information and arriving at decisions that the humans reflectively
endorse.
In particular, this might involve aiding the human to consider arguments
or make observations that would be too complex for the human alone to
discover, or even to fully reason about after the point of discovery. AIAD
can be viewed as being closely complementary with transparency and ex-
plainability (T&E): while T&E methods aim to present information in a
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form amenable to human comprehension, AIAD would assist the humans
in directing their own thoughts productively in analyzing that information.
Social analogue. A busy executive can benefit greatly from the assis-
tance of employees and expert advisors who make it easier for them to
evaluate important choices. At the same time, reliance on deliberative as-
sistance leaves the executive prone to accidental or intentional manipulation
by the assistant.
Scenario-driven motivation. It is possible that humanity will collec-
tively insist on relatively simple constraints for any powerful AI system
to follow, that would ensure the humans are unlikely to misunderstand its
reasoning or activities. Absent such constraints, humans can be expected
to struggle to understand the discoveries and actions of systems which by
design would exceed the humans’ creative abilities. The better guidance
one can provide to the human overseers of powerful systems, the less likely
they will be to overlook the misalignment or prepotence of an AI system.
Hence, AIAD could be used to address Type 1b and 1c risks (unrecognized
prepotence and unrecognized misalignment). At the same time, if AIAD
technologies are eventually developed, caution may be needed to prevent
their use in ways that would accidentally or intentionally deceive or distract
humans away from key safety considerations, especially for high-stakes ap-
plications that could be relevant to existential risk. (For instance, present-
day social media services employ a plethora of interactive AI/ML systems
to capture and maintain user attention, and many people report that these
services distract them in ways they do not endorse.)
Instrumental motivation. Improved human deliberation would be di-
rectly useful to safety methods that rely on human feedback.
This includes Directions 6, 17, and 23 (preference learning, hierarchical
human-in-the-loop learning (HHL), and moderating human belief disagree-
ments)
Actionability. There is also evidence that automated systems can be
used to aid human deliberation on non-technical topics. The delivery of
cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) by automated conversational agents
over the internet has been found to be somewhat effective for reducing some
symptoms of general psychological distress, in comparison with reading an
e-book (Twomey et al., 2014) or simply awaiting an in-person therapist
(Fitzpatrick et al., 2017). One might therefore hypothesize that automated
problem-solving agents could assist in the making of stressful or otherwise
difficult decisions.
Christiano (2017) has proposed a recursive framework for decompos-
ing problems assisting deliberation, recursively named “Humans Consulting
HCH (HCH)”. This method has undergone some empirical testing by a new
research group called Ought.org (2017a,b).
Consideration of side effects. Widespread use of AIAD could lead to
unexpected societal-scale effects. For example, if humans come to rely on
AIAD more than their fellow humans to help them deliberate, perhaps
trust between individual humans will gradually become degraded. As well,
providing AIAD without accidentally misleading or distracting the human
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may remain an interesting and important challenge. To avoid this, it may
be necessary to develop an operationalized definition of “misleading”.
5.1.5 Direction 5: Predictive models of bounded rationality
Both humans and AI systems are subject to bounds on their computational
abilities. These bounds will likely need to be accounted for, explicitly or
implicitly, in predicting what independent and collaborative behaviors the
humans and AI systems can or will exhibit. Ideally, a good model of a
boundedly rational decision-making system should be able to predict what
sorts of the decisions the are too hard, or sufficiently easy, for the system
to make correctly with its given computational resources.
Social analogue. When a law school student with a poor memory and
slow reading speed fails a final examination, it is apt to attribute their
failure to a lack of ability rather than a lack of desire to pass. On the other
hand, if a student known to have a prodigious memory and a fast reading
speed is seen to fail such an exam, it may be more appropriate to infer
that they are insufficiently motivated to pass. Thus, observing the same
behavior from two different humans—namely, failing an exams—lead us to
different conclusions about their desires (trying to pass and failing, versus
not caring much about passing). In this way, thinking informally about a
person’s mental capabilities is key to making inferences about their desires.
Conversely, suppose you know your attorney has the best of intentions,
but nearly failed out of law school and required numerous attempts to pass
the bar exam. If a serious lawsuit comes your way, you might be inclined
to find a more skilled attorney.
These situations have at least three analogues for AI systems: (1) hu-
mans accounting for the limitations of AI systems, (2) AI systems account-
ing for the limitations of humans, and (3) AI systems accounting for the
limitations of other AI systems.
Scenario-driven motivation. See the instrumental motivations.
Instrumental motivation. Numerous directions in this report would
benefit from the ability to calculate upper and lower bounds on a given
cognitive capacity of a system, as a function of the computational resources
available to the system (along with other attributes of the system, which
are always needed to establish non-trivial lower bounds on performance):
• Direction 6 (preference learning). Inferring the preferences of a human
from their words and actions requires attributing certain failures in
their behavior to limitations of their cognition. Some such limitations
could be derived from resource bounds on the human brain, or even
better, on relevant cognitive subroutines employed by the human (if
sufficient progress in cognitive science is granted to identify those
subroutines).
• Direction 17 (hierarchical human-in-the-loop learning (HHL)). The
degree of oversight received by an AI system should be sufficient to
overcome any tendency for the system to find loopholes in the judg-
ment of an overseer(s). A precise model of how to strike this balance
would benefit from the ability to predict lower bounds on the cognitive
abilities of the overseer and upper bounds on the abilities of the AI
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system being overseen, accounting for their respective computational
resources.
• Direction 28 (reimplementation security). Upper bounds on the col-
lective capabilities of malicious hackers could be used to estimate
whether they have sufficient resources to re-train, re-program, or oth-
erwise compromise a powerful AI system or the security protocols
surrounding it. It would be informative if such bounds could be de-
rived from estimates of the hackers’ total computational resources.
(Although this would not protect against flaws in the assumptions
of the designers of the system to be protected, which are the main
source of real-world security breaches.)
• Direction 29 (human-compatible equilibria).
Suppose some sufficiently sharp upper bounds on the collective capa-
bilities of the non-human-agents in a multi-agent system could be pre-
dicted as a function of their computational resources. These bounds
could be used to set limits on how much computation the non-human
agents are allowed to wield, so as to ensure a sufficient degree of con-
trol for the humans while maintaining the usefulness of the non-human
agents to the collective.
• Direction 26 (capacity oversight criteria). Bounds on the capabilities
of both AI systems and humans could be used to determine whether
an AI system is sufficiently computationally endowed to be prepotent.
This could lead to more definable standards for when and when not
to worry about Type 1b risks (unrecognized prepotence).
• Direction 8 (human cognitive models). Griffiths et al. (2015) have
argued that computational limitations should be accounted for in
human cognitive models. A better understanding of how an ideal
bounded reasoner manages computation for rational decision-making
could lead to better predictive and interactive models of humans,
which could flow through to work on Directions 1, 4, 7, and 11 (trans-
parency and explainability, AI-assisted deliberation, human belief in-
ference, and deference to humans).
Actionability. Most experimental work in the field of machine learn-
ing is concerned with assessing the capabilities of AI systems with limited
computation. Therefore, it could be fruitful and straightforward to begin
experimental approaches to each bullet point in the instrumental motiva-
tion section above.
However, to bolster experimental approaches, it would help to develop
a rigorous framework for planning and evaluating such experiments in ad-
vance. Currently, no satisfactory axiomatic theory of rational thinking un-
der computational limitations—such as the hardware limitations inherent
in a human brain, or any physical computer system—is known.
One essential difficulty is that probability estimates calculated using
bounded computational resources cannot be expected to follow the laws of
probability theory, which require computation in order to satisfy (see the
historical note below). For example, it can take a great deal of computation
to prove that one statement is logically equivalent to another, and there-
fore to deduce that the statements should be assigned the same probability.
Agent models which assume agents’ beliefs follow the rules of probability
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theory—which assign equal probability to logically equivalent statements—
are therefore unrealistic. Another difficulty is that it is unclear what rules
the beliefs of reasoners in a multi-agent system should be assumed to satisfy,
especially when the reasoners are in competition with one another. Com-
petition means the agents may have an incentive to deceive one another;
when one agent deceives another, should the deceived agent be blamed, or
the deceiver, or both? On one hand the deceived agent is failing to protect
itself from deception; on the other hand the deceiver is failing to uphold a
basic principle of good faith communication that might be fundamental to
effective group-scale interactions.
Garrabrant et al. (2016) have made some effort to resolve these difficul-
ties by developing a model of a bounded reasoner called a “logical inductor”,
along with a suite of accompanying theorems showing that logical inductors
satisfy a large number of desirable properties. A logical inductor’s capabil-
ities include converging toward satisfying the laws of probability over time,
making well-calibrated predictions about other computer programs includ-
ing other logical inductors, the ability to introspect on its own beliefs, and
self-trust. Logical inductors also avoid the fallacy of treating the outputs
of deterministic computations as random events, whereas past models of
bounded reasoners tend to assume the reasoner will implicitly conflate un-
certainty with randomness (Halpern et al., 2014).
However, the logical inductor theory as yet provides no upper bounds
on a bounded reasoner’s capabilities, nor does it provide effective esti-
mates of how much computation the reasoner will need for various tasks.
Thus, progress on bounded rationality could be made by improving the
Garrabrant model in these ways.
Consideration of side effects. A working predictive theory of bounded
rationality would eliminate the need to run any machine learning experi-
ment whose outcome is already predicted by the theory. This would make
machine learning research generally more efficient, hastening progress. The
theory could also inspire the development of new and more efficient learn-
ing algorithms. It is unclear whether such advancements would reduce or
increase existential risk overall.
Historical note. Chapters 1 and 3 of Do the Right Thing (Russell and
Wefald, 1991) contain a lengthy discussion of the challenge of treating
bounded rationality axiomatically. Some excerpts:
“[...] computations are treated as if they were stochastic experi-
ments, even when their outcomes are completely deterministic.
[...] Given the absence of a satisfactory axiomatic system for
computationally limited agents, our results have only a heuris-
tic basis, strictly speaking.” (p. 25)
“These time-limited estimates, which Good (1977) called dy-
namic probabilities and utilities, cannot obey the standard ax-
ioms of probability and utility theory. Just how the axioms
should be revised to allow for the limited rationality of real
agents without making them vulnerable to a charge of incoher-
ence is an important open philosophical problem, which we shall
not attempt to tackle here. [...] the formulae here and in chap-
ters 4 and 5 have as yet only a heuristic justification, borne out
by practical results.” (pp. 60-61)
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Despite this, many attempts to axiomatize bounded rationality since
then, such as by Halpern and Pass (2011), continue to prescribe that the
agent should model the outputs of unfinished computations using probabil-
ity.
5.2 Single/single instruction
5.2.1 Direction 6: Preference learning
Preference learning is the task of ensuring that an AI system can learn how
to exhibit behavior in accordance with the preferences of another system,
such as a human.
Social analogue. When a CEO asks her employee to help increase their
company’s profits, she implicitly hopes the employee will do so without
conspiring to have her fired from the company in order to replace her with
someone more effective, or by engaging in immoral acts like hacking a com-
petitor’s bank account. The CEO’s preferences are thus quite a bit more
complex than the statement “help us increase profits” alone might suggest.
Moreover, because she cannot easily specify the innumerable things she
hopes the employee will not do, the employee must exercise some inde-
pendent judgment to infer the CEO’s preferences from surrounding social
context.
Scenario-driven motivation. Preference learning is mainly relevant to
mitigating Type 1c risks (unrecognized misalignment), and requires strik-
ing a balance between literal obedience and independent judgment on the
part the AI system. If a superintelligent factory management system is in-
structed with the natural language command, “make as many paperclips as
possible this year”, one of course hopes that it will not attempt to engineer
nanotechnology that fills a sphere two light-years in diameter with paper-
clips Bostrom (2014, Chapter 8, “Infrastructure Profusion”). At the same
time, if it does not make any paperclips at all, it will tend to be replaced
by another system which does.
Without a satisfactory procedure for striking a balance between lit-
eral obedience and independent judgment, we humans may be unable to
instate our preferences as governing principles for highly advanced AI sys-
tems. In particular, the continued existence and general well-being of human
society—a highly complex variable to define—would be placed at risk.
Actionability. Specifying an AI system’s objectives directly in terms of
a score function of the environment to be maximized can lead to highly
unpredictable behavior. For an example, programming a cleaning robot to
maximize the amount of dirt it picks up could result in the robot continu-
ally spilling out dirt for itself to clean (Russell et al., 2003, Chapter 17.1).
Similarly, a reinforcement learning system trained to maximize its score in
a boat racing game learned to drive in circles to collect more points instead
of finishing the race (Amodei and Clark, 2016).
One approach to this problem is to use preference learning, i.e., to design
AI systems to adjust their model of human preferences over time. Human
preference learning is already an active area of research with numerous
past and present applications, for example in product recommendation sys-
tems or automated software configuration. New commercial applications of
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preference learning, such as personal assistant software, will surely become
more prevalent over the coming decade.
There are numerous mathematical formulations of preference learning
problem; see Braziunas (2006) for a review. In a sequential decision-making
setting, the problem can be expressed as a POMDP, where the human’s
preferences are encoded as information about the environment determining
which states are desirable (Boutilier, 2002). This formulation involves not
only learning human preferences, but taking actions that satisfy them. This
is the full problem of preference alignment : aligning an AI system’s behavior
with the preference a user.
Preference learning is further complicated in a cooperative setting,
where the human is also taking actions directly toward their goal. Here,
success for the AI system is defined as the combined efficacy of a human/AI
team working toward a common objective that is understood primarily by
the human. This setting can also been represented as a POMDP, where
the human’s actions are part of the environment’s transition function
(Fern and Tadepalli, 2010). The human’s actions can then be taken as
evidence about their preferences, such as using inverse reinforcement learn-
ing (IRL), also known as inverse optimal control (Kalman, 1964). This
approach was introduced by Javdani et al. (2015). Somewhat concurrently,
Hadfield-Menell et al. (2016a) introduced cooperative inverse reinforcement
learning (CIRL), a problem framing where a human and an AI system
share common knowledge that the AI system is attempting to learn and
optimize the human’s objective. The CIRL framing been used to explore
the possibility of “pragmatic” robots that interpret human actions with an
awareness that the human is attempting to teach them (Fisac et al., 2017).
Using similar but slightly different assumptions from CIRL (in particular,
using limited levels of metacognition on the part of the human and robot,
yielding non-equilibrium strategies), Milli and Dragan (2019) show that
non-pragmatic robots are more robust than pragmatic robots, even when
humans are in fact trying to teach them about their preferences. In these
experiments, joint performance is improved when the robot takes a literal
interpretation of the human, even when the human is not attempting to be
literal.
There are some concerns that present-day methods of preference learn-
ing may not suffice to infer human preferences in a form sufficiently detailed
to safely direct the behavior of a prepotent or near-prepotent AI system.
Thus, in order to be marginally valuable for the purpose of reducing exis-
tential risk, a focus on approaches to preference learning that might scale
well for directing more advanced systems (as in Tier 1 risks) may be needed.
For this, heuristics for minimizing the unintended side effects of the
system’s operation (Amodei et al., 2016; Krakovna et al., 2018), avoiding
taking optimization to extremes (Taylor, 2016b), or taking optimization
instructions too literally, also known as “reward hacking” (Amodei et al.,
2016; Ibarz et al., 2018)), could be useful to codify through theory or exper-
iment. Absent an approach to single/single delegation that would address
such issues implicitly and automatically, heuristics could be helpful as tran-
sient rules of thumb to guide early AI systems, or to provide inspiration for
rigorous and scalable long-term solutions to preference alignment.
As well, preference learning methods that account for idiosyncrasies of
human cognition may also be needed to avoid interpreting errors in judge-
ment as preferred outcomes. For instance, Evans and Goodman (2015) ex-
plore preference learning methods accounting for bounded cognitive ca-
pacity in the humand, and (Evans et al., 2016) account for biases in the
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human’s judgement. An alternative approach would be to ascertain how
humans themselves infer and convey preferences (Baker and Tenenbaum,
2014; Lucas et al., 2014; Meltzoff, 1995), and develop AI systems to use the
same methods.
This approach is being investigated by Stuart Armstrong, in as-yet un-
published work.
Consideration of side effects. If AI systems or human institutions use
preference learning to develop a highly precise understanding of human
preferences, that knowledge could be used in ways that are harmful to the
humans. For instance, satisfying the short-term preferences of the humans in
question could be used as part of a longer-term strategy to gain and exploit
their trust in ways that they will later regret. Thus, to respect the wishes
of the persons or institutions whose preferences are being learned, certain
measures may be needed to ensure that preference learning capabilities are
usually or always deployed within a preference alignment methodology.
Historical note. The challenge of clearly specifying commands to an
intelligent machine was also remarked by Norbert Wiener (Wiener, 1960);
see the historical note in Section 2.2 for a direct quote.
5.2.2 Direction 7: Human belief inference
An AI system that is able to infer what humans believe about the factual
state of the world could be better suited to interact with humans in a
number of ways. On the other hand, it might also allow the system to
acquire a large amount of human knowledge by inferring what humans
believe, thereby enabling prepotence. As such, this research direction is
very much “dual use”.
Social analogue. Suppose Alice is a doctor, and Bob is her intern. A
hospital patient named Charlie has previously experienced severe allergic
reactions to penicillin. One day, Charlie gets an ear infection, and Alice
prescribes penicillin for the treatment. Now suppose Bob is nearby, and
knows about Charlie’s allergy. What should Bob do about Alice’s decision?
If Bob assumes Alice’s beliefs about the world are correct, this would mean
either Alice wishes to harm Charlie, or that that Charlie is in fact no longer
allergic to penicillin.
However, the pragmatic thing is for Bob to infer something about Alice’s
beliefs: in this case, that Alice is not aware of Charlie’s allergy. This infer-
ence will likely lead Bob to ask questions of Alice, like whether Charlie’s
allergy has been accounted for in the decision.
Scenario-driven motivation. See the instrumental motivations.
Instrumental motivation. Progress on the theory and practice of belief
inference could improve our understanding of
• Direction 4 (AI-assisted deliberation). This may require AI systems
to model human beliefs, implicitly or explicitly, in order to decide
when and how to assist in their deliberation.
• Direction 6 (preference learning). Suppose a model describing humans
does not account for potential errors in a human’s beliefs when ob-
serving the human. Then, when the human fails at a task due to
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erroneous beliefs, the model will interpret the human as wanting to
the fail at the task. Hence, belief inference is important for preference
inference and thereby preference learning.
• Direction 11 (deference to humans). A number of protocols for AI
systems deferring to humans could involve inferring the beliefs of the
human. For instance, “defer to the human’s beliefs when the human
is more likely to be correct than me”, or “defer to the human in situ-
ations where the human will believe I should have deferred to them”.
These protocols behave very differently when the human’s beliefs are
incorrect but the human wants to be deferred to anyway, say, for
policy-level reasons intended to maintain human control. Nonethe-
less, they both take inferred human beliefs as inputs.
• Direction 24 (resolving planning disagreements). Humans with differ-
ing beliefs may come into disagreements about what policy a powerful
AI system should follow. An AI system that is able to infer the nature
of the differing beliefs may be able to help to resolve the disagreement
through dialogue.
Actionability. Human beliefs should likely be inferred through a va-
riety of channels, including both natural language and demonstrations.
Bayesian methods specifically for extracting human priors (Griffiths and
Kalish, 2005) have been explored to determine human priors on variables
such as box office earnings and the lengths of poems (Lewandowsky et al.,
2009). For learning human beliefs from demonstrations of human actions,
a generalization of Inverse Reinforcement Learning (Abbeel and Ng, 2004)
could be viable, such as by modeling the human as solving a POMDP.
There is a small amount of quantitative evidence that humans model other
agents (and presumably other humans) in this way, i.e., by assuming the
other agent is solving a POMDP and figuring out what the agent’s beliefs
and desires must be to explain the agent’s behavior (Baker et al., 2011).
If humans indeed make use of this “POMDP inversion” method in order
to model each other, perhaps AI systems could use POMDP inversion to
model humans. Differentiable MDP solvers and POMDP solvers can be
used for gradient descent-based approaches to maximum-likelihood estima-
tion of the MDP or POMDP an agent believes it is solving. This would
enable a learner to simultaneously infer the prior, transition rule, and re-
ward function in the mind of a demonstrator. Empirical testing could then
assess the efficacy of this approach for assessing the beliefs of humans from
their demonstrations. Reddy et al. (2018) has explored this methodology
in a user study with 12 human participants.
Consideration of side effects. There are several major concerns about
AI systems that are able to infer human beliefs.
• (rapid acquisition of human knowledge) If an AI system can in-
fer human beliefs in a usable form, it can acquire human knowledge.
For instance, if an AI system is capable of reading and understand-
ing natural language corpora, perhaps all of the knowledge of the
internet could be made available to the system in an actionable form.
The ability to absorb human knowledge at scale would eliminate one
of the main barriers to prepotence, namely, that human society has
accumulated wisdom over time that is not by default usable to a pow-
erful AI system. Belief inference methods, especially through natural
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language processing that could be repurposed to process natural lan-
guage corpora, could therefore enable prepotence and exacerbate all
Tier 1 risks (MPAI deployment events).
• (deception of humans) A related issue is that any sufficiently de-
tailed model of a human person could be used to deceive that person,
by reverse-engineering what they would need to see or hear in order to
become convinced of a certain belief. If an AI system is able to deceive
all of human society, this could enable prepotence via social acumen,
thereby exacerbating all Tier 1 risk (MPAI deployment events). Al-
ternatively, if an AI system is already prepotent via non-social means,
but only sufficiently skilled in deception that it can can deceive a small
number of individuals humans, it might trick its creators into deploy-
ing it prematurely, which would also increase Type 1b and 1c risks.
These issues would need to be averted somehow to ensure that the
net impact of human-modeling technology is a reduction in existential
risk.
5.2.3 Direction 8: Human cognitive models
Models of human cognition that are representable in a mathematical or
otherwise digital form could be useful for designing human/AI interaction
protocols for addressing other problems in this report. On the other hand,
they could also be abused to manipulate humans. This research direction,
like many, is “dual use”.
Social analogue. Suppose Alice is the CEO of a law firm, and Bob is her
assistant. Alice has been hoping for some time that her firm would take on
CharlieCorp as a client. Once day, CharlieCorp sends Alice a long email,
cc’ing Bob, which ends with
“... we are therefore seeking legal counsel. We assume from your
past cases that you would not be interested in taking us as a
client, but thought it would be a good idea to check.”
Alice, having a busy week, fails to read the last line of the email, and replies
only with “Thanks for the update.” Luckily, Bob realizes that Alice might
have overlooked the ending, and sends her a ping to re-read it. Alice re-
reads and responds with “Looking at your situation, we’d actually be quite
interested. Let’s set up a meeting.” Here, Bob is implicitly modeling not
only Alice’s desire to work with CharlieCorp, but also Alice’s attentional
mechanism. In particular, Charlie thinks Alice’s attention was not directed
toward the end of the email.
Later, CharlieCorp asks Bob a question about a very long document.
That day, Alice’s schedule is clear, and knowing Alice is a fast reader who is
familiar with the subject matter of the document, Bob forwards the question
to Alice for her to think about. Here, Bob is modeling Alice’s attentional
capacity, her written language comprehension, as well as the contents of
her memory.
Scenario-driven motivation. See the instrumental motivations.
Instrumental motivation and actionability. Progress on the theory
and practice of human cognitive modeling could improve our understanding
of
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• Direction 4 (AI-assisted deliberation). To the extent that AI systems
may eventually be needed to assist humans in safety assessments of
other AI systems, understanding the quirks and limitations of human
thinking may be helpful in designing a system that helps humans
to reach a sound conclusion. To this end, Ought.org (2017b) have
attempted to generate datasets of examples of human deliberative
output. Collecting more data of this sort could help to train and/or
validate models of human cognitive functions involved in deliberation.
• Direction 6 (preference learning). To infer a person’s preferences from
their behavioral outputs, it would help to understand the mapping B
from preferences to behavior, including speech. Then, preference in-
ference amounts to inverting that mapping: given observed behavior b,
we seek to find preferences p that would satisfy B(p) = b. Direction 7
(human belief inference) has already discussed how the person’s be-
liefs play a role in defining the map B. However, B is parametrized by
other features of human cognition aside from beliefs and preferences,
such as planning, attention, memory, natural language production,
and motor functions. Isolating or at least narrowing our uncertainty
about those variables could thus help us to reduce uncertainty in the
“behavior equation” B(p) = b that we are solving when performing
preference inference. As an example of early work in this direction,
Steyvers et al. (2006) models the interaction of inference and memory.
• Direction 11 (deference to humans). Suppose an AI system plans to
defer to humans to take over from certain confusing situations, but
those situations would either be too complex for humans to reason
about, or too prone to the influence of particular human biases for
humans to handle the situation responsibly. This means that even rou-
tine applications of AI technology, in situations where the AI hands
off control or decision-making to a human, will likely need to ac-
count explicitly or implicitly for human cognitive peculiarities aside
from preferences. Developing principled and generalizable hand-off
procedures that will scale with the intelligence of the AI system may
require better models of human cognition. As a simple present-day
example, self-driving car technology must account for human reac-
tion time when handing control over to a human driver (Dixit et al.,
2016).
• Direction 24 (resolving planning disagreements). Disagreements be-
tween humans might sometimes be due to different tendencies in more
basic cognitive functions like attention and memory. For example, if
Alice has a great memory and Bob has a terrible memory, Alice might
disagree with Charlie on the nature of their unrecorded verbal agree-
ments, and Bob—if he knows he has a bad memory—might not trust
Alice to be the arbitrator of those disagreements. Thus, an AI system
that offers compromises that humans are likely to accept may need a
working model of humans’ cognitive capacities aside from their pref-
erences. Identifying and explaining these differences could be helpful
in dispute resolutions, and hence in facilitating agreements to con-
tinue sharing ownership of powerful AI systems. For example, Taber
and Lodge (2006) shows that political disagreements arise to some ex-
tent from motivated skepticism, and Griffiths et al. (2008) show that
cultural disagreements should be expected to arise from inherited in-
ductive biases. Such nuances may also prove essential in Direction 22
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(modeling human committee deliberation).
Consideration of side effects. There are a number of potentially dan-
gerous and wide-reaching side effects to developing high-fidelity human cog-
nitive models.
• Manipulation of humans. Human cognitive models can be used
to manipulate humans. This can already be seen in social media plat-
forms that develop user models to generate addictive features to keep
users engaged. If sufficiently detailed, perhaps human cognitive mod-
els could be used by an AI system to manipulate all of human society
in a goal-directed fashion. In principle this could enable prepotence
through social acumen, thereby exacerbating all Tier 1 risks (MPAI
deployment events).
• Impoverished third-party safety testing. If detailed human
models are made publicly available, we impoverish our ability to per-
form “hold-out” safety testing and verification for powerful AI sys-
tems, as in Direction 3 (formal verification for machine learning sys-
tems). Specifically, if precise human models are not made publicly
available, and instead withheld by a independent AI safety testing
institution, then the models could be used to design simulation-based
safety tests as a regulatory safety check for AI systems built by pri-
vate corporations or the public. However, if the human models used in
the safety tests were released, or derivable by institutions other than
the safety testers, then the models could be used by corporations
or individuals deploying AI systems to “game” the regulatory testing
process (Taylor, 2016c), the way a student who knows what questions
will be on exam doesn’t need to learn the rest of the course material.
In particular, this could lead to an increase in Type 1b and 1c risks
(unrecognized prepotence and unrecognized misalignment). Thus, a
judicious awareness of how and when to apply human-modeling tech-
nology will be needed to ensure it is shared appropriately and applied
beneficially.
See also Direction 7 (human belief inference) for a consideration of side
effects of modeling human beliefs specifically.
5.3 Single/single control
5.3.1 Direction 9: Generalizable shutdown and handoff methods
As with any machine, it remains important to maintain safe shutdown pro-
cedures for an AI system in case the system begins to malfunction. One
might operationalize “shutdown” as the system “no longer exerting con-
trol over the environment”. However, in many situations, ceasing to apply
controls entirely may be extremely unsafe for humans, for example if the
system is controlling a self-driving car or an aircraft. In general, the sort of
shutdown procedure we humans want for an AI system is one that safely
hands off control of the situation to humans, or other AI systems. Hence,
the notion of a handoff can be seen as generalizing that of a shutdown pro-
cedure. In aviation, the term “handoff” can refer to the transfer of control
or surveillance of an aircraft from one control center to another, and in
medicine the term is used similarly for a transfer of responsibilities from
one doctor to another. This research direction is concerned with the devel-
opment of generalizable shutdown and handoff techniques for AI systems.
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Social analogue. Suppose AliceCorp hires Betty to take on some
mission-critical responsibilities. In case Betty ever becomes ill or unco-
operative and can no longer perform the job, other employees must be
ready to cover off Betty’s responsibilities until a replacement can be found.
Such handoffs of responsibility can be quite difficult to coordinate, es-
pecially if Betty’s departure is a surprise. For instance, any documented
instructions for performing Betty’s responsibilities may need to be docu-
mented in a manner that is readable to other employees, given their more
limited context and perhaps experience. Therefore, many companies will
go to great lengths to maintain detailed documentation of responsibilities
and handoff procedures. Similar procedures are often needed but missing
on the scale of industries: when certain companies become “too big to fail”,
governments are left with no means of replacing them with better versions
when they begin to malfunction.
Scenario-driven motivation. Generalizable shutdown and/or handoff
procedures could reduce the risk of Type 1b and 1c risks (unrecognized
prepotence and unrecognized misalignment) by making it easier for humans
to regain control of a situation where an AI system is malfunctioning or
behaving drastically. In general, future applications of powerful AI systems
may pose risks to society that cannot be simulated in a laboratory setting.
For such applications to be responsible, general principles of safe shutdown
and safe handoff procedures may need to be developed which are known in
advance to robustly generalize to the high-stakes application.
Somewhat orthogonally, perhaps the involvement of many humans in
training and/or drills for AI→human handoffs could create a source of
economic involvement for humans to reduce Type 2b risk (economic dis-
placement of humans), and/or cognitive stimulation for humans to reduce
Type 2c risk (human enfeeblement).
Actionability. Practically speaking, almost any existing computer hard-
ware or software tool has a custom-designed shutdown procedure, including
AI systems. However, there has not been much technical work on general-
izable strategies for shutting down or handing over control from an AI
system.
In human–robot interaction literature, there is a body of existing work
on safe handovers, typically referring to the handoff of physical objects
from robots to humans. For instance, Strabala et al. (2013), have stud-
ied both robot-to-human and human-to-robot handovers for a variety of
tasks. Moon et al. (2014) showed that using humanlike gaze cues during
human-robot handovers can improve the timing and perceived quality of
the handover event. For self-driving cars, Russell et al. (2016) show that
human motor learning affects car-to-driver handovers. For unmanned aerial
vehicles, Hobbs (2010) argue that “the further development of unmanned
aviation may be limited more by clumsy human–system integration than
by technological hurdles.” Each of these works contains reviews of further
relevant literature.
For coordination with multiple humans, Scerri et al. (2002b) put forward
a fairly general concept called transfer of control for an AI system coor-
dinating with multiple humans, which was tested in a meeting-planning
system called Electric Elves (E-Elves). The E-Elves system was used to
assist in scheduling meetings, ordering meals, and finding presenters, over
a 6-month period by a group of researchers at the University of South-
ern California. Scerri et al. describes the mathematical model underlying
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the system, which used an MDP formulation of the human/AI interaction
problem to express coordination strategies and assess their expected utility
in terms of “the likely relative quality of different entities’ decisions; the
probability of getting a response from an entity at a particular time; the
cost of delaying a decision; and the costs and benefits of changing coordina-
tion constraints”. Perhaps similar general principles could be used to design
shutdown and/or handover processes in other settings.
In any task environment, one might try to operationalize a safe shut-
down as “entering a state from which a human controller can proceed safely”.
As a cheaper proxy to use in place of a human controller in early prototyp-
ing, another AI system, or perhaps a diversity of other AI systems, could
be used as a stand-in during training. Suites of reinforcement learning en-
vironments such as OpenAI Gym (Brockman et al., 2016) could be used to
ascertain the generality of any given safe handover technique.
Consideration of side effects. As with any safety methodology, if safe
handover methods are developed for near-term systems and erroneously
presumed to generalize to more powerful systems, they could create a false
sense of security. For instance, suppose generalizable solutions are devel-
oped for handing off control from a single AI system to a single human,
such as from a self-driving car to a human driver. The same principles
might not work to hand off control from an automated air traffic control
system to human air traffic controllers, which might require solving a coor-
dination problem between the humans who receive the control in the event
of a shutdown. Or, a simple “suspend activity and power down” procedure
might be used to shut down many simple AI systems, but then someday fail
to effectively shut down a powerful misaligned system that can build and
execute copies of itself prior to the shutdown event. Thus, to apply ideas
from this research direction responsibly, one must remain on the lookout for
unique challenges that more complex or capable AI systems will present.
Historical note. Wiener has also remarked on the difficulty of interfering
with a machine which operates on a much faster time scale than a human.
“We have seen that one of the chief causes of the danger of
disastrous consequences in the use of the learning machine is
that man and machine operate on two distinct time scales, so
that the machine is much faster than man and the two do not
gear together without serious difficulties. Problems of the same
sort arise whenever two operators on very different time scales
act together, irrespective of which system is the faster and which
system is the slower.” (Wiener, 1960)
5.3.2 Direction 10: Corrigibility
An AI system is said to be corrigible if it “cooperates with what its creators
regard as a corrective intervention, despite default incentives for rational
agents to resist attempts to shut them down or modify their preferences”
(Soares et al., 2015). In particular, when safe shutdown procedures are
already designed and ready to execute, a corrigible AI system will not work
against its human operator(s) to prevent being shut down.
Social analogue. A person is said to be “corrigible” if they are capable
of being corrected, rectified, or reformed. An “incorrigible” person is one
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who does not adjust their behavior in response to criticism. If an employee
behaves in an incorrigible manner, an employer may rely on the ability to
terminate the employee’s contract to protect the company. Imagine, how-
ever, an incorrigible employee who is sufficiently crafty as to prevent at-
tempts to fire them, perhaps by applying legal technicalities or engaging
in manipulative social behaviors. Such a person can cause a great deal of
trouble for a company that hires them.
Scenario-driven motivation. As AI systems are developed that are in-
creasingly capable of social intelligence, it becomes increasingly important
to ensure that those systems are corrigible. An incorrigible AI system whose
goals or goal inference instructions are mis-specified at the time of its initial
deployment poses a Type 1c risk (unrecognized misalignment) to humans
if it is able to prevent us from modifying or disabling it.
Actionability. Hadfield-Menell et al. (2016b) have shown that a rein-
forcement learning system can be given uncertainty about its reward func-
tion in such a way that human attempts to shut it down will tend to cause
it to believe that being shut down is necessary for its goal. This is not a full
solution to corrigibility, however. Carey (2017) shows that incorrigibility
may still arise if the AI system’s uncertainty about the reward function is
not appropriately specified. Moreover, Milli et al. (2017) point out that too
much reward uncertainty can lead an AI system to underperform, so there
is a balance to be struck between expected performance and confidence that
shut-down will be possible.
As a potential next step for resolving these issues, experiments could test
other mechanisms aside from reward uncertainty for improving corrigibility.
For example, see Direction 20 (self-indication uncertainty) below.
A different approach to corrigibility for reward-based agents is to some-
how modify their beliefs or reward function to make them more amenable
to shutdown or modification. Armstrong and O’Rourke (2017) provides an
overview of attempts in this direction.
Consideration of side effects. Progress on the problem of corrigibility
does not seem to present many negative side effects, other than the usual
risk of falsely assuming that any given solution would generalize to a high-
stakes application without sufficient testing.
5.3.3 Direction 11: Deference to humans
Deference refers to the property of an AI system actively deferring to hu-
mans on certain decisions, possibly even when the AI system believes it has
a better understanding of what is right or what humans will later prefer.
Social analogue. Suppose Allan is a patient and Betty is his doctor.
Allan is bed-ridden but otherwise alert, and Dr. Betty is confident that
Allan should receive a dose of anesthetic to help Allan sleep. Suppose also
that the Dr. Betty is bound by law to ask for the patient’s consent before
administering this particular anesthetic, and that she expects the patient
to say “no”. Even if Dr. Betty is very confident that she knows what’s best
for the patient, the doctor is expected to defer to the patient’s judgment in
this case, rather than, say, administering the anesthetic in secret along with
the patient’s other medications. That is, the doctor is sometimes required
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to defer to the patient, even when confident that the patient will make the
wrong choice.
Instrumental motivation. Theoretical models and/or training proce-
dures for deference to humans could help directly with
• Direction 10 (corrigibility). In order to preserve the corrigibility of an
AI system over time, we will need AI systems to not only respond to
corrective interventions, but to seek them out as a matter of policy,
particularly on decisions that could lead to a loss of corrigibility.
• Direction 17 (hierarchical human-in-the-loop learning (HHL)). A
generic deference capability may allow AI systems to serve as useful
delegates in a chain of command including humans and other AI
systems.
• Direction 29 (human-compatible equilibria). A notion of deference
to humans that is stable as AI systems evolve and replicate over
time might constitute an important class of Direction 29 (human-
compatible equilibria).
Actionability. Simulated experiments where one AI system is required
to seek out and defer judgment to another AI system could be fruitful for
developing and testing protocols for deferring to outside judgment. Milli
et al. (2017) show that performance trade-offs are to be expected when
requiring direct obedience to commands. Experiments to ascertain an ap-
propriate balance between deference and autonomy for minimizing tail risks
arising from system mis-specification could be highly informative.
Consideration of side effects. Too much deference to humans could
lead to catastrophic errors. For instance, if a powerful AI system responsible
for managing the electrical grid of a city were to defer to a single human
on the decision to shut it down, perhaps many people could suffer or die
as a result. In the future, perhaps larger systemic failures of this sort could
present existential risks.
5.3.4 Direction 12: Generative models of open-source equilibria
AI systems are in principle completely inspectable to humans, in that their
execution can create a perfect log of every internal state that occurs. The
degree to which the internal “thought processes” of such machines will be
understandable to humans will likely depend on the success of future re-
search on Direction 1 (transparency and explainability). Whatever degree
of transparency and/or explainability can be achieved, its implications of
the game-theoretic relationship between systems and humans should be ex-
plored. But, so far, very little game theory research has been carried out to
ascertain, either analytically or by simulation, what equilibria arise between
agents when one agent is assumed to be partially or fully transparent to
another.
Social analogue. Suppose Alice is very good at reading Bob’s body lan-
guage, such that if Bob tries to deceive her or make plans that she would
dislike, Alice will notice. His thoughts, in addition to his outward actions,
have a direct impact on his interactions with Alice. Thus, Bob has an incen-
tive to think differently than he would if he were less transparent to Alice.
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This changes the space of actions Bob can take, because actions that would
require planning will produce side effects in Alice’s awareness. For example,
if Bob begins to formulate a plan to deceive Alice, she might notice and try
to shut him down and/or simply see through the deception.
Similarly, imagine two nations which have a large number of spies inves-
tigating one another. If Nation A begins to plan a trade embargo against
Nation B, spies may leak this information to Nation B and trigger early re-
sponses from Nation B prior to Nation A’s instatement of the embargo. The
early response could range from submissive behavior (say, conceding to Na-
tion A’s expected demands) to preemptive counter-embargoes, depending
on the situation.
Scenario-driven motivation. Could a powerful AI system someday
learn or infer how to deceive its own developers? If possible, it could
constitute a Type 1b or 1c risk (unrecognized prepotence or unrecognized
misalignment). If not possible, it would be reassuring to have a definite
answer as to why. This is a question for “open source game theory”, the
analysis of interactions between decision-making entities that are partially
or fully transparent to one another.
More broadly, deception is only one important feature of a human/AI
equilibrium in which mutual transparency of the human and the AI system
could play a key role. Another might be intimidation or corruption: is it
possible for the mere existence of a particular powerful AI system—in a
partially or fully transparent form—to intimidate or corrupt its creators
to modify or deploy it in ways that are harmful to the public? In a diffuse
sense, this might already be happening: consider how the existence of social
media platforms create an ongoing incentive for their developers to make
incremental updates to increase user engagement. While profitable for the
company, these updates and resulting increases in engagement might not
be beneficial to the overall well-being of individual users or society.
To understand the dynamics of these mutually transparent relation-
ships between humans and AI systems, it might help to begin by analyzing
the simplest case of a single human stakeholder interacting with a single
relatively transparent AI system, and asking what equilibrium (long-run)
behaviors are possible to arise.
Instrumental motivation. Generative models of machine learning
agents reaching equilibria in open-source games could be helpful toward
understanding
• Direction 17 (hierarchical human-in-the-loop learning (HHL)). In sce-
narios where one AI system is tasked with assisting in the oversight
of other AI systems, it might make sense for the overseer system to
be given access to the sources codes or other specifications of the
systems being overseen. By contrast, classical game theory assumes
that players are capable of private thoughts which determine their
actions. Hence, the relationship between an AI system and a system
overseeing its source code is outside the assumptions of classical game
theory.
• Direction 29 (human-compatible equilibria). An AI system’s source
code will likely be visible to the humans who engineered it, who will
likely use that code to run simulations or other analyses of the system.
This relationship is also outside the assumptions of classical game
theory.
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Actionability. Halpern and Pass (2013) have already remarked that
“translucency” rather than opacity is a more realistic assumption when
modeling the interaction of human institutions, or humans who can read
one another’s body language. Moreover, remarkably different equilibrium
behavior is possible when agents can read one another’s source code. Ten-
nenholtz (2004) developed the notion of program equilibrium for a pair of
programs playing a game which, when given access to one another’s source
code, have no positive incentive to be replaced or self-modified. Strikingly,
it turns out that open-source agents can achieve certain cooperative (or de-
fective) equilibria that are in principle not possible for closed-source agents
(Critch, 2019). Understanding whether and how such equilibria could arise
amongst advanced AI systems (and how various design choices might af-
fect these outcomes), or between AI systems and humans, is an important
question for understanding how multi-agent AI systems will equilibrate with
humans.
Consideration of side effects. This direction could be problematic
from an existential risk perspective if models of open-source equilibria are
later used to preferentially develop AI/AI/AI coordination methods in the
absence of human/AI coordination methods or multi-human multi-AI co-
ordination methods. Such methods could lead to Type 2b and 2c risks (eco-
nomic displacement of humans and human enfeeblement) and/or Type 2c
risk (human enfeeblement) if they result in too much human exclusion from
economically productive work.
6 Single/multi delegation research
This section is concerned with delegation from a single human stakeholder
to multiple operationally separated AI systems (defined below).
As powerful AI systems proliferate, to diminish Type 1b and 1c risks
(unrecognized prepotence and unrecognized misalignment), it might help to
have ways of predicting and overseeing their collective behavior to ensure
it remains controllable and aligned with human interests. Even if serving
a single human or human institution, coordination failures between large
numbers of interacting machines could yield dangerous side effects for hu-
mans, e.g., pollutive waste, or excessive consumption of energy or other re-
sources. These could constitute Type 1c risks (unrecognized misalignment).
Conversely, unexpectedly well-coordinated interactions among multiple AI
systems could constitute Type 1b risk (unrecognized prepotence), for in-
stance, if a number of cooperating AI systems turned out to be capable of
collective bargaining with states or powerful corporations.
To begin thinking clearly about such questions, we must first decide
what to count as “multiple AI systems” versus only a single AI system:
Operational separation. Roughly speaking, for the purposes of this
report, when we say “multiple AI systems” we are referring to a collec-
tion of AI-based algorithms being executed on physically or virtually sep-
arated computational substrate units, with each unit having a relatively
high-bandwidth internal integration between its sensors, processors, and
actuators, but only relatively low-bandwidth connections to other units.
We say that such units are operationally separated.
It might be tempting to simplify the number of concepts at play by
viewing the collective functioning of operationally separate units as a single
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“agent” to be aligned with the human stakeholder. However, this perspective
would elide the mathematical and computational challenges involved in bal-
ancing the autonomy of the individual units against the overall functioning
of the group, as well as the non-trivial task of dividing up responsibilities
between the units.
Dec-POMDPs. The concept of a Decentralized Partially Observable
Markov Decision Process, or Dec-POMDP (Oliehoek et al., 2016), is a use-
ful formalism for describing the problem faced by multiple AI systems (i.e.,
multiple operationally separated units) working to serve a common pur-
pose. Variants of Dec-POMDPs can also be considered, such as by adding
uncertainty to the reward function or transition dynamics, or more refined
assumptions on computational limitations.
6.1 Single/multi comprehension
If companies and governments deploy “fleets” of AI systems to serve specific
objectives—be they in physical or virtual environments—humans will likely
seek to understand their collective behavior in terms of the individual units
and their relationships to one another. From one perspective, a fleet of AI
systems might be viewed as “just a set of parallel processing units.” But,
when the systems are engaged in interactive intelligent decision-making
based on objective-driven modeling and planning, new tools and abstrac-
tions may be needed to organize our understanding of their aggregate im-
pact. This section is concerned with research to develop such tools and
abstractions.
Single/multi delegation seems poised to become increasingly relevant.
Modern computer systems, and machine learning systems in particular, al-
ready make increasing use of parallel computation. This is in part because
the speed of individual processors has started to encounter physical limits,
even though the cost of a FLOP has continued to decline rapidly. However,
there are also increasingly relevant physical limits to communication band-
width between processes; thus future large-scale computer systems will al-
most certainly employ a high degree of operational separation at some scale
of organization.
6.1.1 Direction 13: Rigorous coordination models
The Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theorem and resulting utility theory
(Morgenstern and Von Neumann, 1953; Von Neumann and Morgenstern,
2007) provides a principled framework for interpreting the actions of a single
agent: optimizing an expected value function conditioned on a belief distri-
bution over the state of the world. Can an analogous theory be developed
for a cooperative multi-agent system to serve a single goal or objective? In
addition to utilities and beliefs, the model should also include mathematical
representations of at least two other concepts:
• Communications: packets of information exchanged between the
agents. These could be modeled as “actions”, but since communica-
tions are often designed specifically to directly affect only the internal
processes of the agents communicating, they should likely receive spe-
cial treatment.
• Norms: constraints or objective functions for the policies of indi-
vidual agents, which serve to maintain the overall functioning of the
group rather than the unilateral contributions of its members.
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Social analogue. Humans, of course, communicate. And our reliance
upon norms is evident from the adage, “The ends do not justify the means”.
An individual person is not generally expected to take actions at all costs
to unilaterally optimize for a given objective, even when the person believes
the objective to serve “the greater good”. Instead, a person is expected to
act in accordance with laws, customs, and innate respect for others, which
ideally leads to improved group-scale performance.
Scenario-driven motivation. If there is any hope of proving rigorous
theorems regarding the collective safety of multi-agent systems, precise and
accurate mathematical definitions for their components and interaction pro-
tocols will be needed. In particular, theorems showing that a collective of
AI systems is or is not likely to become prepotent or misaligned will require
such models. Hence, this direction applies to the reduction of Type 1b and
1c risks (unrecognized prepotence and unrecognized misalignment). More-
over, common knowledge of problems and solutions in this area may be
necessary to motivate coordination to reduce Type 1a risks (uncoordinated
MPAI development), or to avoid dangerous interactions with powerful AI
systems that would yield Type 1d risk (involuntary MPAI deployment).
Actionability. The framework of Dec-POMDPs introduced by Bernstein
et al. (2002) provides a ready-made framework for evaluating any architec-
ture for decentralized pursuit of an objective; see Oliehoek et al. (2016)
for an overview. As such, to begin proving a theorem to support the use
of any given coordination protocol, one could start by stating conjectures
using the language of Dec-POMDPs. Protocols could be tested empirically
against existing machine learning methods for solving Dec-POMDPs. In
fact, any given Dec-POMDP can be framed as two distinct machine learn-
ing problems:
• Centralized training for decentralized execution. This is the problem
of producing—using a centralized training and/or learning system—
a suite of decentralized “agents” (sensor/actuator units) that collec-
tively pursue a common objective. As examples of recent work in this
area:
– Sukhbaatar et al. (2016) treat a system of decentralized agents
undergoing centralized training as a single large feed-forward
network with connectivity constraints representing bandwidth-
limited communication channels. The authors find that on four
diverse tasks, their model outperforms variants they developed
with no communication, full-bandwidth communication (i.e., a
fully connected network), and models using discrete communi-
cation.
– Foerster et al. (2016) propose two approaches to centralized
learning of communication protocols for decentralized execution
tasks. The first, Reinforced Inter-Agent Learning (RIAL), has
each agent learn its communication policy through independent
deep Q-learning. The second, Differentiable Inter-Agent Learn-
ing (DIAL), allows the training system to propagate error deriva-
tives through noisy communication channels between the agents,
which are replaced by discrete (lower bandwidth) communication
channels during execution.
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– Foerster et al. (2017) explore, in a collaborative multi-agent set-
ting with no communication at execution time, two methods for
making use of experience replay (the re-use of past experiences
to to update a current policy). Each method aims to prevent the
learners from confusing the distant-past behavior of its collabo-
rators with their more recent behavior. The first method treats
replay memories as off-environment data (Ciosek and Whiteson,
2017). The second method augments past memories with a “fin-
gerprint”: an ordered tuple comprising the iteration number and
exploration rate, to help distinguish where in the training history
the experience occurred.
• Decentralized training for decentralized execution. This is the problem
of a decentralized set of learners arriving at a collective behavior that
effectively pursues a common objective. As examples of recent related
work:
– Matignon et al. (2012) identify five qualitatively distinct co-
ordination challenges—faced by independent reinforcement
learners pursuing a common (cooperative) objective—which
they call “Pareto-selection”, “nonstationarity”, “stochasticity”,
“alter-exploration” and “shadowed equilibria”.
– Tampuu et al. (2017) examine decentralized Q-learners learning
to play variants of Pong from raw visual data, including a co-
operative variant where both players are penalized equally when
the ball is dropped.
The variety of problems and methods in recent literature for training
collaborative agents shows that no single architecture has been identified as
universally effective, and far from it. None of the above works is accompa-
nied by a rigorous theoretical model of how coordination ought to work in
order to be maximally or even sufficiently effective. Hence the motivation
for more rigorous foundations: to triage the many potential approaches to
learning for single/multi delegation.
Consideration of side effects. In order for research enabling multi-
agent coordination to eventually lead to a decrease rather than an increase
in existential risk, it will need to be applied in a manner that avoids runaway
coordination schemes between AI systems that would constitute a Type 1a,
1b, 1c, or 1d risk (uncoordinated MPAI development, unrecognized prepo-
tence, unrecognized misalignment, or involuntary MPAI deployment). In
particular, coordination-learning protocols compatible with a human being
serving as one of the coordinating agents may be considerably safer in the
long run than schemes that exclude humans. Present methods do not seem
particularly suitable for explicitly including humans in the mix.
6.1.2 Direction 14: Interpretable machine language
Just as today we seek more enlightening explanations for the actions of a
neural network in order to improve our ability to evaluate and predict its
behavior, in the not-too-distant future we will likely find ourselves seeking
to understand the content of communications between AI systems.
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Social analogue. Business regulations that generate legible, auditable
communications within and between companies increase the difficulty for
those companies to engage in corrupt business practices. This effect is of
course only partial: despite the significant benefits of auditing requirements,
it is usually still possible to find ways of abusing and/or circumventing
legitimate communication channels for illegitimate means.
Scenario-driven motivation. As we humans delegate more of our de-
cisions to AI systems, we will likely require those systems to communicate
with each other to achieve shared goals. Just as transparency for an individ-
ual AI system’s cognition benefits our ability to debug and avoid systematic
and random errors, so too will the ability to interpret communications be-
tween distinct decision-making units. This benefit will likely continue to
scale as the scope and number of AI systems grows. For AI capabilities ap-
proaching prepotence, interpretability of communications between AI sys-
tems may be needed to avoid Type 1b and 1c risks (unrecognized prepo-
tence and unrecognized misalignment). The more broadly understandable
the interpreted communications are made, the better developer coordina-
tion can be enabled to diminish Type 1a risk (uncoordinated MPAI develop-
ment). Since interpretable communications are more easily monitored and
regulated, interpretable communication standards may also be helpful for
regulating communicative interactions with powerful deployed AI systems,
including communications that could precipitate Type 1d risk (involuntary
MPAI deployment).
Actionability. As techniques develop for machine learning transparency
and interpretability, similar techniques may be adaptable to ensure the in-
terpretability of machine–machine communications in multi-agent settings;
see Direction 1. Or, there may arise entirely novel approaches. Bordes et al.
(2016) explore the use of end-to-end trained dialog systems for issuing and
receiving API calls, as a test case for goal-oriented dialogue.
In this setting, one could consider a dialogue between two machines,
Machine A and Machine B, where A treats B as a machine+human system
in which the human on rare occasions attempts to understand messages
from A to B and penalizes the system heavily if they are not understand-
able. As an alternative or complement to sparse human feedback, perhaps
machine–machine language could be constrained or regularized to be sim-
ilar to human language, as in Lewis et al. (2017). Or, perhaps frequent
automated feedback on the understandability of the A/B communication
channel could be provided by a dialog state-tracking system (DSTS). As
DSTS normally attempts to understand human dialogue (Henderson et al.,
2014), but perhaps one could be repurposed to give automated feedback on
whether it can understand the communication between A and B.
Consideration of side effects. Any attempt to design or select for in-
terpretability could lead to accidentally deceiving humans if one optimizes
too much for human satisfaction with the communications rather than the
accuracy of the human’s understanding. A particular concern is “steganog-
raphy”, where information is “hidden in plain sight” in a way that is invisible
to humans; demonstrate steganography in cycleGANs ().
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6.1.3 Direction 15: Relationship taxonomy and detection
In any attempt to train a multi-agent system to perform useful tasks like
delivery services and waste collection, it is already clear that our choice of
training mechanism will tend to affect whether the individual agents end
up exhibiting cooperative or competitive relationships with one another.
Aside from “cooperative” and “competitive”, what other descriptors of re-
lationships between agents in a multi-agent system can be quantified that
would allow us to better understand, predict, and perhaps improve upon
the system’s behavior?
Social analogue. Alice and Bob work together on a team whose respon-
sibility is to send out a newsletter every week. Alice always asks to see
the newsletter before Bob sends it out. Bob has expressed that he thinks
Alice’s review is an unnecessary step, however, Alice continues to advocate
for her review step. Are Alice and Bob in a competitive or cooperative
relationship here? The answer could be somewhat complex. Perhaps Alice
and Bob both really have the newsletter’s best interests at heart, and know
this about each other, but Alice just doesn’t trust Bob’s judgment about
the newsletters. Or, perhaps she doubts his loyalty to their company, or
the newsletter project specifically. Perhaps even more complicatedly, she
might trust Bob’s judgment about the content entirely, but prefer to keep
the reviews in place to ensure that others know for sure that the newsletter
has her approval. This scenario illustrates just a few ways in which dis-
agreements in working relationships can arise from a variety of different
relationships between beliefs and values, that do not always involve having
different values.
Scenario-driven motivation. To avert Type 1b and 1c risks (unrecog-
nized prepotence and unrecognized misalignment), any single institution
deploying multiple powerful AI systems into the real world will need to
have a sufficient understanding of the relationships that would arise be-
tween those systems to be confident their aggregate behavior would never
constitute an MPAI. To avoid Type 1a and 1d risks (uncoordinated MPAI
development and involuntary MPAI deployment), development teams will
collectively need to maintain an adequate awareness of the potential inter-
actions between their own AI systems and AI systems deployed by other
teams and stakeholders.
For instance, consider the possibility of a war between AI systems yield-
ing an unsurvivable environment for humanity.
• If the warring AI systems were developed by warring development
teams, the aggregate AI system comprising the interaction between
the warring systems would be an MPAI. This would constitute a
Type 1a risk (uncoordinated MPAI development), or a Type 1e risk
(voluntary MPAI deployment) if one of the teams recognized that
their involvement in the war would make it unsurvivable. Such cases
could perhaps be made less likely by other “peacekeeping” AI systems
detecting the violent relationship between the conflicting systems, and
somehow enforcing peace between them to prevent them from becom-
ing an MPAI in aggregate.
• If the war or its intensity was unexpected or unintended by the de-
velopers of the AI technology used in the war, it could constitute a
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Type 1b, 1c, or 1d risk (unrecognized prepotence, unrecognized mis-
alignment, or involuntary MPAI deployment). Such cases could per-
haps be made less likely by detecting and notifying developers when
violent relationships are arising between the systems they develop
and deploy, and allowing developers to recall systems on the basis of
violent usage.
On the other hand, an unexpected coalition of AI systems could also
yield a runaway loss of power for humanity. If the coalition formation was
expected by everyone, but human institutions failed to work together to
stop it, then it would constitute a 1a or 1d. Developing a methodology for
identifying and analyzing relationships between AI systems might be among
the first steps to understanding and preventing these eventual possibilities.
Crucially, there may be many more complex relationships between pow-
erful AI systems that we humans would struggle to define in terms of simple
war or peace, furthering the need for a systematic study of machine rela-
tionships. In any case, both positive and negative results in research on
relationship taxonomy and detection could be beneficial to making nega-
tive outcomes less likely:
• Benefits of negative results. If the relationships between near-
prepotent AI systems begin to appear too complex to arrange in a
manner that is legibly safe for humanity, then researchers aware of
this issue can advise strongly for policies to develop at most one very
powerful AI system to serve human civilization (or no such system at
all, if multi/single delegation also proves too difficult). In other words,
advanced warning of unsurmountable difficulties in this research area
might help to avoid heading down a so-called “multi-polar” develop-
ment path for powerful AI technologies.
• Benefits of positive results. If the relationships between near-
prepotent AI systems appear manageable, perhaps such systems could
be used to keep one another in check for the safety of humanity. In
other words, positive results in this area might help to optimize a
“multi-polar” development pathway to be safer on a global scale.
Actionability. One approach to this research area is to continually ex-
amine social dilemmas through the lens of whatever is the leading AI devel-
opment paradigm in a given year or decade, and attempt to classify interest-
ing behaviors as they emerge. This approach might be viewed as analogous
to developing “transparency for multi-agent systems”: first develop inter-
esting multi-agent systems, and then try to understand them. At present,
this approach means examining the interactions of deep learning systems.
For instance, Leibo et al. (2017) examine how deep RL systems interact
in two-player sequential social dilemmas, and Foerster et al. (2018) explore
the consequences of agents accounting for one another’s learning processes
when they update their strategies, also in two-player games. Mordatch and
Abbeel (2018) examine the emergence of rudimentary languages from a cen-
tralized multi-agent training process, giving rise to a variety of interactive
behaviors among the agents.
Consideration of side effects. This sort of “build first, understand
later” approach will become increasingly unsatisfying and unsafe as AI tech-
nology improves, especially if AI capabilities ever approach prepotence. As
remarked by Bansal et al. (2017), “a competitive multi-agent environment
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trained with self-play can produce behaviors that are far more complex than
the environment itself.” As such, it would be useful to develop a method-
ology for relationship taxonomy and detection that not only makes sense
for current systems but will generalize to new machine learning paradigms
in the future. For this, a first-principles approach rooted in the language
of game theory and/or economics may be necessary as a complement to
empirical work.
6.1.4 Direction 16: Interpretable hierarchical reporting
This research direction is concerned with arranging hierarchies of AI sys-
tems that report to one another and to humans in a manner that resembles
a present-day human business, and that would be legible to human over-
seers. Hierarchy is a natural solution to the problem of “scalable oversight”
(Amodei et al., 2016) for teams of AI systems and/or humans, because
hierarchies often lead to exponential gains in efficiency by reducing the
complexity of problems and systems to smaller parts. In a hierarchical re-
porting paradigm, AI systems could be developed for the express purpose
of “middle management”, to provide intelligible reports and questions either
directly to humans, or other AI systems. By involving human overseers at
more levels of the hierarchy, perhaps a greater degree of interpretability for
the aggregate system can be maintained.
Social analogue. Imagine the CEO of a large corporation with thou-
sands of employees. The CEO is responsible for making strategic decisions
that steer the company towards desirable outcomes, but does not have the
time or expert technical knowledge to manage all employees and operations
directly. Instead, she meets with a relatively small number of managers, who
provide her with summarized reports on the company’s activities that are
intelligible to the CEO’s current level of understanding, with additional de-
tails available upon her request, and a limited number of questions deferred
directly to her judgment. In turn, each manager goes on to review other
employees in a similar fashion. This reporting structure is enriched by the
ability of the CEO to ask questions about reports from further down in the
“chain of command”.
Scenario-driven motivation. Consider a world in which autonomous,
nearly-prepotent AI systems have become capable of interacting to gener-
ate a large number of business transactions that generate short-term wealth
for their users and/or trade partners. Who or what entity can oversee the
net impact of these transactions to avoid negative externalities in the form
of catastrophic risks, e.g., from pollution or runaway resource consump-
tion? Historically, human governments have been responsible for overseeing
and regulating the aggregate effects of the industries they enable, and have
benefited from human-to-human communications as a source of inspectable
documentation for business interactions. If no similar report-generation pro-
cess is developed for AI systems, human businesses and governments will
face a choice: either to stifle the local economic gains obtainable from au-
tonomous business transactions in favor of demanding more human involve-
ment to generate reports, or to accept the risk of long-term loss of control
in favor of the short-term benefits of more autonomy for the AI systems.
If and when any nation or corporation would choose the latter, the result
could be:
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• An increase in Type 1c, 1b, and 1d risks (unrecognized misalignment,
unrecognized prepotence, and involuntary MPAI deployment) due to
the inability of the companies releasing AI systems to monitor their
potential prepotence or misalignment through reporting mechanisms,
and
• An increase in Type 1a risks (uncoordinated MPAI development) due
to the inability of human authorities such as governments and profes-
sional organizations to recognize and avert decentralized development
activities that could pose a risk to humanity in aggregate.
Thus, it would makes sense to find some way of eliminating the pressure to
choose low-oversight regulatory regimes and business strategies, by making
high-oversight strategies cheaper and more effective. Hierarchical report-
ing schemes would take advantage of exponential growth of the amount
of supervision carried out as a function of the depth of the hierarchy, and
may become a key component to scaling up supervisory measures in a
cost-effective manner. One potential approach to this problem would be to
deploy AI systems in “middle management” roles that curate reports for
human consumption. One can imagine chains of command between sub-
modules that oversee one another for safety, ethics, and alignment with
human interests. Just as communication between employees within a com-
pany can be made to produce a paper trail that helps to some degree with
keeping the company aligned with governing authorities, perhaps teams of
AI systems could be required to keep records of their communications that
would make their decision-making process more inspectable by, and there-
fore more accountable to, human overseers. Such an approach could serve
to mitigate Tier 1 risks (MPAI deployment events) in full generality.
Actionability. The interpretability aspect of this research direction
would benefit directly from work on Directions 1 (transparency and ex-
plainability). The concept of hierarchical learning and planning is neither
new nor neglected in reinforcement learning (Dayan and Hinton, 1993;
Kaelbling, 1993; Wiering and Schmidhuber, 1997; Sutton et al., 1999; Di-
etterich, 2000; Kulkarni et al., 2016; Vezhnevets et al., 2016; Bacon et al.,
2017; Tessler et al., 2017). The conception of different levels of the planning
hierarchy as separate agents is also familiar (Parr and Russell, 1998). By
viewing levels of hierarchical planning as separate learning agents, one can
ask how to improve the transparency or interpretability of the subagents to
the superagents, along the lines of Direction 1 (transparency and explain-
ability). Ideally, the “reports” passed from subagents to superagents would
be human-readable as well, as in Direction 14 (interpretable machine
language). Hence, work on building interpretable hierarchical reporting
structures could begin by combining ideas from these earlier research direc-
tions, subject to the constraint of maintaining and ideally improving task
performance. For instance, one might first experiment with unsupervised
learning to determine which ‘report features’ should be passed from a
sub-agent to a superagent, in the manner learned by the agents in Mor-
datch and Abbeel (2018). One could then attempt to impose the constraint
that the reports be human-interpretable, through a combination of real
human feedback and artificial regularization from natural language parsers,
although as discussed in Direction 1 (transparency and explainability), it
is unclear how to ensure such reports would reflect reality, as opposed to
simply offering “rationalizations”.
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Consideration of side effects. If the humans involved in interpreting
the system were insufficiently concerned with the safety of the public, they
might be insufficiently vigilant to avert catastrophic risk from rare or un-
precedented events. Or, if the humans individually cared about catastrophic
risks, but were for some reason uncomfortable with discussing or reporting
the potential for rare or unprecedented catastrophes, their individual con-
cerns would not be enough to impact the collective judgment of the system.
Hence, Type 2d risk (ESAI discourse impairment) might undermine some
of the usefulness of this research direction specifically for existential risk re-
duction. Finally, if the resulting systems were interpretable to humans, but
the institutions deploying the systems chose not to involve enough humans
in the actual task of interpreting the systems (say, to operate more quickly,
or to avoid accountability), then advancements in this area would accrue
mostly to the capabilities of the resulting systems rather than their safety.
6.2 Single/multi instruction
This section is concerned with delivering instructions to N operationally
separated decision-making units to serve the objectives of a single human
stakeholder. This problem does not reduce to the problem of instructing N
separate AI systems to each serve the human on their own. This is because
coordination solutions are needed to ensure the units interact productively
rather than interfering with one another’s work. For instance, given multiple
“actuator” units—each with the job of taking real-world actions to affect
their physical or virtual environments—a separate “coordinator” unit could
be designed to assist in coordinating their efforts. Conveniently, the role of
the coordinator also fits within the Dec-POMDP framework as a unit with
no actuators except for communication channels with the other units.
6.2.1 Direction 17: Hierarchical human-in-the-loop learning
(HHL)
Just as reports will be needed to explain the behavior of AI systems to
humans and other AI systems, queries from subsystems may be needed to
aid the subsystems’ decision-making at times when they have insufficient
information or training to ensure safe and beneficial behavior. This research
objective is about developing an AI subsystem hierarchy in a manner com-
patible with real-time human oversight at each level of the hierarchy.
Social analogue. Many companies are required to undergo financial au-
dits on a regular basis. For example, the California Nonprofit Integrity Act
requires any charity with an annual gross revenue of $2 million or more
to have their financial statements audited, on an annual basis, by an inde-
pendent certified public accountant. This ensures that the taxpayer has a
representative—the auditing firms—involved in the management of every
tax-exempt company of a sufficient size. Suppose instead that California’s
Franchise Tax Board attempted to audit every company itself; the FTB
would quickly become overwhelmed by the amount of information to pro-
cess. Hence, the notion of an auditing firm is a replicable and hence scalable
unit of organization that allows for more pervasive representation of tax-
payer interests, at a scale of authority that is intermediate between the
employees of individual companies on the low end and the California Fran-
chise Tax Board on the high end.
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Scenario-driven motivation. Active learning—that is, machine learn-
ing driven by queries from the machine to a human about areas of high
uncertainty—seems potentially necessary for ensuring any AI system makes
economical use of the human labor involved in training it. It is likely possi-
ble to arrange AI systems into a hierarchy, as in Direction 16 (interpretable
hierarchical reporting), where lower-level systems make queries to higher-
level systems. In such a set-up, human beings could be involved in answering
the queries, either
• only at the topmost level of the hierarchy, or
• at all or most levels of the hierarchy.
The latter option would seem better from an employment perspective:
more roles for humans in the hierarchy means a reduction of Type 2b risk
(economic displacement of humans), and if the roles involve maintaining
valuable human skills, a reduction of Type 2c risk (human enfeeblement).
Involving a human at each node of the hierarchy also seems better from
the perspective of accountability and governance. Many human laws and
accountability norms are equipped to deal with hierarchical arrangements
of responsibilities, and hence could be applied as soft constraints on the sys-
tem’s behavior via feedback from the humans. In particular, human-checked
company policies could be implemented specifically to reduce Type 1b, 1c,
and 1d risks (unrecognized prepotence, unrecognized misalignment, and in-
voluntary MPAI deployment), and nation-wide or world-wide laws could be
implemented to reduce Type 1a and 1e risks (uncoordinated MPAI devel-
opment and voluntary MPAI deployment). The weight of these laws could
derive in part from the accountability (or less euphemistically, the punisha-
bility) of the individual humans within the system if they fall short of their
responsibilities to instruct the system according to safety guidelines. Such
a system of accountability might feel daunting for whatever humans would
be involved in the system and therefore accountable for global safety, but
this trade-off could well be worth it from the perspective of existential risk
and long-term human existence.
Actionability. Engineering in this area would benefit from work on Di-
rection 16 (interpretable hierarchical reporting) because of the improved
understanding of the aggregate system that would accrue to the engineers.
After deployment, in order for each human in the HHL system to over-
see their corresponding AI system in a time-efficient manner, techniques
would be needed to train each AI system to take a large number of actions
with only sparse feedback from their human supervisor on which actions are
good. Amodei et al. (2016) identify this issue as a problem in what they call
“scalable oversight”, and propose to approach it via semi-supervised rein-
forcement learning (SSRL). In SSRL, where a managing or training system
(which might involve a human) provides only sparse input into the decision-
making of a reinforcement learner. They outline six technical approaches
to scalable oversight, and potential experiments to begin work in this area.
Sparse rewards are merely one piece of the puzzle needed to be solved
to enable HHL. Abel et al. (2017) aim to develop a schema for “Human-
in-the-Loop Reinforcement Learning” that is agnostic to the structure of
the learner. Scaling up human-in-the-loop interaction models in a prin-
cipled and generalizable manner is a rich technical challenge. To reduce
confusion about whether solutions would be applicable for more complex
or civilization-critical tasks, it is recommended that authors include in their
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publications some discussion of the scalability of their solutions, e.g., as in
Saunders et al. (2017).
Consideration of side effects. Hierarchical decision-making structures
present a clear avenue for general AI capabilities advancements. These ad-
vancements may fail to reduce existential risk if any of the following prob-
lems arise:
• The institutions deploying the resulting AI systems choose not to in-
volve enough humans in the hierarchy. For instance, the institution
might prefer this outcome to speed up performance, or avoid account-
ability.
• The AI systems in the hierarchy are insufficiently legible to the hu-
mans, i.e., if progress on Direction 16 (interpretable hierarchical re-
porting) has been insufficient, or not applied to the system.
• The humans involved in the hierarchy are insufficiently individually
motivated to think about and avert unprecedented catastrophic risks.
• The humans in the hierarchy are uncomfortable discussing or report-
ing their concerns about unprecedented catastrophic risks.
6.2.2 Direction 18: Purpose inheritance
As AI systems are used increasingly in the development of other AI systems,
some assurance is needed that the deployment of a putatively “aligned”
system will not lead to the creation of dangerous systems as a side effect.
To begin thinking about this dynamic informally, if an AI system A
takes actions that “create” another AI system B, let us say that B is a
“descendant” of A. Descendants of descendants of A are also considered to
be descendants of A. Given a satisfactory a notion of “creating a descen-
dant”, we say that A has a heritable purpose to the extent that there is
some purpose—that is, some internally or externally specified objective—
which A’s own actions directly benefit, and which the collective actions
of A’s descendants also benefit. This research direction is concerned with
the challenge of creating powerful AI systems with any particular heritable
purpose, with human survival being a purpose of special interest.
While the precise definition of “creating a descendant” is interesting to
debate, the relevant definition for this report is whatever notion can best
guide our efforts to reduce existential risk from useful real-world AI systems.
In particular, our notion of “creation” should be taken fairly generally. It
should include cases where A creates B
• “intentionally”, in the sense of being directed by a planning process
internal to A which represents and selects a series of actions for their
utility in creating B;
• “subserviently”, in the sense of being directed by a human or another
AI system with an intention to use use A as a tool for the creation of
B; or
• “accidentally”, in the sense of not arising from intentions on the part
of A or other systems directing A.
Whatever the definition, safety methods applicable for broader definitions
of “descendant” will be able to cover more bases for avoiding existential
risks from descendant AI systems.
73
Social analogue. A human corporation may be viewed as having a her-
itable purpose if it only ever creates subsidiary companies that effectively
serve the parent corporation’s original purpose. To the extent that sub-
sidiaries might later choose to defect against the parent’s mission, or create
further subsidiaries that defect, the parent’s purpose would not be consid-
ered perfectly heritable.
When a human institution builds an AI system, that system can be
viewed as a “descendant” of the institution. So, if an AI system brings
about human extinction, it could be said that human civilization itself
(as an institution) lacks the survival of the human species as a heritable
purpose.
Scenario-driven motivation. An AI system with the potential to create
prepotent descendants presents a Type 1b risk (unrecognized prepotence).
As an unlikely but theoretically enlightening example, an AI system per-
forming an unconstrained search in the space of computer programs has
the potential to write an AI program which is or becomes prepotent. In
general, it may be difficult to anticipate which AI systems are likely to
instantiate descendants, or to detect the instantiation of descendants. At
the very least, a powerful AI system that is not itself an MPAI, but which
lacks human survival as a heritable purpose and is used to develop other
AI systems, could constitute a Type 1c risk (unrecognized misalignment).
For instance, an automated training system for developing machine learn-
ing systems could be used as a tool to develop an MPAI, and hence the
training system would lack human survival as a heritable purpose.
Actionability. Lack of technically clear definitions of “instantiate a de-
scendant” and “heritable purpose” are obstructions to this research direc-
tion. Some definitions would be too restrictive to apply in reality, while oth-
ers would be too permissive to imply safety results even in theory. Hence,
next actions could involve developing clearer technical conceptions of these
ideas that are adequate for the purposes of guiding engineering decisions
and reducing existential risk. There are at least two distinct approaches one
might consider:
• Approach 1: Avoidance techniques. This approach develops an
adequate definition of “instantiating a descendant”, and uses the re-
sulting concept to design AI systems that entirely avoid instantiating
descendants, thus obviating the need for purpose inheritance. There
has not been much research to date on how to quantify the notion
of “instantiating a descendant”, though a few attempts are implicit
in literature on agents that “copy”, “teleport”, or “tile” themselves
(Yudkowsky and Herreshoff, 2013; Orseau, 2014a,b; Soares, 2014; Fal-
lenstein and Soares, 2015). One problem is that current theoretical
models of AI systems typically assume a well-defined interface be-
tween the AI system and its environment, receiving inputs only via
well-defined sensors and making outputs only via well-defined actua-
tors. Such models of AI systems are sometimes called dualistic, after
mind-body dualism. In reality, AI systems are embedded in the phys-
ical world, which they can influence and be influenced by in ways not
accounted for by the leaky abstraction of their interface. Orseau and
Ring (2012) consider a fully embedded version of AIXI (Hutter, 2004;
Everitt and Hutter, 2018) and conclude that in this setting: “as soon
as the agent and environment interact, the boundary between them
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may quickly blur or disappear” (Orseau and Ring, 2012), but these
works do not attempt to resolve the questions this raises about iden-
tifying descendants. Thus, a more general and real-world applicable
notion of “instantiating a descendent” is needed.
Alternatively, one could imagine a “know it when we see it” approach
to defining the concept. However, such an approach might not scale
well to regulating systems that could find ways of replicating and/or
engineering new systems that humans would not easily recognize as
cases of replication and/or engineering. Thus, a characterization of
“instantiating descendants” that is simultaneously rigorous and real-
world applicable is missing. The reader is invited ponder potential
approaches to formalizing this problem.
• Approach 2: Heritability results. Develop an adequate definition
for “instantiating a descendant”, as well has “heritable purpose”, and
use these conceptions in one of two ways:
(a) Possibility results: Develop AI systems with the heritable pur-
pose to serve and protect humanity as a whole, in particular by
avoiding existential risks and MPAI deployment events; or
(b) Impossibility results: Develop demonstrations or arguments
that Approach 2(a) is too difficult or risky and that Approach 1
is better.
These approaches are more difficult than Approach 1 because they
involve more steps and concepts. Nonetheless, some attempts in this
direction have been made. Yudkowsky and Herreshoff (2013); Fall-
enstein and Soares (2015) and others consider AI systems reason-
ing about the heritable properties of their descendants using logic,
which remains a topic of ongoing research. One remaining challenge
is to maintain the strength of descendants’ reasoning in the face
of self-reference issues, which is addressed to some extent—at least
asymptotically—by Garrabrant et al. (2016).
It could also be valuable to empirically evaluate the propensity of agents
based on current machine learning techniques to create descendants. For in-
stance Leike et al. (2017) devise a toy grid-world environment for studying
self-modification, where they consider the behavior of reinforcement learn-
ing algorithms. Considering more complex environments where descendants
are still easy to identify by construction would be a good next step. Learn-
ing to predict which behaviors are likely to instantiate descendants in such
settings would be also be useful.
Consideration of side effects. Progress on possibility results in Ap-
proach 2(a) would be dual purpose, in that the results would likely create
the theoretical capability for other purposes aside from “serve and protect
humanity” to be inherited and proliferated. As well, progress on defining
the notion of descendant in Approach 1 could be re-purposed for a bet-
ter understanding of heritability in general, and could thereby indirectly
contribute to dual purpose progress within Approach 2(a).
6.2.3 Direction 19: Human-compatible ethics learning
It is conceivable that human-favorable behavior norms for a powerful AI
system interacting with human society could be derived from some more
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fundamental ethical abstraction, such as loyalty or reciprocity of an agent
toward other agents that have allowed its existence, which would include
humans. This research direction involves investigating that possibility.
Social analogue. Many individuals experience a sense of loyalty to the
people and systems that have empowered them, for example, their parents
and teachers, their country of origin, the whole of human civilization, or
nature. As a result, they choose to align their behavior somewhat with their
perceptions of the preferences of those empowering systems.
Scenario-driven motivation. It is conceivable that many peculiarities
of human values will not be easily describable in terms of individual prefer-
ences. There may be other implicit constraints on the behavior of individual
humans that would violate the von Neumann-Morgenstern rationality ax-
ioms for individual agents, but might be valuable at the scale of group
rationality. For example, a person might reason “I won’t do X because if
everyone did X it would be bad, even though if only I did X it might be
slightly good.”
Failing the development of an explicit theory for learning “non-
preferential” human values, a fallback option might be to discover co-
operative ethical principles from scratch, and then test to see if they suffice
for sustainable cooperation with humans. This would add another potential
pathway to alignment, thereby reducing Type 1c risk (unrecognized mis-
alignment). Perhaps the ethic “avoid acquiring too much power” could be
among the ethical principles discovered, leading to a reduction in Type 1b
risk (unrecognized prepotence). In principle, preference learning and ethics
learning could be complementary, such that partial progress on each could
be combined to build more human-aligned systems.
Instrumental motivation. In addition to posing an complementary al-
ternative to preference learning, work on human-compatible ethics learning
could yield progress on
• Direction 6 (preference learning) and Direction 24 (resolving plan-
ning disagreements). It is conceivable that a single basic principle,
such as loyalty or reciprocity, would be enough to derive the extent
to which an AI system should not only achieve preference learning
with the human customer who purchases the system, but also with
the engineers who designed it, and other individuals and institutions
who were passively tolerant of its creation, including the public. The
system could then in theory be directed to exercise some of its own
judgment to determine the relative influence various individuals and
institutions had in its creation, and to use that judgment to derive
appropriate compromises between conflicts in their preferences.
• Limited instances of Direction 28 (reimplementation security). A sys-
tem which derives its loyalties implicitly from the full history of in-
stitutions and people involved in its creation—rather than from a
simple “whom to serve” attribute—might be more difficult to redi-
rect to serve the purposes of a delinquent individual, thus addressing
certain instances of reimplementation security.
Actionability. This direction could benefit from progress on Direction 13
(rigorous coordination models), to the extent that human-compatible ethics
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will involve cooperation with humans. Decentralized learning of cooperation
is more likely to be applicable than centralized learning of cooperation:
when an AI system learns to cooperate with a human, the human’s beliefs
and policies are not being controlled by the same training process as the AI
system’s. That is, any group that includes humans and AI systems working
together is a decentralized learning system.
Implicit progress and insights might also be drawn from working on
other research directions in this report, such as Directions 1, 6, 11, 20, and
24 (transparency and explainability, preference learning, deference to hu-
mans, self-indication uncertainty, and resolving planning disagreements). AI
researchers will likely encounter disagreements with each other about how
to operationalize ethical concepts such as loyalty or reciprocity to human-
ity, just as developing technical definitions of concepts like cause, respon-
sibility, and blame have also been topics of debate among AI researchers
(McCoy et al., 2012; Halpern, 2015). Hence operationalizing these concepts
may need to go through numerous rounds of discussion and revision before
researchers would converge on satisfactory definitions of what constitutes
ethics learning, and what ethics are human-compatible.
Consideration of side effects. In order to selectively advance tech-
nology that would enable human/machine cooperation rather than only
machine/machine cooperation, studies of decentralized machine/machine
cooperation will need to be thoughtful about how humans would integrate
into the system of cooperating agents. Otherwise, these research directions
might increase the probability of runaway economies of AI systems that
cooperate well with each other at the exclusion of human involvement,
increasing Type 2b and 2c risks (economic displacement of humans and
human enfeeblement).
6.2.4 Direction 20: Self-indication uncertainty
AI systems can be copied, and can therefore be implemented in numer-
ous distinct environments including test environments, deployment envi-
ronments, and corrupted environments created by hackers. It is possible
that powerful AI systems should be required to be built with some aware-
ness of this fact, which we call “self-indication uncertainty”.
Social analogue. Self-indication uncertainty is not a matter of necessary
practical concern for most humans in their daily life. However, suppose a
human named Alice awakes temporarily uncertain about whether she is
still dreaming. Alice may be viewed as being uncertain about whether she
is “Real Alice” or “Dream Alice”, a kind of self-indication uncertainty. To put
it another way, Alice is uncertain about whether her current perceptions
and actions are taking place in the “real world” or the “dream world”.
A more familiar but perhaps more tenuous analogy is the following.
Suppose Alex is a supporter of a certain political party is considering staying
home instead of voting, because he expects his candidate to win. He might
find himself thinking thoughts along the lines of “If I stay home, does that
mean many other supporters of my party will also stay home? And if so,
doesn’t that mean we’ll lose?” Now, consider the mental subroutines within
Alex that are deciding whether he should stay home, and generating the
above question in his mind. These subroutines may be viewed as uncertain
about whether they are deciding just for the one voter (Alex), or for a
large number of “copies” of the same decision-making procedure inside the
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minds of many other supporters of her party. In other words, the vote-
or-stay-home subroutine has self-indication uncertainty about who (and in
particular, how many party members) it is operating within.
Scenario-driven motivation. See instrumental motivations.
Instrumental motivation. Progress on modeling or training self-
indication uncertainty could be useful for some instances of:
• Direction 10 (corrigibility). Ensuring that an AI system that is able
to wonder if it is a misspecified version of its “true self” could aid
in motivating the system to seek out corrections for those misspeci-
fications. For example, consider an AI system which, after real-world
deployment, maintains some degree of uncertainty about whether it is
operating in a pre-deployment test environment. Such a system might
be more likely to comply with shut-down commands if it believes non-
compliance in the test environment would result in non-deployment
and therefore no opportunity to pursue its real objective in the real
world. It may even be the case that some degree of self-indication
uncertainty of this form is needed for an AI system to exhibit the de-
gree of “humility” that humans naturally exhibit and would like to see
exhibited in AI systems. That is to say, it remains an open question
whether implicit or explicit self-indication uncertainty is a necessary
condition for corrigibility.
• Direction 11 (deference to humans), Direction 17 (hierarchical human-
in-the-loop learning (HHL)), and Direction 29 (human-compatible
equilibria). A computerized decision algorithm that knows it is being
implemented on many different machines at once might reason, when
making a decision, about the consequence of all of its copies making
that same decision, rather than fallaciously assuming that only one
of its copies will do it. This could allow an individual AI system act-
ing within a collective or hierarchy of other AI systems to derive and
follow principles that are appropriate for the entire group, playing
a role in the multi-agent dynamics of HHL and human-compatible
equilibria. Perhaps deference to humans is such a principle.
• Direction 12 (generative models of open-source equilibria). For each
decision a game-playing agent takes, it could be made uncertain about
whether the resulting action is taking place in its own reasoning (its
true self) or in another player’s model of the agent’s reasoning (an
approximate representation of its true self).
• Direction 28 (reimplementation security). An AI system which knows
it might be running on a hacker’s computer might be intrinsically
motivated to take extra precautions before a highly-impactful action
like disabling a portion of the electrical grid.
Actionability. Any particular method for representing indexical uncer-
tainty for an agent can be readily tested for efficacy in solving Decentralized
POMDPs (Dec-POMDPs), a well-known problem class for stating decen-
tralized coordination problems between agents with a common objective
(Bernstein et al., 2002). For inspiration, Dec-POMDPs can also be related
to older work on decision problems with imperfect memory (Piccione and
Rubinstein, 1997), by observing that solving a Dec-POMDP is equivalent
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to solving a “memoryless POMDP”, i.e., a POMDP where the solution pol-
icy is prohibited from passing information from one time step to the next.
Piccione and Rubinstein (1997), and later Taylor (2016a) using more mod-
ern notation, have shown that any memoryless POMDP solution may be
viewed as a Nash equilibrium, by viewing each memory loss as the cre-
ation of a new agent with the same utility function but with a certain form
of uniform uncertainty about which agent it is. The form of uncertainty
used in the equilibrium, which Bostrom calls the “Self-indication assump-
tion” (Bostrom, 2007), could be incorporated in decentralized Dec-POMDP
solvers and tested for scalability. Future work would need to account for
the possibility that copies of an AI system can be made with only minor
variations, in which case perhaps a non-Boolean concept will be needed for
whether to view two such systems as sharing the same identity.
Consideration of side effects. How to ideally implement self-indication
uncertainty for an AI system is a subtle question, because it might enable
the system to reason about whether it is operating within a test envi-
ronment or a real environment. If the system is successful in determining
whether or not it is undergoing a test, it could choose to exhibit different
behavior in the test than in reality, thus invalidating tests used to assess the
system’s safety. Hence, there are ways in which self-indication uncertainty
as a capability could undermine certain approaches to safety.
6.3 Single/multi control
Analogues of Direction 9 (generalizable shutdown and handoff methods),
Direction 10 (corrigibility), and Direction 11 (deference to humans) all exist
for a multi-agent system serving a single human principal. Achieving solu-
tions to these problems in a single/multi control setting will likely involve
challenges that did not exist in the single/single paradigm. This section
aims to identify some such problems. For instance, what precisely does it
mean to shut down an AI system if it is able to transmit a copy of its source
code to another existing AI system prior to being turned off?
Unlike in the other research sections of this report, actionable research
directions are not identified in this section, only problems.
Network design and administration: a present-day analogue. The
design and administration of communications and computing networks may
be viewed as solving present-day analogues of single/multi control problems,
to the extent that network components can be viewed as very rudimentary
AI systems.
For instance, maintaining communications networks requires methods
for modifying and shutting down network components. The patent litera-
ture includes techniques for upgrading a programmable device in commu-
nication with a server (San Martin et al., 2002), transmitting an emergency
shutdown signal to a malfunctioning device in the network (Litwin Jr and
Ramaswamy, 2006), and gracefully shutting down intermediate network
nodes Scudder et al. (2008). Similarly, maintaining computing networks in-
volves somewhat analogous methods, with patents including techniques for
allowing a job on a node in a computing cluster to shut down that node
if it is malfunctioning (Block et al., 2005), and putting to sleep or termi-
nating idle virtual machines to sleep to conserve cloud computing resources
(Huang et al., 2014; Rigolet, 2017).
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However, each of the above methods seems to depend on components
following pre-defined protocols, rather than learned protocols. Moreover,
irrespective of the method, most of the available literature on the shutdown
and maintenance protocols for communications and computing networks is
contained in patents—which generally only contain enough detail to enforce
ownership disputes—as opposed to research literature that is intended to
convey knowledge. As such, there might be considerable room for academic
progress in this area.
Single/multi delegation will likely present novel control problems.
Just as novel administrative challenges arise for present-day computing net-
works that are not needed for operating a single computer, single/single
control solutions are not likely to be entirely sufficient to solve single/multi
control problems.
Consider the problem of safe shutdown for a multi-agent system. Any
operationalization of the command “safely hand off control to a human or
other system” from Direction 9 could be deployed in parallel to hand off
control from each agent to another “backup” agent assigned to it, such as a
human overseer. However, novel failure modes might then arise, including
the following:
• Unsafe composition of local shutdown protocols. Safe protocols
for shutting down single agents in a multi-agent system might not
be safe when applied to all the agents at once, e.g., if the resulting
disruption to overall system performance would be unsafe.
To give a human social analogy: while it might be relatively safe for
one doctor at a hospital to take a sick day when they’re not feeling
well, it would not be safe for all the doctors in the hospital to do so
at the same time.
• Malfuctioning of local shutdown protocols. If most agents in
a multi-agent system successfully shut down as a result of a global
shutdown command, but some agents remain active, the actions of
the remaining agents might be highly unsafe outside of the context
of rest of the system. To give a human social analogy: the action
of a human pilot taking off an airplane is normally a safe action to
take, but would be an incredibly unsafe action if air traffic controllers
around the world were on strike. Thus, any procedure that takes air
traffic controllers off the job had better take pilots off the job as well.
What present-day AI research directions could be undertaken that could
begin to address these issues? The task of identifying concrete next actions
for single/multi control research, beyond the repeated local application of
single/single control solutions, is a challenge left to the reader and future
researchers.
7 Relevant multistakeholder objectives
Before proceeding to discuss research directions on multi/single and
multi/multi delegation, this section outlines some objectives that Sec-
tions 8 and 9 will build upon in their scenario-driven motivations. These
objectives may also serve as general, high-level guidelines in the further-
ance of multi/single and multi/multi delegation research. A diagram of the
objectives and their most direct relationships is provided in Figure 10.
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Figure 10: multi-stakeholder objectives
Note on the meaning of “misalignment”. In a setting involving multi-
ple stakeholders with diverse values, what should be considered an “aligned”
AI system? While there is much room for debate about what constitutes
alignment from the perspective of all of humanity, by contrast there is a
great deal of agreement among people that the world becoming unsurviv-
able to humanity would be a bad outcome. More generally, there may be
many outcomes that nearly everyone would agree are worse than the sta-
tus quo, such that the concept of misalignment might be more agreeably
meaningful than alignment in many multi-stakeholder scenarios of interest.
In any case, for the purpose of this report, MPAI will continue to refer to
AI systems whose deployment would be unsurvivable to humanity, as it was
defined in Section 2.3.
7.1 Facilitating collaborative governance
As time progresses and the impacts of AI technology increase, existential
safety concerns and other broadly important issues will likely lead to an
increased pressure for states and companies to collaborate in the governance
of AI technology.
What is collaborative governance? For the purposes of this report,
collaboration between stakeholders in the oversight of AI technology refers
to the exchange of reliable information and commitments between the stake-
holders. Collaborative governance of AI technology refers to collaboration
between stakeholders specifically in the legal governance of AI technology.
The stakeholders could include representatives of governments, companies,
or other established groups.
Making the governance of AI technology more collaborative, i.e., in-
volving more exchange of information and commitments in the governance
process, is not guaranteed to be safer or more effective, as elaborated some-
what below.
Moreover, the technical properties of AI systems themselves can add to
or detract from the options available for multiple stakeholders to collaborate
in the oversight of the systems’ activities. We therefore adopt the following
objective:
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Objective 7.1 (facilitating collaborative governance) is to
make it easier for diverse stakeholders to collaborate in the oversight
of powerful AI technologies, by the co-development of AI technology
and accompanying governance techniques that will capture the ben-
efits of collaboration in certain aspects of governance while avoiding
forms of collaboration that would be unsafe or unnecessarily costly
relative to independent governance.
This objective may be somewhat complex to achieve, because the potential
benefits collaborative governance may also come with a variety of pitfalls
that need to be avoided, as follows.
Potential benefits of collaborative governance. Consider a scenario
where some powerful new AI capability is being implemented by multiple
human institutions, collaboratively or independently, to pursue one or more
purposes, such as:
• efficient distribution of electricity from power plants in a safe and
equitable manner;
• global health research requiring difficult-to-negotiate privacy policies
for patients;
• education tools that might enable the spread of cultural values that
are difficult to agree upon; or
• environmental monitoring or protection systems that might require
difficult-to-negotiate economic policies.
There are a number of reasons why the developing institutions might be
motivated to collaborate in the governance of this technology, including:
A) to ensure fair representation of diverse views and other objectives in
governing their system(s);
B) to pool the collective knowledge and reasoning abilities of the separate
institutions; or
C) to ensure sufficient weight is given to other objectives that are of
interest to everyone involved (such as existential safety), relative to
objectives only of interest to one person or institution.
Items B and C here point to an existential safety argument for collab-
oration in the governance of AI systems: a committee of representatives
from different institutions of would be less likely to accidentally (by B) or
intentionally (by C) take risks that a single institution might be willing to
take. This consideration is elaborated further in Objective 7.3 (reducing
idiosyncratic risk-taking).
Pitfalls of collaborative governance. In pursuing collaborative gover-
nance for AI systems, it is important to be mindful that collaborative gov-
ernance does not guarantee better outcomes than independent governance.
In general, too much collaboration or the wrong kinds of collaboration be-
tween institutions can in general lead to a variety of problems:
• Fragility: if the institutions become more dependent upon one an-
other through collaboration, a failure of one institution risks failure
of the other.
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• Interference: the institutions’ operations could become entangled in
unexpected ways, leading to unexpected errors.
• Collusion: by collaborating, the institutions could gain too much
power or influence relative to other institutions or the public; antitrust
and competition laws exist to prevent these outcomes.
• Groupthink: membership in a group can sometimes cloud the judge-
ment of individuals, by a process known as groupthink (Janis, 1971;
Hart, 1990; Janis, 2008; Esser, 1998; Janis, 2008; Bénabou, 2012).
In groupthink, individual beliefs are warped to match the prevail-
ing group consensus. Collaboration between institutions might reduce
groupthink within each institution by exposing individuals to views
from outside their institution, but it could also increase groupthink if
the institutions begin to view themselves as a single large group.
Innovations in collaborative governance for powerful AI systems should
aim to account for these and other failure modes of collaborative decision-
making that would be harmful to many objectives, including safety.
How and when should governance be collaborative? When, and
in what ways, can collaborative governance of AI systems be more effective
than independent governance by essentially separate institutions? This is a
daunting and multi-faceted question that is beyond the scope of this report
to resolve. However, we do aim instigate some technical thinking in this
area, particularly as pertaining to existential safety.
Sources of historical lessons. Absent a satisfying theory of how and
when to collaborate in the governance of powerful AI systems, studies of
successes and failures in the oversight of safety-critical technologies could
yield informative lessons with implications at various scales of governance.
On the failure side, Sasou and Reason (1999) have developed a broad
taxonomy of team decision-making failures in the oversight of safety-critical
systems, through examining case studies in aviation, nuclear power, and
the shipping industry. Charles Perrow’s widely cited book Normal Acci-
dents (Perrow, 1984)—written partially in response to Three Mile Island
nuclear accident of March 1979—predicts catastrophic failure in hazardous
systems when those systems involve “complex and tightly coupled” inter-
actions. Subsequent technological disasters are also considered in the 1999
edition (Perrow, 1999), such as the Bhopal industrial chemical leak in In-
dia in December 1984 (Shrivastava, 1992), the explosion of the US space
shuttle Challenger in January 1986 (Vaughan, 1996), and the Chernobyl nu-
clear accident in Russia in April 1986 (Meshkati, 1991). Perrow contrasts
these events with “normal accidents”, concluding that they involved serious
managerial failures and were not inevitable consequences of the underlying
technological systems.
On the success side, positive lessons can be taken from human insti-
tutions with strong track records for the safe provision of highly valued
services in hazardous industries. This point has also been argued somewhat
by Dietterich (2019). There is an existing corpus of academic studies ex-
amining so-called high reliability organizations (HROs), i.e., “organizations
that operate beneficial, highly hazardous technical systems at high capacity
with very low risk, for instance, the effective management of physically (and
often socially) very hazardous production processes with very low incidents
83
of operational failure” (LaPorte and Thomas, 1995). Examples of organiza-
tions identified and studied closely as HROs by organizational researchers
include
• two nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (Rochlin, 1989; Roberts, 1989,
1990; Roberts et al., 1994; Schulman, 1993),
• the US Federal Aviation Administration’s Air Traffic Control system
(Roberts, 1989; Klein et al., 1995),
• several nuclear power plants (Klein et al., 1995; LaPorte and Thomas,
1995; Bourrier, 1996),
• electricity providers (Roberts, 1989; Schulman et al., 2004), and
• a large California fire department (Bigley and Roberts, 2001).
HRO researchers have gone on to produce theories and recommendations for
organizations in general to achieve high reliability (LaPorte, 1996; Rochlin,
1999; Roberts and Bea, 2001a,b; Ericksen and Dyer, 2005). Perhaps sim-
ilar theories could someday be formulated quantitatively as principles for
multi/single and multi/multi AI delegation in powerful AI systems.
Summary. Collaborative governance of AI systems is attractive from the
perspective of issues that concern everyone, such as existential safety. How-
ever, collaborative governance is not automatically more effective than in-
dependent governance. The objective of this subsection, facilitating collab-
orative governance, means finding collaborative AI governance techniques
that are beneficial from many perspectives (including existential safety),
and that avoid pitfalls of collaborative governance. How exactly to achieve
this is a complex social question that is beyond the scope of this report to
answer, but is something the authors are beginning to explored somewhat
at a technical level.
7.2 Avoiding races by sharing control
If powerful AI technology is developed in a manner that makes it difficult
for multiple stakeholders to share control of a single system, there is some
degree of pressure competing stakeholders to race in AI development so as
to secure some degree of control over the how the technology is first used.
Conversely, the pressure to race can be alleviated somewhat by developing
AI technology in a manner that makes it easier for multiple stakeholders to
control a single system, such as by designing the system to receive inputs
representing beliefs and values from multiple users. Hence, we adopt the
following objective:
Objective 7.2 (avoiding races by sharing control) is to make
collaborative oversight of AI systems by companies and governments
sufficiently easy and appealing as to significantly reduce pressures
for AI development teams to race for first-mover advantages in the
deployment of powerful AI systems, thereby reducing Type 2a risk
(unsafe development races). The nature of the collaboration between
the overseeing stakeholders could involve exchange of information,
exchange of commitments, or both.
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This objective may be challenging to pursue while respecting the let-
ter and spirit of antitrust laws. Thus, some degree of progress on Objec-
tive 7.1 (facilitating collaborative governance) may be needed to ensure
that control-sharing between companies cannot lead to collusion or other
unfair business advantages that would harm society.
7.3 Reducing idiosyncratic risk-taking
Consider two groups, Group 1 and Group 2, each with somewhat distinct
beliefs and values, who are each involved in the governance of powerful AI
capabilities that might otherwise pose a risk to global public safety. The
two groups might be states, companies, or other common interest groups.
The AI systems under governance might be owned by one or both of the
two groups, or by parties who have invited the two groups to participate in
governing their systems.
Suppose each group, in pursuit of its goals for the AI capabilities in
question, would be willing to expose the global public to certain risks. For
instance, one of the groups might be willing to accept a certain level of
existential risk if it means furthering a political agenda that the group
believes is important. Since risks to the global public would negatively affect
both groups, involving them both in the governance of a particular system
would mean global public safety is doubly represented as a concern in the
governance of that system, and might therefore be expected to have safety
benefits relative to involving just one of the groups. Hence, we adopt the
following objective:
Objective 7.3 (reducing idiosyncratic risk-taking) is to co-
develop AI technologies and accompanying governance techniques
that enable multiple governing stakeholders to collaborate on miti-
gating the idiosyncratic risk-taking tendencies of each stakeholder,
while still enabling the group to take broadly agreeable risks.
This objective is non-trivial to achieve. Involving more groups in gover-
nance is not automatically helpful from a safety perspective, as discussed
somewhat already in Section 7.1. For instance, the added complexity could
render coordination more difficult for the governing body, or create a diffu-
sion of responsibility around issues that are well known to concern everyone.
Progress in Objective 7.1 (facilitating collaborative governance) can be
expected to benefit this objective somewhat, insofar as consideration of
risks will arise in the process of collaborative governance. Also, since races
in AI development might cause the racing parties to take risks in order to
best the competition, progress in Objective 7.2 (avoiding races by sharing
control) benefits this objective as well.
Beyond progress in Objectives 7.1 and 7.2, there may also be ways to
specifically promote the avoidance of risks to public safety, e.g., by design-
ing AI systems that can be instructed to safely shutdown without much
difficulty, and granting each member of a diverse governance committee
authorization to initiate a shutdown procedure.
7.4 Existential safety systems
In this report, an existential safety system is any somewhat autonomous
organizational unit, comprising some combination of humans and/or auto-
mated tools, which exists and operates primarily for the purpose of pro-
tecting global public safety at a scale relevant to existential risk.
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Examples of existential safety systems. For concreteness, consider
the following potential mandates for a hypothetical existential safety sys-
tem:
• (manufacturing oversight) The system monitors the worldwide
distribution of manufacturing capabilities, for the purpose of warn-
ing human authorities if the capability to easily build a destructive
technology might be developing within a particular group or region.
• (technological forecasting) The system aids in the forecasting of
technological developments, for the purpose of identifying if hazardous
advancements are on the horizon and warn human authorities to pre-
pare for and/or avert them.
• (conflict prevention) The system aids in the monitoring of other
powerful entities under the control of human authorities (such as
states, corporations, or AI systems), and predicts potentially catas-
trophic conflicts between the entities, for the purpose of warning hu-
mans with access to legitimate means of diffusing the potential con-
flicts. Peacekeeping and counterterrorism are both instances of con-
flict prevention.
• (shutdown issuance) The system is involved in issuing shutdown
commands to powerful automated systems, so that those systems can
be quickly deactivated and investigated if they come to pose a sub-
stantial risk to global public safety.
Certain agencies of present-day human governments might already be
viewed as existential safety systems. AI technology is not strictly speaking
necessary to implement an existential safety system, but could play an
invaluable role by assisting in the processing of large amounts of data,
composing simulations, or automating certain judgements that are costly
for humans to carry out at scale.
Benefits and risks of existential safety systems. Such systems could
be extremely valuable to humanity because of the safety they can create for
allowing other activities to be pursued at scale. On the other hand, existen-
tial safety systems may be difficult to manage because of the potential they
create for the accidental or intentional misuse of power. A system with the
potential to monitor and/or impact global public safety has great potential
for influence, which could be quite harmful if misused.
Challenges to developing existential safety systems. Because of
the potential for misuse of any of the monitoring or intervention capabilities
that existential safety systems would employ, any viable plan for developing
new existential safety systems would likely be faced with strong pressures
to involve a geopolitically diverse representation in governing the system.
If those pressures are too difficult to resolve, the result could be that the
safety system is never developed. Failure to develop the safety system could
in turn could imply either a considerable sacrifice of existential safety, or a
considerable dampening of other valuable human activities that are deemed
unsafe to pursue without an existential safety system in place to safeguard
them.
Hence, the potential development of AI existential safety systems could
benefit from Objective 7.1 (facilitating collaborative governance), which
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might diffuse political tensions regarding who would control or benefit
from the systems’ operations. As well, progress on Objective 7.3 (reducing
idiosyncratic risk-taking) is directly relevant to ensuring that existential
safety systems would manage risks in a safe and broadly agreeable way.
8 Multi/single delegation research
We now return to the task of outlining actionable technical research direc-
tions in this and the subsequent section.
Multi/single delegation refers to the problem faced by multiple stake-
holders delegating to a single AI system. This problem—or class of
problems—may be key to ensuring that powerful AI systems are capa-
ble of benefiting people and institutions from a broad range of geographic,
cultural, and individual backgrounds. Existential safety is one such broadly
valued benefit, and per the theme of this report, the multi/single delega-
tion solutions here will be examined for their potential role in reducing
existential risks. However, there are likely many other broadly valuable
benefits that could be derived from multi/single delegation solutions.
8.1 Multi/single comprehension
The single/single comprehension solutions in Section 5 above can easily be
scaled to help multiple users to understand the same AI system. As such,
there seem to be few problems in multi/single comprehension that are not
subsumed by single/single comprehension. However, at least one issue is
not:
8.1.1 Direction 21: Privacy for operating committees
A committee charged with the task of operating or overseeing a powerful
AI system should have the ability to discuss the system’s performance in a
private setting not observable to the system. This could be a challenge if
the system is sufficiently intelligent as to potentially infiltrate or infer the
content of their apparently-closed-door discussions.
Social analogue. When an employee undergoes a performance review at
work, it helps if the people reviewing the employee can discuss the employee
in private. But, suppose the employee inadvertently finds out the identity
of a coworker who granted them a negative review that was intended to be
private. Ideally, the employee can disregard the information and continue
acting in a professional manner that is uninfluenced by the knowledge of
the coworker’s identity or privately expressed opinions.
Scenario-driven motivation. Consider a scenario where a socially in-
telligent AI system is being used to serve some broadly impactful societal
purpose (e.g., for any of the purposes discussed in Section 7.1). Suppose
also that the system is overseen by a committee which holds meetings to
discuss the system’s performance. If the committee members are concerned
that the details of their conversations might be leaked, they might be re-
luctant to raise certain issues. For instance, suppose a committee member
begins to suspect that the system is misaligned and ought to be shut down.
That member might feel some reluctance to propose the shut-down if there
is some chance the proposal would be rejected and the misaligned system
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would, upon becoming aware of the proposal, take actions to make shut-
down more difficult. This reluctance to discuss shutdown would be reduced
if the committee were able to discuss the system in a setting guaranteed to
be private, or else guaranteed not to influence the system’s behavior.
Actionability. Techniques within the domains of cybersecurity and phys-
ical building architecture are outside the scope of this report, but must be
mentioned as obvious first-line approaches to enabling private deliberation.
Indeed, research on the technical problem of maintaining privacy from an
intelligent adversary is as old as the field of cryptography. However, in
applications of cryptography, one does not design the adversary. As AI de-
signers, we have the opportunity to decrease the degree to which AI systems
would behave intentionally or unintentionally in ways that would violate
our privacy.
• With improved techniques for Direction 1 (transparency and explain-
ability), it may be possible to determine by inspection if and when an
AI system is deducing private information from public information.
In such cases, the system could potentially be rolled back to an earlier
state with less awareness of the private information, and repaired to
ignore it.
• There is an existing literature on non-discrimination in statistics and
machine learning, which has developed techniques for avoiding dis-
crimination based on certain variables. For instance,
Dwork et al. (2012) present an algorithm for maximizing utility sub-
ject to a fairness constraint. Hardt et al. (2016) present a method of
adjusting a learned predictor (after its training is complete) so as to
eliminate a certain rigorously defined form of discrimination. Kilber-
tus et al. (2017) further develop these concepts using causal models
of discrimination based on certain types of information, and put for-
ward algorithms which more finely isolate and eliminate the impacts
of discriminatory causal pathways.
Now, returning to the committee in the scenario-driven motivation:
suppose we view the committee’s private deliberation process as part
of the causal history generating the committee’s final endorsed com-
munications to the AI system. As a safeguard in case the private
deliberations would later be accidentally revealed to the AI system
(e.g., via a computer security leak), we could impose a constraint
upon the AI system that its behavior should not discriminate upon
the private information if it is observed. That is to say, the private
deliberations should be ignored even if seen.
Mathematically, this problem is quite similar to the non-discrimination
criteria pursued by Dwork et al. (2012); Hardt et al. (2016) and Kil-
bertus et al. (2017). Hence, building upon their work to apply it in
more complex settings could be a useful way forward. Ideally, one
would not want to depend on only this safeguard to maintain pri-
vacy, and of course physical and cybersecurity measures to maintain
privacy should be applied by default.
• If committee members are interested in privacy for themselves as in-
dividuals, perhaps principles from differential privacy (Dwork, 2011)
could be generalized to allow new members to join the committee
without too much being revealed about the influence they are having
over its decisions.
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Consideration of side effects. If AI systems are designed to respect
our privacy even when our private information is accidentally leaked, we
might fail to notice when the leaks are happening (since the AI systems
do not act on the information), and we might then develop a false sense of
security that the leaks are not happening at all. Later, if a malicious actor
or malfunction disables the “respecting privacy” feature of an AI system,
there would be lot of leaked private information available for the system to
take action on. As such, the actionable directions above should be taken as
complementary, not supplementary, to standard physical and cybersecurity
measures to maintain privacy.
8.2 Multi/single instruction
8.2.1 Direction 22: Modeling human committee deliberation
A system whose purpose is to serve a committee may need to model not
only the preferences of the committee members but also the dynamics of the
committee’s deliberation process. This objective is in some sense opposite in
spirit to Direction 21 (privacy for operating committees). Finding a way to
serve each of these objectives in some way is an interesting and potentially
important meta-problem.
Social analogue. A good CEO thinks not only about the individual
wishes of their shareholders, but also about the relative weight of the share-
holders’ investments, and how their opinions and preferences will update
at a meeting of the shareholders as they discuss and deliberate together.
Scenario-driven motivation. Consider the task of building any broadly
impactful AI system that will serve or be governed by a committee. Some
approaches to human/machine instruction involve the AI system maintain-
ing a model of the human’s intentions. To the extent that such modeling
may be necessary, in the case of an AI system serving a committee, the
intentions of the constituent committee members may need to be modeled
to some degree. Even if the committee elects a single delegate to faithfully
convey their intentions to the AI system, inferring the intentions of the
delegate may require modeling the committee structure that selects and/or
directs the delegate, including the relative levels of authority of various
committee members if they are not equal.
• For Objective 7.1 (facilitating collaborative governance), it will save
the committee time if the system is able to flesh out a lot of unspecified
details in the committee’s instructions, which might require imagining
what the committee would decide upon if a much longer meeting were
held to hammer out the details.
• For Objective 7.2 (avoiding races by sharing control), the committee’s
instructions would need to be followed well enough to encourage con-
tinued collaboration of the stakeholders in operating and maintaining
the shared system, as opposed to splintering their efforts in order to
build or manage separate competing systems. For this, it might help
for the system to be able to model the outcome of deliberations where
one of the committee members (or the institution they represent) is
considering separating from and competing with the remainder of
group in some way.
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• For Objectives 7.3 and 7.4 (reducing idiosyncratic risk-taking and
existential safety systems), it would make sense to ensure that the
system follows the committee’s instructions with a level of caution
that the committee’s summary judgement would consider reasonable
if the system were examined more closely. For this, it might help to
be able to model the committee’s deliberative processes for accepting
and rejecting risks, which might be a simpler problem than modeling
arbitrary deliberation.
It is possible that modeling the committee’s deliberations might be un-
necessary for serving the committee, just as modeling a single human’s
deliberations is sometimes unnecessary for serving the human. However, in
domains where modeling of human intentions is necessary to serve humans,
modeling of deliberation would also seem important because of the impact
of deliberation upon intention.
Actionability. One approach to modeling committee deliberation would
be to use multi-agent system models. That is to say,
1. Assume the committee members behave similarly to an existing AI
model for multi-agent interaction;
2. Fit the AI model parameters to the observed behavior of the commit-
tee, and
3. Use the fitted model to predict and reason about the committee’s
future behavior and/or opinions.
In step (1), for any particular committee there is the question of whether
it should be modeled as comprising agents with the same goal or slightly
different goals:
• Shared goal. In cases where the goals of the human committee mem-
bers are highly aligned, it might make sense to model their interac-
tions using some of the AI systems examined in Direction 13 (rigorous
coordination models).
• Different goals. To allow for the possibility of multiple goals among
the committee members, one could instead model their deliberation
as a multi-agent negotiation process. How should the humans in this
exchange be modeled?
There is little existing work implementing formal models of spoken
negotiation between more than two agents at once, but perhaps some
inspiration could be taken from two-agent negotiation models, such
as those studied by Rosenfeld et al. (2014) or Lewis et al. (2017).
Whether modeling a committee with a shared goal or divergent goals,
one would also need to be judicious and perhaps innovative in step (1) to use
or develop a model that accounts for known facts about human cognition,
such as those explored in Direction 8 (human cognitive models).
Consideration of side effects. Because this objective is directly con-
trary to Direction 21 (privacy for operating committees) where the goal is
to prevent the AI system from acting on the committee’s deliberations, it
should be approached with some caution. Just as modeling single humans
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could make it easier to manipulate those humans, modeling committee de-
liberations may also make it easier to intentionally or unintentionally ma-
nipulate the committee’s judgments. Hence, a judicious awareness of how to
apply this technology would be needed to ensure it is applied beneficially.
8.2.2 Direction 23: Moderating human belief disagreements
This direction is concerned with the development of a service for assisting
in the resolution of belief disagreements between conflicting stakeholders
or committee members involved in the oversight of impactful systems or
processes, including AI systems.
Social analogue. A workshop event organizer is faced with the chal-
lenge of finding a time and place for a workshop that will not only be
pleasing to the participants, but also will meet the participants’ advanced
approval enough for them to choose to attend. This involves the organizer
not only accounting for the conflicting preferences of the attendees, but
also perhaps for disagreements and misconceptions among their beliefs. For
example, suppose participants A, B, and C would only be willing to attend
the workshop if it were held at a certain beautiful and secluded venue, while
participants X, Y, and Z would all enjoy that venue but falsely believe that
it would be difficult for them to reach by car. To get everyone to attend,
the organizer might need to dispel some misconceptions about the venue
in their advertisement for the workshop (e.g., “Just a 20-minute taxi ride
from PQR airport”). For some issues, the organizer might need to facilitate
disagreements among the workshop invitees without having direct access
to the truth. For example, suppose invitee A is planning to attend a pri-
vate event called the Q Conference and has complained to the workshop
organizer that the proposed workshop date conflicts with the Q Conference,
but invitee B has said that the Q Conference date will not conflict with the
workshop. Then, the workshop organizer may need to ask A and B to check
with the Q Conference organizers until the disagreement is settled and an
agreeable workshop date can be chosen.
Scenario-driven motivation.
• For Objective 7.1 (facilitating collaborative governance), consider the
development of a powerful AI technology to serve a broadly useful
societal purpose, that would be governed or overseen by a set of in-
dividuals entrusted by society to pursue those purposes responsibly.
If a disagreement moderation service is able to tease out and get to
the bottom of sources of disagreement among the overseers, this could
help to ensure that truth prevails in the overseers’ collective wisdom.
• For Objective 7.2 (avoiding races by sharing control), consider two
competing AI development teams who each believe their own ap-
proach to AI development is safer and more likely to succeed. If a
trusted third-party disagreement resolution system is able to help the
teams to settle their disagreement and effectively agree in advance
about who would be likely to win in a development race, the two
teams might be able to agreeably combine their efforts in a way that
grants slightly more influence over the joint venture to the would-be
race winner(s).
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• For Objectives 7.3 and 7.4 (reducing idiosyncratic risk-taking and
existential safety systems), consider a powerful AI system being gov-
erned or operated by a commitee of overseers. A disagreement mod-
eration service might be able to identify when a conflict of interest
or other idiosyncratic bias might be affecting the risk assessments of
one of the overseers. Then, the disagreement moderation service could
encourage that person to further reflect upon their potential source
of bias, or recommend recusing that overseer from the decision.
Actionability. There are a number of theoretical results that suggest two
agents can reach agreement through communication after making different
observations in the world. Aumann’s Agreement Theorem (Aumann, 1976)
shows if that two Bayesian agents with a common prior also have com-
mon knowledge of one another’s posteriors and the fact that they are both
Bayesian, then those posteriors must be equal. This raises the question of
how common knowledge of posteriors could be established. Encouragingly,
Aaronson (2005) showed an effective procedure for exchanging messages
such that the agents will converge on agreement within an ε margin of er-
ror after exchanging 1/ε2 bits of information. Hellman (2013) generalizes
Aumann’s theorem in a different direction, by relaxing the assumption of
common priors and deriving a bound on posterior disagreement as a func-
tion of prior disagreement. Perhaps an effectively computable version of
Hellman’s result could also be derived.
There is also existing work in the social sciences on moderating disagree-
ments. For instance, Luskin et al. (2002) and Fishkin and Luskin (2005)
have examined examine human-assisted deliberative procedures for resolv-
ing disagreements among laypeople. Perhaps some such techniques could
be automated by building on techniques and interfaces developed in Direc-
tion 4 (AI-assisted deliberation).
Consideration of side effects. Disagreement moderation services that
push too hard toward reaching agreement and not enough toward truth-
seeking could cause institutions to enter deluded states of “groupthink” (Ja-
nis, 1971). More generally, to the extent that progress on disagreement mod-
eration might involve studying the dynamics of how human beliefs evolve,
some of those results could also enable technologies that would be able to
manipulate human beliefs in dishonest or otherwise undesirable ways. As
such, work on human disagreement moderation is somewhat “dual purpose”,
and should be therefore be shared and applied judiciously.
8.2.3 Direction 24: Resolving planning disagreements
This direction is concerned with assisting in the formulation of plans that
multiple stakeholders can agree to execute together, especially in cases
where belief or value disagreements might exist between the stakeholders
that cannot be brought closer to agreement by moderation techniques such
as Direction 23 (moderating human belief disagreements). In such cases,
perhaps only a mutually agreeable plan can be found, in lieu of an agree-
ment about underlying beliefs or values.
Social analogue. Consider a group of company directors in the process
of forming or running a company. If these directors encounter what ap-
pears to be an impassable disagreement about the company’s priorities, a
period of dysfunction could ensue, or perhaps the company will split or
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shut down. However, if the CEO of the company is able to devise or iden-
tify a plan that addresses all of the directors’ concerns somewhat, perhaps
everyone will buy into the plan, and smooth operations for the company
can continue. This ability to devise agreeable plans is a key capability for
a CEO. In a more diffuse sense, this planning ability can also be seen hap-
pening even before a company is formed, through the history of legal pro-
fessionals creating and revising standardized bylaws for forming companies.
Standardized bylaws establish broadly agreeable norms for how companies
should operate—including details on how the directors can leave or depart
the company if irreconcilable disagreements arise later—such that company
directors can readily agree in advance to the bylaws as a plan for governing
the company in case of disputes.
Scenario-driven motivation. In all of the multi-stakeholder objectives
in Section 7, some of the human stakeholders governing the AI system may
have conflicting preferences about what the system should do, or differing
beliefs that cannot be resolved through further discussion. If an AI-based
component of the system is able to assist them in arriving at a policy that
is nonetheless appealing to all of the stakeholders involved, this improves
the probability of stakeholders choosing to collaborate in its further devel-
opment, deployment, and/or operation.
Actionability. There are a number of subproblems here that one could
begin to address:
• Accommodating preference disagreements. Perhaps this could be
achieved by weighting the AI system’s model of humans’ reward
functions (Harsanyi, 1980).
• Accommodating belief disagreements.When disagreements about facts
cannot be resolved through discourse, in order for an AI system to
serve multiple stakeholders in a manner that is efficient and agreeable
to each of them, the system might need to explicitly model the differ-
ences in beliefs between the stakeholders. Critch and Russell (2017)
provide conditions on the structure of such plans that are necessary
and sufficient for a plan to be subjectively Pareto optimal to the
stakeholders before the plan is executed.
• Rewarding stakeholder engagement. In soliciting statements of dis-
agreement between stakeholders, it would help if an AI system could
make use of communications from the stakeholders in such a way
that the stakeholders do not individually regret sharing information
with the system, the way honest participants in a Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves auction do not regret placing their bids (Groves, 1973). For
instance, particular incentive structures might be needed to alleviate
or compensate for fears among stakeholders that they might upset one
another by revealing their disagreements. On the other hand, stake-
holders might also need reassurance that they will not be unfairly
punished for revealing their idiosyncratic preferences and/or biases,
or exploited for revealing confusions or misconceptions in their be-
liefs. This could be accomplished by allowing stakeholders to share
information privately with only the AI system, and not the other
stakeholders. For the stakeholders to prefer this option, they might
require a high level of trust that the AI system will make appro-
priate use of their private information without revealing it. Perhaps
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this could be achieved through the adaptation of differential privacy
methods (Dwork, 2011).
Consideration of side effects. This research direction has potential
side effects that are similar to those considered in Direction 23 (moderating
human belief disagreements), namely, that the resulting techniques could
be used to manipulate us humans in ways we would not endorse. Another
potential side effect might be that if the automated formation of broadly
agreeable plans obviated the need for humans to settle belief disagreements
in order to get things done, then accuracy of human beliefs could gradually
deteriorate over time, from a lack of incentive for humans to seek out truth
in the process of settling disagreements.
8.3 Multi/single control
This section is concerned with control techniques that could be used for
any single AI system serving a committee or diverse group of human stake-
holders. As usual thoughout this report, control refers to stop-gap measures
for when the humans’ comprehension and/or instruction techniques are not
working.
Just as in single/single delegation, the overseers of a powerful AI system
should retain the ability to shut down or otherwise override the system in
at least some circumstances, as a separate fallback procedure if the com-
munication abstractions that normally allow humans to comprehend and
instruct the system begin to fail. A variety of committee structures could be
considered for authorizing override commands. For example, consider shut-
down commands. For some systems, perhaps a shutdown command should
require full consensus among all of its overseeing stakeholders to be autho-
rized. For other systems, perhaps it makes sense for every stakeholder to
have unilateral authority to command a shutdown.
8.3.1 Direction 25: Shareable execution control
One way to help ensure that multiple stakeholders continue to endorse a
system’s operation would be to grant each stakeholder control over some
aspect of the system’s execution.
Social analogue. When a company tasks a hiring committee with decid-
ing whether to hire a particular candidate, if one member of the committee
is sufficiently strongly opposed to hiring the candidate, typically the can-
didate is rejected. This is because teams function better when everyone
is sufficiently happy with the work environment that they do not want to
leave, and if one committee member is very strongly opposed to a candi-
date, their opposition might be representative of some broader problem the
company as a whole would face in employing the candidate. This is true to
the extent that a good hiring committee is one selected to be representative
of the company’s needs as a whole, with regards to hiring the candidate.
Scenario-driven motivation. This direction is relevant to Objec-
tives 7.2 and 7.3 (avoiding races by sharing control and reducing id-
iosyncratic risk-taking). Specifically, if the Alpha Institute is sufficiently
concerned about the risks that the Beta Institute might take with a new
AI technology, the Alpha Institute might be willing to grant the Beta
Institute some level of direct control over the Alpha Institute’s usage of the
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technology in exchange for the Beta Institute granting the Alpha Institute
similar control over the Beta Institute’s usage.
Actionability. Perhaps the simplest example of a computer system with
shareable execution control is one that requires passwords from multiple
users to be entered before it will execute. More general is the concept of
secure multi-party computation; see Du and Atallah (2001) for a review.
However, in some cases, depending on an entirely cryptographic control-
sharing mechanism might not be satisfying due to general concerns about
cybersecurity risks, and there may be a desire to physically separate system
components and share them out between stakeholders. For instance, Martic
et al. (2018) have put forward a method for achieving a separation of trained
AI system components that could be applied in this way, and hypothesize
that it might be applicable to any setting where training the AI system is
very expensive.
Related is the concept of “federated control” for computer systems. For
instance, Kumar et al. (2017) have begun to examine methods of global
optimization directed by locally controlled units, although not in a manner
that grants the individual units the potential to unilaterally control the
entire collective, e.g., via a shutdown command. For very large numbers of
stakeholders to control specifically the learning process of an AI system,
some ideas from so-called “federated learning” might be applied (Konečny`
et al., 2016; Smith et al., 2017; McMahan et al., 2016). However, these
approaches also do not grant any special unilateral controls to the individual
participants in the process.
For any of these methods to be valuable in practice, one would need
to ensure that the individual stakeholders sharing control of the system do
not shut down their system components so often as to render the system
useless and hence not worth sharing. For instance, this could happen if there
is widespread doubt or disagreement about whether the system is operating
correctly.
Progress on Directions 1, 23, and 24 (transparency and explainability,
moderating human belief disagreements, and resolving planning disagree-
ments) might be helpful in addressing such scenarios.
Consideration of side effects. The ability to threaten the shutdown
of a powerful AI system that is deeply integrated with the well-being and
functioning of human society is a privilege that could easily be abused if a
malicious actor gained access to the shutdown mechanism(s). As such, ac-
cess to such control mechanisms, if they exist at all, should only be granted
to highly secure and trustworthy institutions, and the access itself should
likely be revokable in the case of suspected abuse or security compromises.
Conversely, this concern also presents a general argument against the cre-
ation of AI systems that would cause widepread harm to humans in the
case of a surprise shutdown event.
9 Multi/multi delegation research
This section addresses technical problems and solutions arising for mul-
tiple human stakeholders delegating to multiple AI systems. Multi/multi
delegation encompasses novel problems not addressed by single/single, sin-
gle/multi, and multi/single delegation, many of which will be important to
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ensuring powerful AI systems will bring about robustly beneficial outcomes
for all human persons.
Some of these problems may also be relevant to existential safety. For in-
stance, in multi/multi delegation, some of the human/machine interactions
might cross what would otherwise be natural stakeholder boundaries within
the composite multi/multi interaction, such as personal property lines or
state boundaries. As such, solutions may require more than mere composi-
tions of human/human and machine/machine interaction methods, to avoid
risks that could arise from coordination failures or conflicts. In terms argued
by Rahwan (2018), novel tools will likely be needed to program, debug, and
maintain an “algorithmic social contract” between humans and mediated
by AI systems.
9.1 Multi/multi comprehension
Multi/multi delegation raises novel problems in human/AI comprehension.
For instance, what happens when Stakeholder A wishes to comprehend an
AI system that is being developed, owned, or used primarily by Stakeholder
B? How can A respect B’s privacy in this process? And, if given only limited
opportunities to observe B’s system, how can A use those opportunities
judiciously to answer only their most pressing and important questions
about B?
9.1.1 Direction 26: Capacity oversight criteria
This research direction is concerned with the identification of quantitative
and qualitative criteria describing what capacities might be either necessary
or sufficient for any given research group to develop a prepotent AI system.
Such criteria could be used to define registration and auditing requirements
for AI development groups, creating opportunities for outside stakeholders
to comprehend and assess the safety and ethics of otherwise proprietary AI
systems. Outside oversight is thus an aspect of multi/multi comprehension:
it allows stakeholders other than the developers and owners of a given AI
system to understand how the system works and is being used.
Many would argue that the potential for capabilities far less than prepo-
tence should be sufficient to trigger outside oversight of powerful proprietary
AI systems. Others might argue that too much oversight can stifle inno-
vation and deprive society of invaluable scientific advancements. Without
taking a side on this age old debate of regulation versus innovation—which
is liable to be settled differently in different jurisdictions—it might still be
easy to agree that the capacity to develop and deploy a prepotent AI sys-
tem is definitely sufficient to warrant outside oversight. Therefore, success
in this research direction could potentially yield agreeable worldwide limits
on what is acceptable for AI development groups to do without outside
oversight.
Historical note. The eventual need for oversight standards for AI de-
velopment may be similar to the present-day NIH guidelines for research
involving recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules (NIH, 2013), or
the NSABB’s recommendations for the evaluation and oversight of proposed
gain-of-function research (National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity,
2016).
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Social analogue. It is common for business regulations to apply to a
company only when that company acquires a threshold amount of a cer-
tain resource. For instance, various regulations for farming in the United
States are triggered by threshold levels of production, land area, service con-
nections, or fuel storage (United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), 2019). These rules ensure that regulatory effort is commensurate
with the scale of a company’s potential for impact. Analogous principles
could be used to oversee the usage of any large amounts of data, com-
munication bandwidth, or processing power thought to be sufficient for
accidentally or intentionally developing a prepotent AI system.
Scenario-driven motivation. As human society’s potential to develop
powerful AI systems increases, at some point we must collectively draw
some agreed upon lines between computing activities that
1) should be considered obviously safe,
2) should require self-applied safety precautions,
3) should require third-party regulatory oversight for potentially dan-
gerous system developments, or
4) should not be permitted under any conditions (e.g., the development
of a misaligned, prepotent system).
Where should these lines be drawn? As with any standards, a balance will
need to be established between the necessary and the unnecessary. The
present research direction would aim to strike this balance using empirical
and mathematical research on what exactly is necessary, and what exactly is
sufficient, to avoid the development of prepotent systems, as well as systems
that might risk non-existential but nonetheless catastrophic destablizations
of human society. Clarifying our shared understanding of (1)-(4) above is
directly relevant to Objective 7.1 (facilitating collaborative governance),
and hence also to Objectives 7.2, 7.3, and 7.4 (avoiding races by sharing
control, reducing idiosyncratic risk-taking, and existential safety systems).
Actionability. How can one determine what capacities are necessary or
sufficient to build prepotent systems, without actually taking the risk of
building a large number of prepotent systems to experiment with? To an-
swer this question safely, a combination of as theoretical and empirical ap-
proaches will likely be needed, enabling both quantitative and qualitative
assessments.
Empirical work in this area could begin by quantifying how compu-
tational resources like processing speed, memory, and parallelism can be
translated—under various algorithmic paradigms—into the ability to out-
perform humans or other algorithms in game play. Measurements of this na-
ture are already commonplace in AI development for competitive games. As
well, in the training of generative adversarial networks (Goodfellow et al.,
2014), there is somewhat of an art to preventing either the discriminator
from outperforming the generator too early during training, by limiting the
number of intermediate computational steps afforded to discriminator.
Such research could conceivably lead to general insights regarding bal-
ances between learning processes. For instance, if one system is able to
learn much faster than another, when does this result in an equilibrium
that strongly favors the fast learner? If sufficiently general, answers to such
questions could be applied to algorithmic models of human cognition along
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the lines of Griffiths et al. (2015), so as to make and test predictions about
resource levels that might be necessary or sufficient for a system to learn
too quickly for human society to adapt to the system.
Further in the future, empirical findings should eventually be formal-
ized into a theory that allows for the reliable prediction of when one system
will be competitively dominant over another, without needing to run the
systems in a competition to observe the results. Perhaps these ideas could
be practically useful well before any risk of prepotence exists. For instance,
suppose one wishes to ensure a reasonably equitable distribution of techno-
logical resources between two distinct human populations or groups. This
might be operationalized as requiring that neither group should become
“relatively prepotent” with respect to the other. Perhaps this requirement
could even be formalized as an agreement or treaty to prevent the devel-
opment of “relatively prepotent” AI technologies. A mathematical theory
adequate to address this question might also help to estimate what resources
would be necessary or sufficient for an entirely non-human system to achieve
competitive dominance over humanity as a whole, i.e., prepotence.
Consideration of side effects. There are a number of potential negative
side effects of research in this area:
• Experimenting with “relative prepotence”—i.e., the competitive dom-
inance of AI systems over humans or other AI systems in multi-agent
scenarios—could select for the creation of AI systems with generaliz-
able tendencies leading to absolute prepotence.
• Publishing results on capacities that are either necessary or sufficient
for prepotence could encourage malicious actors to obtain those ca-
pabilities. This suggests some level of discretion in distributing such
findings.
• Consider the way published speed limits on highways lead to everyone
driving at or very near to the speed limit. Publishing recommended
computing capacity limits for development teams might similarly en-
courage many individuals and/or institutions to obtain computing
resources that that are just just short of triggering registration or
auditing criteria. This suggests setting registration and auditing cri-
teria with the expectation that many actors will operate just short of
triggering the criteria.
9.2 Multi/multi instruction
When a single AI system receives an instruction form a single human stake-
holders in a multi/multi delegation scenario, those instructions will need to
be taken in a manner that does not interfere too much with the other
humans and AI systems in the interaction. This presents many novel chal-
lenges for human/AI instruction research, of which the following is just a
single illustrative example.
9.2.1 Direction 27: Social contract learning
This research direction is concerned with enabling AI systems to respect the
“terms” of a social contract with multiple stakeholders, including existing
institutions such as states, businesses, and human civilization as a whole.
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Historical note. There is a point of view in moral and political philoso-
phy known as social contract theory (Rousseau, 1766; Rousseau and May,
2002). In this view, “persons’ moral and/or political obligations are depen-
dent upon a contract or agreement among them to form the society in which
they live” (Friend, 2004). The relevance of a social contract to shaping the
impact of science and innovation was argued by Gibbons (1999).
Social analogue. Suppose Alice works for Alphacorp and Bob works for
Betacorp. Neither Alice nor Bob has read the relevant sections of state and
federal legal code governing their companies. Nonetheless, some things just
feel wrong to do. For instance, suppose Alice and Bob go on a date, and
Alice knowingly presents Bob with an opportunity to sell Betacorp widgets
to Alphacorp at an inflated price that Bob knows is exorbitant for Alpha-
corp. Common sense might say that Alice is acting in “bad faith” with
respect to her Alphacorp duties. But what is “bad faith” exactly? Even if
Bob doesn’t quite know the definition, he might be uncomfortable with the
deal. He might even turn down the deal, not out of loyalty to Betacorp’s
shareholders–who would in fact stand to benefit from the sale—but out of
respect for the ethical norm that Alice should be more professional in her
representation of Alphacorp. While this norm might technically be enforce-
able by state or federal law enforcement’s protection of Alphacorp’s right
to terminate Alice if she acts in bad faith to her company duties, Bob’s
respect for the norm is more difficult to explain in purely legal terms. It
seems Bob has learned to respect a certain kind of social order in business
dealings that he is not willing to associate with violating.
Scenario-driven motivation. Ideally, powerful AI technology should
avoid disrupting human society at scales that would pose significant risks
to humanity’s continued existence.
Thus, an existential catastrophe may be viewed as an extreme form of
disruption to social order, which might be entirely preventable if less ex-
treme risks of disruption are also avoided. In particular, maintaining certain
forms of social order might be necessary to avoid Tier 2 risk (hazardous so-
cial conditions), and might be integral to pursuing Objectives 7.2, 7.3, and
7.4 (avoiding races by sharing control, reducing idiosyncratic risk-taking,
and existential safety systems).
Actionability. The self-driving car industry presents a natural opportu-
nity to observe when and how learning algorithms can respect the implicit
terms of a social contract (Leben, 2017; Rahwan, 2018; Contissa et al.,
2017). For instance, when two self-driving cars interact, there are at least
four agents involved: the two cars, and their two passengers. Each car needs
to take actions that will respect the other vehicle while protecting their
own passenger sufficiently well to retain their loyalty as a customer of the
car manufacturer and/or ride provider. With larger numbers of cars, car
manufacturers will also need to ensure their cars avoid collectively causing
coordination failures in the form of traffic jams. Viewed at this larger scale,
any given self-driving car will implicitly be serving numerous human and
institutional stakeholders, in way that needs to strike a ’deal’ between these
many stakeholders for the self-driving car industry to unfold and continue
operating successfully.
There is already a strong interest in identifying end-to-end training
methods for self-driving cars (Bojarski et al., 2016), as well as interest
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in the ethical problems the industry could face (Goodall, 2016). Imitation
learning via reward learning is already being explored for this application
(Laskey et al., 2017).
It seems plausible that a better understanding of the social aspects
of driving may be crucial to progress in this area, including aspects of
driver-to-driver communication via movement (Brown and Laurier, 2017),
and how to plan through a series of such signaling behaviors (Fisac et al.,
2019). Safety and ethics solutions for driverless vehicles that are sufficiently
respectful of human-driven vehicles, and that will alleviate rather than pre-
cipitate
large-scale coordination problems like traffic jams, may lead to many
insights and principles for the safe and gradual introduction of autonomous
agents into society.
Consideration of side effects. As with any safety-critical technology,
there is always the risk of premature deployment. For example, if self-
driving car algorithms are deployed at scale before their interaction effects
are well understood, car accidents and/or large-scale traffic coordination
problems could result. On the other hand, if the self-driving car industry
is sufficiently careful to avoid such failures, there might still be subsequent
risks that safety or ethical solutions for self-driving cars could be prema-
turely deployed in other areas where those solutions would not result in
adequate safety or ethics.
9.3 Multi/multi control
9.3.1 Direction 28: Reimplementation security
This research direction is concerned with preventing individual stakeholders
from modifying or otherwise reimplementing individual AI systems in a
multi/multi delegation scenario, in cases where such modifications would
jeopardize the safety or ethics of their overall interaction.
Social analogue. Suppose Bob has been entrusted with the capability
to make large payments from his employer’s bank account. One hopes that
an outsider could not easily induce Bob to abuse that capability simply by
serving Bob a recreational drug that would distort his sense of safety or
ethics.
That is to say, one hopes that Bob will not be vulnerable to attempts to
’modify’ him in ways that would compromise his judgement. For this and
other reasons, some institutions conduct regular drug testing to ensure the
judgment of their members is unlikely to be compromised by drugs.
Scenario-driven motivation. In general, many measures may be
needed to lower the risk of unauthorized modifications to publicly available
AI technologies. For instance:
(1) If any AI system could be modified and/or scaled up to versions that
would threaten public safety, then before sharing the system with the
public, its code should probably be obfuscated to diminish the risk
of unauthorized individuals modifying or scaling it up. The degree of
effort and security should be commensurate with the degree of risk.
(2) If large numbers of research and engineering developers are employed
in the task of developing or maintaining a near-prepotent AI system,
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protocols may be desired for allowing the many developers to carry
out experiments and make changes to the system without having read
access to its full source code.
(3) Access to hardware sufficient to reverse-engineer the software compo-
nents of near-prepotent AI systems should be closely monitored and
in many cases restricted; see also Direction 26 (capacity oversight
criteria).
Without appropriate security measures to prevent unsafe reimplimen-
tations of powerful AI systems, careless AI developers could precipitate
Type 1a, 1b, 1c, and 1d risks (uncoordinated MPAI development, unrecog-
nized prepotence, unrecognized misalignment, and involuntary MPAI de-
ployment), and malicious or indifferent developers could precipitate Type 1e
risks (voluntary MPAI deployment). On a societal scale, ensuring pow-
erful AI systems cannot be easily modified to disregard safety or ethical
guidelines is a manner of pursuing Objective 7.3 (reducing idiosyncratic
risk-taking), and might be a necessary for Objective 7.4 (existential safety
systems).
Actionability. Problems (1) and (2) above might benefit from program
obfuscation techniques (Anckaert et al., 2007; Bitansky et al., 2011), which
allow potential adversaries to interact with a program without being able to
easily understand its inner workings. Determining obfuscation techniques
that work well with present-day machine learning systems, without slowing
down their operation significantly, would be a good start.
To address (3), cloud computing resources could be safeguarded by ma-
chine learning techniques for intrusion detection (Buczak and Guven, 2015).
Large deployments of offline computing resources might also be detectable
in some cases by repurposing smart supply-chain monitoring systems cur-
rently used for demand forecasting (Carbonneau et al., 2008).
Consideration of side effects. It would be quite a problem if a power-
ful, incorrigible AI system used a combination of reimplementation security
techniques to prevent all humans from correcting its code. Or, imagine an
AI-based malware system that somehow makes it extremely technically or
socially difficult to restore its host hardware to a clean state. Indeed, any-
where that repairs to computer systems might be needed, reimplementation
security techniques could conceivably be abused to make the repairs more
difficult.
9.3.2 Direction 29: Human-compatible equilibria
This research direction is concerned with developing a more realistic under-
standing of game-theoretic equilibria and population equilibria where some
of the agents involved are humans, and where the human agents are guar-
anteed not to be destroyed or replaced by the dynamics of the interaction.
Social analogue. The following scenario describes a disequilibrium. Sup-
pose Alice runs a small business, and to attract more clients, she opens a
small blogs for sharing news and insights relevant to her work.
She soon learns that many other business owners in her industry are
outsourcing their blog-writing to advertising companies that specialize in
search engine (ranking) optimization (SEO). SEO companies make a sys-
tematic study of search engines like Google, and learn how to optimize
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webpage content to rank more highly in search engine results (Beel et al.,
2009). So, Alice contacts an SEO firm to begin outsourcing some of her
blog design. At first she only outsources decisions regarding the layout of
the blog. However, when she falls unacceptably behind her competitors in
Google’s search rankings, she decides to outsource her choice of headlines
to the SEO firm as well. Eventually, Alice entirely replaces herself in her
role as a blog writer, with an SEO firm writing entire blog posts on her
behalf, by imitating the style and content of posts from more successful
companies. In this story, Alice was not at equilibrium with Google in her
role as a blog-writer, and was eventually replaced by the SEO firm.
Scenario-driven motivation. There are a number of reasons why there
might be no human-compatible program equilibrium in a given game:
• (speed) The human may simply be too slow relative to a software
system that would replace them.
• (decision quality) The human might make worse decisions than a
software counterpart.
• (transparency / verifiability) A human is not able to make the con-
tents of their mind readable to others in the way a computer can
produce a record of its internal processes. This could lead to less
trust in the human relative to trust that could be placed in an AI
system, and therefore weaker performance from the human in games
that require trust.
Any of these issues could lead to Type 2b risks (economic displacement
of humans), and further to Type 2c risk (human enfeeblement). Therefore,
a need exists to identify “human-compatible equilibria”: economic and social
roles wherein there would be little or no incentive to replace a human being
with an AI system. A simple and trivial example would be a game where
the counterparty checks “Are you human?” and grants you a reward if and
only if you pass the check. Is this the only sort of game where a human,
practically speaking, would be irreplaceable?
Actionability. To begin thinking about this dynamic in a simple case,
consider a two-player game wherein each player designs and submits a com-
puter program, after which the programs interact in some way that yields
a pair of payoffs for the players. The programs submitted are said to be in
a program equilibrium (Tennenholtz, 2004) if each player has no incentive,
from her own perspective, to replace her program with a new version upon
seeing the opponent’s program. This concept is importantly different from
the concept of a Nash equilibrium: whereas Nash disequilibrium involves an
incentive to change strategies, program disequilibrium involves an incentive
to replace an agent in its entirety.
Using this framework, one can meaningfully ask whether a human being
H and an AI system Q are in a program equilibrium, by modeling the
human’s decision-making process as a probabilistic program P , along the
lines described by Stuhlmüller (2015) or Griffiths et al. (2015). Informally,
then, one might define a human-compatible equilibrium for a given game as
a triple (H,P,Q), where (P,Q) constitute a program equilibrium, and P
played against Q is an excellent predictor of H played against Q. In such
a case, one would have some assurance of a stable relationship between H
and Q. The level of assurance would of course depend on our willingness
(and Q’s willingness) to rely on P as a theoretical model of H.
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What sorts of programs P could make sense to use here? Or, what
instructions could one offer a human to make the human more likely to
achieve a human-compatible equilibrium with a an AI system? One might
worry that any program P that achieves an equilibrium with Q would have
to be prohibitively different from a human being.
However, it is known that systems with differing goals, but who are
highly transparent to one another (e.g., able to read one another’s source
codes) are capable of cooperative equilibria arising from the ability to sim-
ulate or write proofs about one another’s future actions before they are
taken. This has already been shown possible by Critch (2019) for agents
who use theorem-provers to decide whether to cooperate with one another in
a Prisoner’s Dilemma, using a generalization of Löb’s theorem (Löb, 1955)
to circumvent stack-overflow issues that would otherwise arise from agents
reasoning about one another’s reasoning. As a parallel effort, Chapter 11
of Evans et al. (2017) explores a few scenarios with probabilistic programs
that have the ability to sample simplified instances of one another; however,
a stack overflow occurs if the agents can make unrestricted function calls to
each other. This problem could be circumvented by probabilistic programs
that exploit the structure of Löb’s theorem in their procedure for deciding
whether to cooperate.
Hence, implementing a “stack overflow resistant human-compatible pro-
gram equilibrium” is a natural and actionable next step. Probabilistic pro-
gram models of humans taken from cognitive science could be used as stand-
ins for human agents in early experiments, and perhaps later used by real-
world AI systems to assess the cooperativity of humans around them. This
could serve to ensure that human beings are not excluded from a highly-
collaborative machine economy that might otherwise exclude us because of
the difficulty of mathematically proving our trustworthiness.
Consideration of side effects. Progress toward modeling human-
compatible equilibria might yield progress toward modeling general equi-
libria in games and populations. Such concepts could potentially be mis-
used, accidentally or intentionally, to develop networks or populations of
AI systems that interact very stably with one another, but poorly with
humans, or in a manner incompatibly with human morals or ethics.
This concludes the final research direction examined in this report.
10 Further reading
For further reading on existential risk from artificial intelligence, see:
• Good (1966). Speculations concerning the first ultraintelligent ma-
chine. Advances in computers 6, 31–88.
• Yudkowsky (2008a). Artificial intelligence as a positive and negative
factor in global risk. Global catastrophic risks 1 (303), 184.
• Bostrom (2012). The superintelligent will: Motivation and instru-
mental rationality in advanced artificial agents. Minds and Machines
22(2), 71–85.
For reading on existential risk in general, see:
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• Matheny (2007). Reducing the risk of human extinction. Risk analysis
27(5), 1335–1344.
• Bostrom (2013). Existential risk prevention as a global priority. Global
Policy 4(1) 15–21.
10.1 Related research agendas
Several related technical research agendas having themes in common with
this report are described below, ordered by year. Familiarity with these
related agendas is not a prerequisite to reading this report, but they will
make for valuable follow-up reading because of their varied perspectives on
the risks and benefits of AI technology. As well, since Section 5, 6, 8, and
9 of this report may be viewed as coarsely describing a long-term research
agenda aiming to understand and improve interactions between humans
and AI systems (as described in Section 4), these related agendas can be
compared and contrasted with the implicit long-term agenda present in this
report, as follows.
Aligning Superintelligence with Human Interests (ASHI) (Soares
and Fallenstein, 2014) lays out research directions intended to address three
problems: “How can we create an agent that will reliably pursue the goals
it is given? How can we formally specify beneficial goals? And how can we
ensure that this agent will assist and cooperate with its programmers as
they improve its design, given that mistakes in the initial version are in-
evitable?” ASHI also introduced the concept of “alignment” for AI systems,
a key concept in this report.
Aside from idiosyncratic differences in focus and approach, this report
aims to expand and improve upon the narrative of ASHI in several regards.
• The research directions in ASHI do not directly address alignment or
delegation for AI systems serving multiple stakeholders, and do not
address the modeling of human cognition.
• This report avoids expository dependence on any “superintelligence”
concept (see Section 2.2), such as that developed by Bostrom (2014).
Instead, this report focuses on the minimal properties of an AI system
that could lead to an irreversible loss of control for humanity, namely,
prepotence.
• This report also aims to avoid the appearance of dependency on an
economic “agent” concept, by building fewer arguments that depend
on attributing “agency”, “beliefs”, or “desires” to AI systems in general
(even if these concepts make sense for some systems). Instead, we
categorize AI systems (prepotent AI and MPAI) according to the
impact the systems will have, or could have, upon society.
There is no direct discussion of existential risk in ASHI, although it is
written with concerns similar to this report, specifically, that the deploy-
ment of powerful AI systems could have “an enormous impact upon human-
ity” and “cause catastrophic damage”. It also cites artificial intelligence as
a positive and negative factor in global risk (Yudkowsky, 2008a).
Research Priorities for Robust and Beneficial Artificial Intelli-
gence (RPRBAI) (Russell et al., 2015) lays out a number of research
areas for ensuring that AI remains robust and beneficial to human society.
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Many research directions in this report may be viewed as approaches to
the broader priorities outlined in RPRBAI. For example, and Direction 3
(formal verification for machine learning systems) addresses the RPRBAI
“Verification” heading, and Direction 6 (preference learning) addresses the
“Validity” heading. The section on “Law and Ethics Research” can be viewed
as addressing multistakeholder delegation problems.
There is no direct discussion of existential risk in RPRBAI, although
there is some consideration given to the risks of losing control of AI systems
in the future, which could correspond roughly to the concept of prepotence
explored in this report. By contrast, this report takes a much less balanced
view of the risks and rewards of AI development, and adopts existential
safety as its explicit objective. The distinctiveness of this objective from
provable beneficence has already been elaborated somewhat in Section 2.9.
Concrete Problems in AI Safety (CPAS) (Amodei et al., 2016) ex-
amines open problems arising from the potential for accidents in machine
learning systems. Accidents are defined as “unintended and harmful behav-
ior that may emerge from poor design of real-world AI systems”. CPAS set
forth five practical research areas relating to accident risk, “categorized ac-
cording to whether the problem originates from having the wrong objective
function (avoiding side effects and avoiding reward hacking), an objective
function that is too expensive to evaluate frequently (scalable supervision),
or undesirable behavior during the learning process (safe exploration and
distributional shift).”
There are a few key differences between the research directions of this
report and those covered in CPAS:
• The research directions in CPAS do not directly address alignment or
delegation for AI systems serving multiple stakeholders, and do not
address the modeling of human cognition.
• CPAS seems mostly focussed on mitigating accident risk, whereas
this report also considers the intentional deployment of destructive
AI technologies, as well as hazardous social conditions that might
precipitate risky AI deployments, as key guiding concerns throughout
its research directions.
There is no direct discussion of existential risk in CPAS. While the au-
thors acknowledge “concerns about the longer-term implications of powerful
AI”, they also rightly argue that “one need not invoke these extreme scenar-
ios to productively discuss accidents”. After all, the term “AI safety” should
encompass research on any safety issue arising from the use of AI systems,
whether the application or its impact is small or large in scope.
Alignment for Advanced Machine Learning Systems (AAMLS)
(Taylor et al., 2016) examines eight research areas attempting to address
the question, “As learning systems become increasingly intelligent and au-
tonomous, what design principles can best ensure that their behavior is
aligned with the interests of the operators?” As such, AAMLS is similar in
focus to Section 5 of this report, particularly Direction 6 (preference learn-
ing), and the concept of “alignment” used in AAMLS corresponds roughly
to the concept of “preference alignment” used here.
The research directions in AAMLS do not directly address alignment or
delegation for AI systems serving multiple stakeholders, and do not address
the modeling of human cognition. There is no direct discussion of existential
risk in AAMLS, although Superintelligence (Bostrom, 2014) is cited in its
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introduction, indicating concern for global-scale risks and benefits as a key
motivation.
Scalable Agent Alignment via Reward Modeling: a research di-
rection (SAARM) (Leike et al., 2018) defines the “agent alignment prob-
lem” as asking “how do we create agents that behave in accordance with
the user’s intentions?”. The authors argue that “alignment becomes more
important as ML performance increases, and any solution that fails to scale
together with our agents can only serve as a stopgap”. SAARM proposes re-
ward modelling as a candidate solution to the agent alignment problem, i.e.,
learning a reward function from human feedback and optimizing it using
(e.g. deep) reinforcement learning, which corresponds closely to Direction 6
(preference learning) as described in this report.
There are at least a few important differences to draw between SAARM
and this report:
• The research directions in SAARM do not directly address alignment
or delegation for AI systems serving multiple stakeholders.
• SAARM is situated in the paradigm of reinforcement learning,
whereas this report avoids assumptions about which types of AI
systems could be important sources of existential risks in the future.
• SAARM also highlights the importance of being able to trust the
alignment of AI systems, and discusses methods which could help
build such trust.
The issue of how much a users feel they can trust an AI system is
not addressed directly in this report (although comprehension and
control techniques can be used to legitimately build trust).
There is no discussion of existential or global catastrophic risk in
SAARM.
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